New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

A 16 years old girl was arrested with the others in a raid of a house of prostitution. She was immediately brought to the district attorney’s office and questioned in the presence of the police officers. She stated that she had been forced by a man to enter and remain in the place. The police officer was then ordered by the district attorney to arrest the said man. The arrest however happened a few hours later without a warrant.

Upon the original arrest for the felonies of compulsory prostitution and abduction, an incidental search was made by the police officer. The said search uncovered a revolver from the man. An arrest was immediately made for the unrelated crime of possession of a dangerous weapon, a crime then and there being committed in the presence of the police officer.

The man was then separately indicted for the felonies of compulsory prostitution and abduction, and for the instant crime for possession of a dangerous weapon as a felony.

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A man is charged with the crime of failure to register as a sex offender. He then moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is facially insufficient. He raises two interesting issues with respect to the complex and still relatively new law, namely the proper geographical jurisdiction for a trial for failure to register, and the extent to which the complainant must plead and ultimately prove that a previously convicted sex offender acted intentionally when violating his duty to register.

Subsequently, the court found first that the man may be prosecuted in Bronx County, the county where his original sex crimes was committed and where he still lives, even though the sex offender monitoring unit where the man failed to register as a sex offender was located in New York County.

Based on records, the Bronx County has the geographical jurisdiction over the man’s case because the man’s failure to register affects the Bronx County, in that the police and the community in the county will not receive appropriate sex offender act notifications about the man. However, in order to proceed with the case in the county, it will be the complainant’s burden at trial to prove that the man either intended or knew that his failure to register would affect Bronx.

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A 54 years old woman has a long history of drug abuse and a lengthy criminal history, consisting primarily of drug-related offenses.

During the woman’s younger age, she dropped out of school in the seventh or eighth grade because she was having problems at home, and began using speed and heroin. Following a stay in a rehabilitation facility, she was able to stop using drugs for a period of about nine years. However, after both of her parents became seriously ill and passed away, she began misusing the valium pills which had been prescribed to her for depression and insomnia.

Subsequently, she was arrested with her boyfriend on charges of assault, burglary, and robbery. The victim of the offense was the woman’s former boyfriend. Two days after her arrest, she was arraigned and released on her own recognizance. She and her boyfriend were subsequently charged with 12-count indictment, with multiple offenses including assault in the second degree.

This proceeding is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered 10 February 1977, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree (three counts) and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

The court reverses the judgment, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and a new trial is ordered, except as to defendant’s conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, which conviction is reversed, on the law, and the said indictment is dismissed.

The defendant was indicted for selling cocaine to an undercover police officer on four occasions in 1974. His defense was based on agency and entrapment.

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In this Criminal action, defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of suppression of identification testimony.

A Queens County Rape lawyer said that on the day after the Supreme Court denied suppression of identification testimony, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to rape in the first degree in exchange for a promised determinate sentence of nine years of imprisonment. During the course of the ensuing plea allocution, the Supreme Court advised the defendant of the terms of its sentencing commitment, and briefly explained that he would be waiving his right to appeal.

Although the defendant was asked directly by the Supreme Court whether he understood the nature of the waiver of the right to appeal, the defendant instead responded by asking the Supreme Court a question about the mandatory fees that would be imposed upon him as a result of his conviction. The defendant did not acknowledge in any manner that he understood the nature of the waiver. After both the Supreme Court and defense counsel attempted to clarify the fee issue, the Supreme Court asked the defendant whether he understood the explanation, and he replied “yes.”

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The defendants were indicted for the sex crimes of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sex abuse in the first degree and assault in the second degree. Although the alleged sex crimes occurred on April 4, 1975, the trial did not commence until October 21, 1975. The trial court determined that the provisions of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) were applicable to the trial of this case.

Evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admissible in a prosecution for an offense or an attempt to commit an offense defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law. Pursuant to CPL, the defendants made an offer of proof concerning the complaint’s prior sexual conduct. After a hearing and a review of the various exhibits submitted by defendants, the trial court ruled that subdivisions 1 through 4 were not applicable and that the evidence offered was not relevant and admissible in the interests of justice under subdivision 5. Evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual conduct was therefore barred at the trial.

The defendants contend that application of CPL violated the United States Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature from passing an ex post facto law. The Supreme Court held that it is well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. Although CPL restricts, to some extent, a defendant’s ability to attack the credibility of a complaining witness, the statute is not an impermissible ex post facto law. The limitation does not deprive the accused of a defense and certainly does not involve as substantive a right. Furthermore, if the limitation were to raise substantial ex post facto concerns in any particular case, such problems would be obviated by subdivision 5 thereof, which permits the admission of evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual abuse conduct where the interests of justice would thus be served.

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A Nassau Sex Crime Lawyer said that, by way of habeas corpus, in an unusually literate Pro se application, the criminal defendant attacks his detention, pending trial, in the Nassau County Jail. The papers give a broad overview of, and an insight into, conditions in the Nassau County Jail, the way it is conducted and the life of both prisoners and those being held for trial because of an inability to post bail.

A Nassau Rape Lawyer said that, the defendant-petitioner (hereinafter, defendant) was arraigned on December 27, 1973, on an indictment which charged him with kidnapping in the second degree, rape in the first degree and robbery in the first degree. On another indictment he is charged with an attempt to commit the crime of murder, kidnapping in the second degree, rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and other crimes. According to the People, he has spent approximately 22 out of his last 25 years incarcerated in various institutions.

A Nassau Rape Lawyer said that, the heart of Petitioner’s argument is the indistinguishable experience in confinement of convicted and detained persons here in the Nassau Co. Jail. The latter is as much imprisoned in a ‘correctional facility’ as is the former. The confinement experiences of both are more than parallel; they are indistinguishable. The entire spectrum of Do’s and don’ts, of privileges and restrictions imposed upon the convict is equally imposed upon the detained. The two eat the same food, use the same library and canteen, wear the same ‘prison blues’, and are alike called ‘prisoner’ and/or ‘inmate’. They live in the same cells, write home on the same jail letterhead; know the same mail censorship and the same rule as to what kind of paper to write on and how many pages to write, as well as what they are permitted and not permitted to write about. Theirs are identical existences. They know the same liabilities and punishments for infractions (‘Hole’), the same denial of newspapers; they visit with their families through the same 10 7 double pane of plastic glass, forbidden and denied to touch and embrace. They know the same TV time schedule, are attended by the same physicians, retire and arise at the same time, are counted by the same correctional officers, advised and represented by the same ‘Inmate Council’, managed under the same security system operating out of the same centralized control center. The same educational classes are available to both, the same religious services. The lives of both are oversee red by the same official attitudes. If the convicted and detained are different, sired by distinctive legal categories, framed in different legal concepts, then these differences exist only on paper, and not in fact.’

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A Queens Sex Crimes Lawyer said that, defendant is a convicted sex crime offender pursuant to Correction Law § 168-a having pled guilty on April 6, 1994, to one count of Attempted Rape in the First Degree, a lesser-included crime of Count I of the Indictment charging Rape in the First Degree under Penal Law § 130.35(3), commonly known as “statutory” rape. All other charges in the Indictment (one count of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree under PL § 130.65(3) and 2 counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Minor) are also based upon the age of the victim. There are no allegations of forcible compulsion per se. Defendant has challenged his proposed “moderate” risk level designation under the sex Offender Registration Act as not consistent with the facts of his case and his due process rights.

Defendant was arrested on March 5, 1993, and charged with Rape in the First Degree under Penal Law § 130.35(3), Sex Abuse in the First Degree, and Endangering the Welfare of a Child based upon the complaint of ten-year old victim who stated Defendant had removed her clothing, spread her legs, and placed his penis inside her vagina. He later gave her five dollars to keep secret what had happened. The Sex Abuse charge was dismissed upon a technical error in the Grand Jury presentation. Defendant was also charged in the same indictment with endangering the welfare of the child, age 15, who was photographed by Defendant, both with her consent and surreptitiously, in her underwear following her refusal of Defendant’s requests for “sexual contact.” There was no admission to this accusation although the minutes of Grand Jury testimony and one of the photographs submitted by the District Attorney do provide the necessary clear and convincing evidence that such incident took place.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant pled guilty before now-retired Justice to Attempted Rape in the First Degree with respect to the allegations concerning the victim. The then-58-year-old Defendant, a live-in friend of the victim’s grandmother with whom both the victims also resided, admitted he had “had sex” with the victim and knew she was “under eleven.” On April 18, 1994, Defendant was sentenced to one and a half to four and a half years incarceration. Defendant was released from prison on March 1, 1996. On May 12, 1997, Defendant appeared in response to notice and was appointed counsel. Challenging his recommended assessment at risk level 2, pursuant to Correction Law § 168-n(3), on August 25, 1997, Defendant requested a hearing. A full hearing was held on December 17, 1997.

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