The phrase “good cause” under the venue provision at issue here lists three non-exclusive examples of issues which can be considered in making a venue change determination under the statute. They are the convenience of the parties, the convenience of witnesses and the condition of the respondent. With respect to the convenience of witnesses factor, the Court finds that the State has not made the evidentiary showing which is required by law for the Court to make a determination that this factor weighs in favor of granting the State’s motion.
As noted above, the “convenience of witnesses” ground for a change of venue under Article 10 is strikingly similar to one of the grounds for a change of venue under the C.P.L.R (§510[3]), which provides that the “convenience of material witnesses” and “the ends of justice” may provide a basis to change venue under the C.P.L.R. In these motions, both the State and the Respondents cite to cases decided under the general C.P.L.R. venue provision to argue that this factor weighs in favor of granting or denying the instant motion.
Under C.P.L.R. §510(3), it is well settled that “a change of venue based on the convenience of witnesses may only be granted after there has been a detailed evidentiary showing that the convenience of nonparty witnesses would in fact be served by the granting of such relief”. Four criteria should generally be met by the moving party in such motions. First, the affidavit in support of the motion must provide the names, addresses and occupations of the witnesses. Second, the moving party must disclose the facts the witnesses will testify to, so the trial court can determine whether the testimony would be necessary or material. Third, the movant must show that the witnesses are in fact willing to testify. Finally, there must be a showing as to how the witnesses would in fact be inconvenienced if venue were not changed.
The State in these motions cites cases decided under C.P.L.R. §510(3) to argue that venue should be changed in these Article 10 cases, inter alia, because of the convenience of potential government employee witnesses. The State simultaneously argues, however, that the evidentiary standards which were met by the movants in these cited cases and must be met by movants in all venue change motions under C.P.L.R. §510(3) should not be applicable in these Article 10 proceedings.
It is undisputed that in these motions, the State has not satisfied any of the evidentiary showings which would be required under the C.P.L.R. They have not identified the name of a single specific witness who would be inconvenienced if venue were not changed in these cases. They have not provided any specific information as to what any of these prospective witnesses would testify to if called at trial. With one exception they have not indicated that they have contacted any witnesses to ascertain their current locations or availability. They have not specifically indicated how any potential witnesses would be inconvenienced if required to testify in these proceedings.
Rather, the State generally asserts that categories of witnesses, for example, police officers, correctional personnel, doctors or crime victims, whom the state believes or speculates are in far flung locations and stand ready and able to provide relevant and admissible testimony would likely be significantly inconvenienced if these proceedings were not transferred to new venues. The State makes the logical argument that the location where the crimes were committed in these cases, even decades after some of these crimes were committed, may continue to house witnesses who will present relevant testimony. They further argue that although the standard for transferring venue in an Article 10 case by virtue of witness convenience essentially mimics the standard provided under the C.P.L.R., the C.P.L.R. standard should not be applicable in these cases. Rather, they argue that the kind of summary assertions they have put forward here should be sufficient for the court to find that the convenience of witnesses would be facilitated by a venue transfer.
C.P.L.R. §101 provides that the C.P.L.R.’s provisions “shall govern the procedure in civil judicial proceedings in all courts of the state and before all judges, except where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute.” Given that Article 10 contains its own detailed venue provisions, in the view of this Court, it is clear that venue change determinations under Article 10 are governed by Article 10, rather than the C.P.L.R.’s general change of venue provisions. It is also clear in this Court’s view, however, that the well-established requirements for moving venue based on witness convenience applicable under the C.P.L.R. are also applicable under Article 10.It is well-settled under New York law that “words having a precise and well-settled legal meaning in the jurisprudence of the state are to be understood in such sense when used in statutes, unless a different meaning is plainly indicated.”
Here, there is no indication on the face of the Article 10 statute or its legislative history that the legislature, in enacting Article 10, intended to abrogate the well-settled evidentiary requirements applicable to change of venue motions based on witness convenience. Indeed, as noted supra, the legislature used virtually the same phrase to describe this consideration in Article 10 as the phrase contained in the C.P.L.R. At the time Article 10 was enacted, the evidentiary requirements for venue change motions based on witness convenience under the C.P.L.R. had been well-settled for more than a decade. It should be assumed that “in drafting the statute, the Legislature understood and adopted that well-settled meaning”.
In the view of this Court, the State is essentially asking that the Article 10 statute be construed to allow for the State (or perhaps the Respondents as well) to use M.H.L. §10.08(e) to move venue to the location where an offender’s crime was committed in any case, since the same arguments the State is making here would apply in any Article 10 proceeding. This is precisely the issue which the legislature considered and resolved in M.H.L. §§10.06(a) & (b), however. To construe the statute as the State urges, in the view of this Court, would make the careful procedural scheme contained in M.H.L. §§10.06(a) & (b) a nullity, since a party could always make the same showing the State has made in the instant motions at any time and have venue transferred to the location where an offender’s crime had been committed in any case.
The venue provision at issue in these motions, in the view of this Court, is of a wholly different character than the provision discussed immediately supra. M.H.L. §10.08(e), at issue here, in the view of this Court, contemplates a venue change not because it is better policy to conduct trials in the locations where an offender’s crimes were committed, but on the basis of facts particular to an individual case. That is, having resolved the policy issues which inherently form the basis for the State’s motions here in Article 10’s initial venue setting provisions, the legislature went on to provide a catch-all additional venue shifting provision to address any cases in which a particularized showing of good cause had been made.
In the view of this Court, the State has not made the particularized demonstration of good cause required by the statute in these motions and indeed, as outlined supra, a number of countervailing considerations exist which argue that venue should not be changed in these cases. Whatever the merits of the policy arguments inherent in allowing the State or respondents to move venue to the location where an offender’s crime had been committed may be, the statute, in this Court’s view, simply does contemplate that those arguments, standing alone, constitute “good cause” to change venue.
Accordingly, the court held that the state’s motions in these cases, as noted above, are therefore denied.