Nassau

Published on: September 25, 2012

Court Hears Bank Fraud Case

by Stephen Bilkis

The savings bank filed a motion for summary judgment in its action against the mortgage corporation and the guarantors for breaches of loan agreement and guaranty agreement, respectively, by the latter and for their charges against another defendant for the commission of bank fraud.

The plaintiff entered into a contract of loan at New Jersey with the mortgage banker wherein the savings bank extended a line of credit to the defendant for the purpose of closing the latter’s existing mortgage loans. In connection with the loan agreement, the officers, who are the owners of the mortgage corporation, executed individual guaranty contract which established their solidary liability of the mortgage banker’s obligation upon its failure to settle the obligations on time. Another guaranty was executed by the owner’s wife in relation with the loan agreement.

The stipulations of the loan agreement pertain to the grant of mortgage loans of the defendants’ borrowers where the line of credit shall be used to finance the mortgage contracts. Upon settlement of the mortgage loans by the borrowers, the proceeds of the loan would then be remitted to the savings bank and mortgage notes would be used as security in favor of the savings bank as part of their agreement. A Long Island Criminal Lawyer said much mortgages would then be sold to potential investors and the plaintiff, as bailee, shall give the investors the mortgage notes where they shall pay the purchase price directly to the savings bank’s mortgage warehouse lenders who in turn would give the proceeds back to the savings bank as payment to the advances made by the defendants in their line of credit with the plaintiff. The defendants were responsible to the keeping of all the records pertaining to the loan agreement.

Published on: September 23, 2012

Court Decides Conspiracy Charges

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, a shoplifter had been apprehended and brought to the office of Carl G., a 22-year old office manager of a food store, and after some discussion G agreed to ‘forget’ the whole incident upon payment to him of $500. A New York Criminal Lawyer said upon reflection, the shoplifter disavowed the scheme and reported it to the District Attorney, who arranged for payment of the money to G.

When the money was paid G was arrested for extortion. Although G had retained counsel he inquired of defendant S, a security officer in his store, if he knew anyone who could help him. The next day S informed G that defendant B, an ex-state senator, had great influence and could perhaps have the charge dropped but it might involve paying off some people. He arranged for G to meet B. At this meeting attended by all three, B and G had a discussion in which S did not participate.

G was advised to discharge his attorneys; B ‘guaranteed’ he could produce a satisfactory result because of his influence with certain public officials and agreed to make an inquiry to determine how much of a pay-off might be required. At that meeting G intended to go along with B suggestion to turn over money to resolve or drop the pending charges. Before the scheduled second meeting, G upon reflection concluded that B was a name dropper who couldn’t do anything for him and advised S he had reconsidered B proposition, decided to decline his help and withdrew from any arrangement. S did not attempt to induce G continued participation in the scheme. Thereafter G revealed all these events to his attorneys, who advised the District Attorney, and G agreed to co-operate with him in an investigation of the defendants. By pre-arrangement with the District Attorney, G office was equipped with a hidden microphone and S was called to his office. G asked him whether B would ‘take him back on’. S indicated that B had become very displeased B for backing out of the original deal because he had done 3 or 4 days of research on his case. He did however arrange for another meeting. The record shows no other meeting between G and S, only the one meeting at which all three were present, and no other meeting between S and B. G, on the other hand, conferred with B on two more occasions, during both of which he was equipped with a concealed transmitter tuned to a receiver in the District Attorney’s car. At the second meeting Bauer advised Gmerek that he had discussed the extortion charge with the District Attorney and certain other people (when in fact the record reveals he had never done so); that the charges could be favorably disposed of for $3,000 but he would try for $2,000, and he requested Gmerek to bring that sum in cash at their next meeting. Gmerek was furnished the money in marked bills by the District Attorney, and after it was given to Bauer the latter was arrested.

Published on: September 19, 2012

Defendant Moves to Suppress Physical Evidence

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered October 21, 1993, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), robbery in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of the branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials.

The issue in this case is whether the defendant is entitled to the suppression of his statements made to the law enforcement officials.

In this possession of a weapon case, the Court said that, the People established that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant. Probable cause may be supplied, in whole or in part, through hearsay information. Under the Aguilar- Spinelli rule, when probable cause is predicated in whole or in part upon the hearsay statement of an informant, it must be demonstrated that (1) the informant disclosed a sufficient basis for his or her knowledge, and (2) the informant was reliable. Further, the basis-of-knowledge and veracity requirements of Aguilar- Spinelli are analytically independent and each must be satisfied separately. “Information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest.

Published on: September 16, 2012

Court Looks at Parole Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

Petitioner was convicted in the Supreme Court, New York County, of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree and was sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 15 to 25 years. On January 10, 1973 petitioner was paroled with a maximum expiration date of March 15, 1989. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, while in Puerto Rico with permission of his parole officer, petitioner was arrested on an indictment returned by a Federal Grand Jury in the Southern District of New York, charging violation of Federal drug laws.

In early January, 1976 petitioner was extradited to New York and incarcerated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan. Petitioner’s parole officer visited him in Federal custody and questioned him about his arrest but did not serve him with parole violation charges. On March 20, 1976 petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to violate Federal narcotics laws. Thereafter, the Board of Parole declared petitioner delinquent and issued a parole violation warrant against him. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 7 1/2 years imprisonment on the Federal conviction.

On May 5, 1976 petitioner was transferred from the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City to the Federal Correctional Facility in Atlanta, Georgia. New York officials attempted to lodge the parole violation warrant at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. In light of the fact that petitioner had been transferred to Atlanta on the previous day the warrant was forwarded to that facility where it was eventually lodged against petitioner.

Published on: September 12, 2012

Court Decides Jurisdiction in Drug Crime Case

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, the location of the premises where the alleged drug crime transactions took place is 151 West 228th Street. At the Grand Jury presentation the Assistant District Attorney elicited testimony from the undercover police officers who participated in the sales of drugs and in the arrests of the defendants. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the officers were members of the Bronx Drug Homicide Task Force and the Bronx Narcotic Major Case Unit. They were conducting a long term buy operation at this location and drug purchases were made there on October 18, 1994, October 21, 1994, November 3, 1994, November 4, 1994, and December 3, 1994. Arrest warrants were executed on December 8, 1994.

After the indictment was voted and before motions were made, it came to the attention of some of the defense attorneys that the premises were not in the Bronx but rather in Manhattan. This information was given to the attorney during another proceeding.

Counsel argues strenuously that unless the People prove proper venue before the Grand Jury, the Bronx Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to try this case and the indictment must be dismissed.

Published on: September 1, 2012

Court Rules on Discusses Exclusionary Rule

by Stephen Bilkis

The laws of arrest in the United States are well defined. The laws that provide a police officer with the ability to stop a car or a person to determine if they are involved in a crime are also well defined. However, in both cases, case law continues to define the limitations that exist when a police officer has contact with a citizen. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that as the laws stand right now, the landmark case of Terry v Ohio, 1968 still remain the predicate for a stop of a person by a police officer. This case also defines the limitations placed on the officer for patting down the outer garments of the stopped person to determine if that person is carrying a concealed weapon on their person.

One case, involved a detective who saw three men casing a drug store. The officer observed that the men were wearing bulky overcoats even though it was a hot day. The fact that the men were dressed in a manner that was incongruous of the weather conditions, made the officer pause to observe them further. While he watched, he saw that one at a time, the men would each walk up to the window in front of the store and look inside. That person would then return to the group and a discussion would take place. The officer determined that the men were probably concealing weapons under the large coats and that they were casing the store in an effort to determine the optimum opportunity to rob it. He approached the group and began to ask them questions. He was concerned that they were armed, so he ordered them to place their hands on the wall, and he patted down their outer garments. During the course of patting down the outer garments, the officer located a handgun in the pocket of the defendant’s coat (possession of a weapon). He and the others were placed under arrest. The defendant’s attorney claimed that the men were not breaking any laws at the time that the police officer approached them. He maintained that the officer had no right to stop the defendant or to search him. He appealed the conviction of the defendant to the Supreme Court on Constitutional grounds that the police officer had violated the defendant’s Constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment protections against illegal search and seizure.

The court disagreed. The Supreme Court ruled that it would not be reasonable to prevent an officer from patting down the outer garments of a person who he believed was concealing a firearm and could create a substantial risk to the officer or surrounding people. They determined that the officer had not violated the defendant’s rights because the search was not intrusive until the officer felt an object inside the defendant’s coat that the officer recognized to be the same size, weight, and shape of a handgun. The limitations on a stop under defendant, is that the officer must have articulable reasonable suspicion to stop the subject.

Published on: August 29, 2012

Defendants Contend Court Lacks Jurisdiction

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts:

Stemming from a grand larceny case where defendants were convicted, at an Extraordinary Special and Trial Term of the Supreme Court, of conspiracy in the fourth degree, hindering prosecution in the third degree and official misconduct, the Appellate Division, on appeal, found that the evidence was legally insufficient, unanimously reversed, expressly stating it did so on the law and the facts, and dismissed the indictment.

The people now appeal from the said judgment.

Published on: August 24, 2012

Defendant Charged with Illegal Salary Payments

by Stephen Bilkis

During the 89th Congress, a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration conducted an investigation into the expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor, of which petitioner was chairman. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the Special Subcommittee issued a report concluding that the defendant and certain staff employees had deceived the House authorities as to travel expenses. The report also indicated there was strong evidence that certain illegal salary payments (white collar crime) had been made to defendant’s wife at his direction. No formal action or criminal charges was taken during the 89th Congress. However, prior to the organization of the 90th Congress, the Democratic members-elect met in caucus and voted to remove the defendant as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor.

When the 90th Congress met to organize in January 1967, the defendant was asked to step aside while the oath was administered to the other members-elect. Following the administration of the oath to the remaining members, the House discussed the procedure to be followed in determining whether the defendant was eligible to take his seat. After some debate, by a vote of 363 to 65 the House adopted House Resolution No. 1, which provided that the Speaker appoint a Select Committee to determine Powell’s eligibility. Although the resolution prohibited Powell from taking his seat until the House acted on the Select Committee’s report, it did provide that he should receive all the pay and allowances due a member during the period.

The Select Committee, composed of nine lawyer-members, issued an invitation to defendant to testify before the Committee. The invitation letter stated that the scope of the testimony and investigation would include defendant’s qualifications as to age, citizenship, and residency; his involvement in a civil suit, and matters of alleged official misconduct.

Published on: August 22, 2012

Defendant Contends Violations of Search and Seizure Law

by Stephen Bilkis

Seldom has this Court considered a more spectacular or bizarre case than this habeas corpus petition of an experienced Texas criminal lawyer, former mayor of the City of Pasadena, Texas, who was found guilty in Texas State Court of being the mastermind and accomplice in an especially brutal and horrible assault and robbery, but who contends that he was invalidly convicted in violation of federal constitutional rights.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the is presently serving a sixty-year sentence imposed by the Criminal District Court of Harris County, Texas. A jury found him guilty in a separate trial as an accomplice to the crime of robbery by firearms, committed by three principals. The defendant has appealed from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.

On appeal Hoover has asserted two claims of error to the denial below of his habeas corpus petition based on federal constitutional grounds. First, he contends that the Court erred in refusing to sustain alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The State Trial Court admitted into evidence two diamonds seized from the defendant’s home during a nighttime search conducted by the Houston Police Department. Defendant argues that the search was made without his voluntary consent, by police officers acting under color of a search warrant which was invalid. Secondly, the defendant asserts that his right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was infringed when the State Trial Court admitted into evidence the oral confession of alleged principal and co-indictee. A Nassau County Criminal Lawyer said the confession, which also implicated the defendant as an accomplice, was admitted during the testimony of the police officer to whom the defendant confessed, pursuant to a well-established Texas exception to the hearsay rule which allows the confession of a principal to be admitted at the trial of an accomplice to prove the principal’s guilt, proof of such guilt being a necessary prerequisite to conviction of an accomplice to the offense.

Published on: August 12, 2012

Court Hears Drug Fraud Case

by Stephen Bilkis

The respondent and defendant in this case is J. Milford Kirkup Jr. The People of the State of New York are the appellants in the case. The Court of Appeals in the state of New York is hearing this case. There were two indictments filed against the defendant, Kirkup, in the Extraordinary Special and the Trial Terms of the Supreme Court of Suffolk County. Indictment 7256 charged the defendant with committing the crime of conspiracy. Indictment 7258 charges the defendant of violating section 1864 of the Penal Law.

Case Background

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the People of the State of New York submitted evidence to the Grand Jury that showed that Albert Freistadt, who is a pharmacist that operates a small retail drug store in Suffolk County along with his successors in interest had ordered drugs from pharmaceutical houses solely for the use of the Suffolk County Home, but in actuality for selling to the public.