Suffolk County

Published on: October 24, 2012

Court Discusses Possession with Intent to Distribute Charges

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant’s convictions arose from a series of drug transactions which began when a certain person contacted another person and informed the latter that he had heroin for sale. The former was unaware that the latter was a confidential informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). A New York Criminal Lawyer said the parties and co-defendant agreed that the former would sell the informant 25 ounces of heroin for $6,000 per ounce. While the co-defendant was in Mexico he ran into the defendant who offered to drive him to Texas. He agreed and the two men drove to the border. As they approached the border the co-defendant told the defendant that he wished to walk across the border and would meet the defendant on the United States side. The defendant drove the vehicle across the border while co-defendant walked across carrying the one gram sample of heroin.

A Houston Heroin Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant and his co-defendant drove to the informant’s apartment where they met the informant and an Agent outside the apartment. The defendant and the Agent remained outside in their respective vehicles while co-defendant and the informant went inside. When the two men left the apartment the Agent saw co-defendant hand informant a piece of paper later found to contain .12 grams of heroin (drug possession). The informant gave the paper to the Agent. Co-defendant, the informant and the Agent then discussed the purchase of a test ounce and the full 25 ounce shipment. The defendant drove the co-defendant to another apartment where he met with the certain John doe while the defendant remained outside in the vehicle.

Later that evening co-defendant and the informant took one ounce of heroin to the Agent’s motel room and sold it to him for $5,000 cash. Co-defendant returned to Mexico where he processed the remaining ounces of heroin. The defendant came into the apartment while this processing was being done. The next morning co-defendant secreted heroin in the stereo speaker of his vehicle. After doing so he asked the defendant for help in replacing the screws. The two men then drove to the informant’s apartment in the United States. While en route into town co-defendant advised the defendant that what he was doing was not honest and that he should not get involved in similar “deals”. When co-defendant and the defendant arrived at the informant’s apartment the defendant carried the heroin into the apartment. Later the three men left for the Agent’s motel with the defendant driving. Co-defendant, believing they were being followed, directed the defendant to return to the informant’s apartment. Co-defendant and the informant then drove to the Agent’s motel to deliver the heroin and the defendant left. Co-defendant was arrested as he delivered the heroin to the Agent. Defendant was arrested near Hidalgo, Texas.

Published on: October 18, 2012

Defendant Says Court Failed to Instruct the Jury Properly

by Stephen Bilkis

Appellant was charged with and convicted of robbery of property having a value of less than $100. He raises four points on appeal, one of which requires discussion and reversal. A Palm Beach Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, although the evidence presented at trial would have supported a conviction of petit larceny, appellant’s request for a jury instruction on that crime was denied. In a 1979 case, the Court held that larceny is necessarily included in the crime of robbery and that it is legally impossible to prove robbery without proving larceny.

The issue in this case is whether appellant is entitled to the reversal of his conviction for robbery.

The Court held that the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.510 expressly requires the trial court to charge the jury on any offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. Appellee concedes it was an error not to do so, but argues the error was harmless. The Supreme Court held that it is reversible error per se not to instruct on the next immediate lesser included offense, while it may be harmless error not to instruct on an offense two steps removed from the offense charged. In reference to the charge sub judice “the determination of whether the refusal to instruct on larceny was reversible error would depend upon an application of the case to the facts of what transpired in the trial court.” Here, a New York Criminal Lawyer said there was neither charge nor evidence of property having a value of $100 or more. Consequently, petit larceny was the next immediate lesser included offense and the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct on said crime.

Published on: October 16, 2012

Court Reverses Grand Larceny Charges

by Stephen Bilkis

An owner of a truck appeals for the convictions of grand larceny of a truck, petit larceny of its contents, and trespass on property.

It was started when a man took possession of the truck and began making monthly installment payments after agreeing to purchase it from a long-time friend. But before the full purchase price of two thousand dollars had been paid, the owner of the truck lent the man another sum of money. Eventually, because that sum had not been repaid, the owner of the truck took the truck, asserting in effect a security interest in the truck and a right to repossess it, even though the originally agreed-upon installment payments had by then been made.

The man assumed what had happened and he did not report the truck as stolen for seventeen days. A New York Criminal Lawyer said he merely thought that his friend had repossessed the truck because of his outstanding debt. Consequently, the deputy sheriff testified about his conversation with the owner of the truck. The sheriff further testified that the owner told him that he will not give back the truck to the man until he pays backs what the man owes.

Published on: October 8, 2012

Defendant Contends Confession was Coerced

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, a New York Lawyer said the defendant was arrested by a Police Officer at 144th Street in Manhattan and charged with possession of a 9mm firearm. While en route to the 32nd Precinct, he initiated a conversation with the Police Officer in which he asked him to let him go and stated that he would help him by bringing in additional guns. They arrived at the precinct at approximately 7:50 p.m. and while the Police Officer elicited pedigree information, the defendant continued to talk about bringing in additional guns. The defendant, who was “kind of fidgety”, talked continuously and was “over-excited”, told the Police officer that he “used” heroin. At 9:05 p.m. A detective read Miranda warnings to the defendant. The defendant indicated that he understood his rights and wished to answer questions. Thereafter, the Police Officer and the Detective spoke with the defendant intermittently. During this period the defendant also was questioned by homicide detectives from the 32nd Precinct. Thereafter, the defendant gave a detailed oral statement to the detective in whom he explained where and from whom he had purchased the 9mm weapon and said that he had purchased cocaine from the same location. At approximately midnight, the defendant made two telephone calls: one to his wife and the other to an unidentified male. He told the man that he had been arrested, that he was “working with some good police officers” and that the man should gather the guns and gave them to the defendant’s wife. The Police Officer told the defendant that he would tell the District Attorney’s Office that the defendant was cooperating. At approximately 2:00 a.m. the defendant’s wife arrived at the precinct and the defendant, in the Police Officer’s presence, instructed her to get the guns. At about 4:00 a.m. she returned to the precinct with a Cobray Mac 11 gun, a .380 caliber pistol and matching ammunition.

The defendant was then transported from the 32nd Precinct to Manhattan Central Booking for arraignment. He complained of being ill and asked to see a doctor. Central Booking, therefore, would not accept him and he was returned to the 32nd Precinct. The Police Officer filed a felony complaint on the arrest with the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office. The Warrant Officer again transported the defendant to Manhattan Central Booking. At 10:15 a.m. the Warrant Officer received a call from the Police Officer asking that he return the defendant to the 32nd Precinct and the former did so.

At 11:45 a.m. another Detective in the Brooklyn South Homicide Task Force learned from the Police Officer that the defendant, a suspect in the December 20th shooting was being returned to the 32nd Precinct. Defendant was questioned by narcotics detectives from Manhattan South. The detective questioned the defendant, asking him about a gun trafficker in Brooklyn. Twenty minutes into their conversation, he told the defendant that he and a Sergeant were from Brooklyn and “that they knew that he had done a shooting in the apartment on Parkside Avenue.” The defendant shook his head “No” and the detective repeated that they knew he had done it and wanted to hear his version of what had happened. The defendant stated: “He tried to f* * * my wife. My wife called me and I went over there.” The detective then showed the defendant the Miranda waiver, signed the previous evening, and “reminded him that he had waived his rights, signed the Miranda form and agreed to make a statement.” The detective then re-administered Miranda warnings and the defendant once again indicated that he understood. During the next hour the defendant made statements concerning the shooting. The defendant, also, told the detective that he was a heroin user.

Published on: September 27, 2012

Court Hears Heroin Possession Case

by Stephen Bilkis

A Georgia Intent to Distribute Lawyer said that, the defendant appeals his conviction after trial to a jury for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846, and to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1). This court recently affirmed an earlier conviction of defendant for conspiracy to possess and to distribute heroin. On the present appeal a New York Criminal Lawyer said that defendant contends that the government arbitrarily has carved a single conspiracy to deal in narcotics into separate heroin and cocaine conspiracies in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.

A Georgia Heroin Lawyer said that, the government’s proof in the heroin conspiracy trial established that defendants arranged sales of heroin for their cocaine customer a Detective, who unknown to them was an undercover DEA Agent. Co-defendant, who pled guilty, and the Detective testified against defendant in both trials. The government presented to the jury portions of defendant’s own testimony from the heroin conspiracy trial in the trial on the cocaine conspiracy charge. During July 1976, conspiratorial negotiations involving cocaine and heroin possession went on simultaneously. The major events proven in defendant’s trial on the heroin conspiracy charge which we discussed in our earlier opinion affirming that conviction, were also central to the government’s proof against defendant’s in the trial on the cocaine conspiracy charge.

The issue in this case is whether defendant’s claim for double jeopardy should be granted.

Published on: September 20, 2012

Court Finds Citation Should be Dimissed for Lack of Service

by Stephen Bilkis

Probate laws are specific about timed deadlines. In New York, Surrogate’s Court Act §59(2) provides that timely service of a probate citation to appear or produce documents must be served in a certain period of time. The time that is allowed for a document to be produced once a person has been served with the citation depends on the location of the service. The time that is detailed takes into consideration the fact that the person who is served must also make arrangements to appear in court. Therefore, a New York Criminal Lawyer said the service time allotment for a citation for probate court depends on whether the counties are touching. If the counties touch on any side, then the person who is receiving the citation is given seven days to appear in court. If the county where the citation is served does not touch the county where it originated on any side, then the statute declares that the respondent must have ten days at minimum to respond to the citation.

On April 23, 1963, a woman who lived in Richmond County was served with a copy of a citation to respond to probate court in eight days. The woman filed a motion to extend the time that she is given to respond and also to dismiss the first citation to respond based on the fact that she was not provided adequate time to respond to the citation. The court looked at the history of New York as a colony in order to determine the woman’s standing. When New York was just a colony, it was divided into counties. The boundaries of these counties have been refined over years of legal enactments. In the case of this particular woman, she lives in Richmond County and the surrogates court that sent her the citation is located in New York county. The two counties do not touch on any side. A Westchester County Criminal Lawyer said the only county that borders Richmond County is the county of St. George. Therefore, it is not reasonable that the woman was only given eight days to respond to the citation. The citation should have had a return date that was at least ten days later than the date of service of the citation.

Since, the woman was not given the correct amount of time to prepare and return service that was required on the citation, the court agreed with her council that the citation should be dismissed. She would be issued a citation that was corrected and that would provide her with a full ten days in which to prepare her return. While it may not seem like a deciding factor in any situation that three days could alter the outcome of anything, when it comes to legal actions, it is important to ensure that the laws are being followed to the letter. If a court is allowed to shorten the number of days that are allowed to a person before they must return the citation, then they are preventing that person from taking all of the time that they are allowed by law to take in order to prepare their case. Preventing a person from being allowed to prepare their case, is a serious offense. A Suffolk County Criminal Lawyer said the American jurisprudence system is designed to ensure that everyone has the time to present the case that is critical to their legal standing. When a court shortens that time, then that person is not provided with adequate time to prepare their case. This court took that infraction seriously and did not allow that court to change the rules of the game to suit their particular purpose. Anyone who is required to respond to a probate citation is permitted to use all of the time that the statute allows them to prepare their case.

Published on: September 17, 2012

Court Decides Alleged Mistreatment of Citizens of Philadephia

by Stephen Bilkis

Two suits, permitted to proceed as class actions, were brought in District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by respondents, individuals and organizations, against petitioners, the Mayor of Philadelphia, the Police Commissioner, and others, alleging a pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police mistreatment of minority citizens in particular and Philadelphia residents in general. The petitioners were charged with misconduct ranging from express authorization or encouragement of the mistreatment to failure to act in such a way as to avoid recurrence.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the principal antagonists involved in one case were two police officer, not named as parties, who were found to have violated complainants’ constitutional rights in three of eight incidents as to which the District Court made detailed factual findings and as to which a five-day suspension had resulted in one incident and no disciplinary action in another. In the other case, in only two of 28 incidents did the District Court conclude that the police conduct amounted to a deprivation of a federally secured right; it found no police misconduct in four incidents; in another, departmental policy was subsequently changed; and, though the court made no comment on the degree of misconduct occurring in the remainder, there were arguably 16 police violations of citizens’ constitutional rights in the year involved.

A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, the District Court found, that the evidence did not establish the existence of any policy on the part of petitioners to violate the constitutional rights of respondent classes but found evidence of departmental discouragement of complaints and a tendency to minimize the consequences of police misconduct. The court found that only a small percentage of policemen commit violations of the rights of Philadelphia residents generally but that such violations could not be dismissed as rare or isolated. Petitioners were directed to draft for the court’s approval “a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints” to be formulated in accordance with the court’s “guidelines” containing detailed suggestions for revising the police manuals and procedural rules for dealing with citizens and for changing procedures for handling complaints. On petitioners’ appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Published on: September 16, 2012

Court Looks at Parole Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

Petitioner was convicted in the Supreme Court, New York County, of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree and was sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 15 to 25 years. On January 10, 1973 petitioner was paroled with a maximum expiration date of March 15, 1989. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, while in Puerto Rico with permission of his parole officer, petitioner was arrested on an indictment returned by a Federal Grand Jury in the Southern District of New York, charging violation of Federal drug laws.

In early January, 1976 petitioner was extradited to New York and incarcerated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan. Petitioner’s parole officer visited him in Federal custody and questioned him about his arrest but did not serve him with parole violation charges. On March 20, 1976 petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to violate Federal narcotics laws. Thereafter, the Board of Parole declared petitioner delinquent and issued a parole violation warrant against him. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 7 1/2 years imprisonment on the Federal conviction.

On May 5, 1976 petitioner was transferred from the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City to the Federal Correctional Facility in Atlanta, Georgia. New York officials attempted to lodge the parole violation warrant at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. In light of the fact that petitioner had been transferred to Atlanta on the previous day the warrant was forwarded to that facility where it was eventually lodged against petitioner.

Published on: September 9, 2012

Defendant Claims his Right to a Speedy Trial was Denied

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant was convicted after trial of criminally selling a dangerous drug in the third degree and cocaine possession in the fourth degree (drug possession). He had been indicted on June 14, 1971 and his case was moved for trial fifteen months later, on September 11, 1972. In the interim he had been convicted of a drug crime in Puerto Rico and since November 26, 1971 had been serving his sentence in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. Prior to the voir dire on the trial herein, he moved orally to dismiss the indictment for failure to be accorded a speedy trial

The motion, having been made prior to the commencement of the trial, was timely. The defendant’s incarceration in Atlanta can serve neither as an explanation for the delay nor as an excuse .

The reason for the motion was that the defendant ‘feels one or more of his witnesses may now be unavailable to him’. The defendant’s counsel explained that a male and a female had been indicted with the defendant; that while the male was available as a witness for the defendant, the female had not appeared in court and that there was a bench warrant out for her. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the court, stating that the male was available as a witness and that the female had disappeared before the defendant had demanded a trial, denied the motion.

Published on: September 8, 2012

Court Decides if Defendant Should Receive an Enhanced Sentence

by Stephen Bilkis

This involves a drug crime case where the Court denied the People’s appeal to consider a defendant’s perjury at trial in enhancing his service of sentence.

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial, at which he testified, of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fourth Degree (drug possession). In response to the defendant’s pre-sentence memorandum requesting leniency in sentencing, the District Attorney’s Office, citing United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. —-, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993), contends that the defendant should receive an “enhanced sentence”, i.e., a higher sentence than the Court would otherwise impose based upon his alleged perjury at trial. The People claim this perjury is established by the contradictions between defendant’s trial testimony concerning his cocaine possession and his statements about his addictions to the social workers of the Legal Aid Society in the pre-sentence memorandum submitted to the Court on his behalf.

The People argue that this falsehood, coupled with defendant’s false testimony claiming innocence of the charges for which he stood trial and was convicted, constitute willful and materially false statements, i.e., perjury, that may be considered by this Court in assessing the defendant’s history and character to determine an appropriate sentence. A New York Criminal Lawyer said defense counsel contends that this Court should find such consideration irrelevant. Defense concedes that the majority of reported state jurisdictions permit consideration of a defendant’s trial perjury as a factor in enhancing sentence on the ground that it evidences lack of potential for rehabilitation.