This case involves two federal prescriptions: the one-year limitation period imposed on federal habeas corpus petitioners by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1); and the rule that pleading amendments relate back to the filing date of the original pleading when both the original plea and the amendment arise out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.
Respondent was convicted of murder and robbery in California state court and sentenced to life imprisonment. His current application for federal habeas relief centers on two alleged trial-court errors, both involving the admission of out-of-court statements during the prosecutor’s case in chief but otherwise unrelated. Respondent had made inculpatory statements during pretrial police interrogation. A New York Criminal Lawyer said he alleged that those statements were coerced, and that their admission violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He also alleged that the admission of a videotape recording of testimony of a prosecution witness violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
Respondent’s conviction was affirmed on appeal and became final on August 12, 1997. Under the one-year limitation period imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1), he had until August 12, 1998, to file a habeas petition in federal court. A New York Drug Crime Lawyer said on May 8, 1998, in a timely filed habeas petition, respondent asserted his Confrontation Clause challenge to admission of the videotaped prosecution witness testimony, but did not then challenge the admission of his own pretrial statements. On January 28, 1999, over five months after the August 12, 1998 expiration of AEDPA’s time limit and eight months after the court appointed counsel to represent him, respondent filed an amended petition asserting a Fifth Amendment objection to admission of his pretrial statements. In response to the State’s argument that the Fifth Amendment claim was time barred, respondent asserted the rule that pleading amendments relate back to the filing date of the original pleading when both the original plea and the amendment arise out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2). Because his Fifth Amendment and Confrontation Clause claims challenged the constitutionality of the same criminal conviction, respondent urged, both claims arose out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.”