Articles Posted in Drug Possesion

The defendant contested that the admission of evidence of his prior drug activity was error. The defendant was arrested after he allegedly sold two packets of heroin to an undercover police officer in August 1990. Upon his arrest, 10 additional packets of heroin were found on his person. The prosecution presented evidence on its direct case of an incident involving the defendant three months earlier. A police officer testified that he observed the defendant on a date in May 1990 standing in the doorway of an abandoned building with an unidentified male. The defendant had a number of ‘tins” in one hand, which he appeared to be counting, and money in his other hand. Upon the officer’s approach, the defendant ran through the building and was subsequently arrested. The officer testified that he recovered one “tin”, and it appeared to contain marijuana, although no proof was offered that it was in fact cocaine. The complainant contends that the evidence was admissible, purportedly for the limited purpose of proving the defendant’s intent to sell the 10 packets of heroin which were found on his person when he was arrested in August 1990.

As a general rule, evidence of similar uncharged crimes is inadmissible because the jury may convict the defendant because of his predisposition to criminal conduct. Such evidence may be received if it helps to establish some element of the crime under consideration or is relevant because of some recognized exception to the general rule. Evidence of a prior criminal sale of narcotics may be admissible under some circumstances to establish criminal intent, provided its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of prior criminal acts to prove intent is often unnecessary, and therefore should be precluded even though marginally relevant, where intent may be easily inferred from the commission of the act itself. It may be admitted to prove intent, for example, when the evidence falls short of demonstrating that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, and where proof of a prior act is relevant to that issue. Where the act itself is equivocal, and the transaction would not be criminal unless accompanied by some guilty knowledge, evidence of prior uncharged crimes is more likely to be admissible to create an inference of guilty knowledge.

The testimony here that the defendant, on an occasion three months prior to the crime, was observed in possession of money and a “tin” of what may or may not have been cocaine, was inadmissible, and its introduction was an invitation to the jury to speculate that the defendant had previously sold drugs. This evidence was irrelevant. It was of no probative value on the issue of the defendant’s intent, and only served to establish his criminal propensities. The court erred in allowing its admission and in instructing the jury that it could be considered on the issue of intent to sell. The error was compounded when the prosecutor was permitted to argue on summation that the jury could rely on the incident in May to resolve any reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to sell the additional packets of heroin in August. The error was not harmless, the order was reversed.

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A man stands convicted from criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, a class A-I felony. In that, he knowingly and unlawfully possessed one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing a narcotic drug, namely, cocaine, and said preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances were of an aggregate weight of four ounces or more. In particular, the man was in possession of over five ounces of crack-cocaine.

Subsequently, the man was sentenced to an indeterminate period of imprisonment of fifteen years to life.

The man then filed a motion on notice for an order vacating his sentence. He additionally requests the court to reduce his conviction and to re-sentence him as a predicate violence felony offender IV to a determinate sentence of eight years’ imprisonment with five years’ post release supervision.

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This is a motion by the complainants to reargue a prior decision of the County Court suppressing evidence. The complainants contend that the Court of Appeals compels the conclusion that, contrary to the prior holding of the County Court, none of the three named defendants had standing to contest the seizure of the contraband herein and that, as a result, their suppression motions should have been denied.

The threshold question is whether the re-argument motion, made more than thirty days after entry of the orders granting suppression, is time-barred. The defendant contends that it is.

It is ordinarily true that a motion to reargue may not be made beyond the time within which to appeal from the prior order. This is so because re-argument may not be used to extend the time in which to appeal or to revive a right to appeal which has been extinguished. Where, however, the prior order is still open for review by an appellate court, a motion for re-argument will lie, especially when based upon an intervening change in controlling law.

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In a criminal case, the chief point urged on appeal by defendant is that the court had previously accepted a plea of guilty to the lesser crime of attempted criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree, a Class E felony, to cover the entire indictment; that thereafter, the court unilaterally set aside that plea and directed a trial upon which the defendants were convicted of the Class C felony for which they were indicted and for which they have now been sentenced. In essence this is a claim of double jeopardy.

A Bronx County Criminal attorney said that, in court’s view, the fair meaning of the proceedings that took place at the time of the vacating of the plea to the Class E felony was that the defendant applied to withdraw his plea of guilty and the court granted that application, and this was the understanding of all at the time.

While the court are here discussing the defendant, some light is cast on the matter by the proceedings with respect to the co-defendant whose case is in almost all respects identical with the case; most of the proceedings were joint proceedings, including the original plea and the trial. The only difference is that second case’s attorney explicitly moved to withdraw the plea in so many words while the defendant in the first case’s attorney did not use those precise words. But the entire proceedings make it clear that that is what the defendant was doing.

One day, a man reached into a brown paper bag, removed a vial of crack cocaine and handed it to an undercover police officer. A few minutes later, the man was arrested and the bag was seized. Based on records, the man’s action was clearly a criminal sale. So, the man’s intent to sell was clearly inferable from his actions minutes before he was arrested.

The man was then convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. But, the man filed an appeal from the said decision.

The man contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed to present evidence, on its direct case, that previously he pleaded guilty of selling cocaine. The man further argues that, in spite of the trial court’s limiting instruction, the evidence improperly labeled him as a repeat cocaine seller.

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In a Drug Crime, defendant appealed from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

A Kings County Criminal attorney said that the defendant contends that the People failed to establish constructive possession of the cocaine found on top of his armoire in his bedroom in this purely circumstantial evidence case. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. The conclusion of guilt was consistent with and flowed naturally from the facts and, when viewed as a whole, the proof excluded to a moral certainty every hypothesis other than guilt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence.

The Court rejected defendant’s contention that his conviction was inconsistent or repugnant to the acquittal of his wife on the same charge. The evidence as to the culpability of the two was not identical since it is undisputed that she and not he gave the police permission to search the apartment. This critical fact supports the jury’s conclusion that the drugs belonged to the defendant and not his wife. Robbery was not a factor.

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A working student called someone in Florida with the hope of using $50,000 in his possession to become involved in the sale of a drug. Even if the negotiations were carried on through at least two telephone conversations and the student’s two trips to Florida in order to meet the person, the student asserted at the trial that no deal was completed. The reason is that the student was too scared.

Afterward, the student and two passengers in his car were arrested in Brooklyn and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance, and reckless endangerment. Sources revealed that the arrest was prompted only after a chase by an unmarked police car. The student claims that the officers did not identify themselves as police and he was unaware who they were until a red flasher was placed atop the unmarked vehicle and the student’s car was blocked by a marked patrol car. He claims to have fled because he had his money in the trunk of the car and feared that the men in the unmarked car were going to rob him. The arresting officer, however, states that he identified himself as a police officer and ordered the student to stop his car, after which the student fled. There was no violence.

As the car came to a stop, thirteen glassine envelopes, later found to contain heroin, were thrown from its passenger window. The search of the vehicle revealed a trunk containing, among other things, $64,580 in cash.

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In this Criminal case, a Pro Se motion was filed by defendant, an inmate at the Correctional Facility, moves pursuant to CPL § 440.10(h) to vacate his judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, convicting him of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, respectively, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to concurrent terms often years incarceration and three years post release supervision.

A Kings County Drug Crime lawyer said that this case stems from a buy and bust operation wherein one undercover, who was being observed by a ghost undercover, gave the undercover buy money. They then walked to meet • defendant, whereupon the undercover gave him the money in return for the vial which he gave to the undercover officer. Defendant was arrested shortly thereafter with thirty-four matching vials and $619, including the $10 in buy money. A chemist for the New York City Police Department tested the vial purchased by the undercover officer. It was determined that the substance in the vial was cocaine. A second chemist weighed one of the thirty-four vials recovered from defendant, and based upon the weight of that vial, projected the total weight of all the vials to be 41.6 grams. He also re-tested the substance found in the vial purchased by the undercover, and tested one of the thirty-four vials recovered from the defendant and concluded that the substance in both vials was cocaine.

On appeal, defendant argued that he had been denied his right to a fair trial because the court (1) closed the courtroom without a showing that an open courtroom would present a particularized risk to the undercover officers or their investigations; and (2) improperly responded to the jury’s request for a readback of the testimony.

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On 14 February 1990 at approximately 6:15 p.m., criminal defendant and another individual acting together, was observed by a police officer selling crack coccaine to three persons. The three buyers were seen talking to the defendant and his partner and each gave a sum of money to defendant’s partner, whereupon defendant handed, in exchange for the money, a quantity of crack coccaine to each of the buyers. Arrest were made and officers recovered from inde defendant’s mouth, four small clear plastic bags containing crack and coccaine and same drug was recovered from the defendant and his partner.

A plea agreement was made and entered into by the defendant and pleasd guilty to Penal Law section 220.31 CSCS in the 5th degree. As a result, defendant was sentenced to two to four years incarceration running concurrent with one and one- third to four years incarceration for violation of probation on Kings County. Defendant was adjudicated as second felony offender at the time of his plea in this case.

At the time of the plea agreement, defendant was 22 years old with a 10th grade education. He is a citizen and native of Jamaica, West Indies and was admitted to the United States at New York City on or about 26 September 1986 as a P22. Also, counsel manifested that at the time of plea, defendant was in good physical and mental health, not under the influence of drugs and was entering the plea of his own free will after having sufficient time to discuss his case and plea with his counsel.

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In this cocaine related case, defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, convicting her of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence of two concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 19 years to life.

A Suffolk County Cocaine lawyer said that the defendant offered to sell a kilogram of cocaine to a police informant who arranged for its sale to an undercover Long Island Drug Enforcement Task Force agent. The informant traveled with the defendant and her boyfriend to the place where they picked up the cocaine and then placed it in the trunk of the car in which it was discovered by police after they were arrested. DWI was not charged. Neither petit larceny nor grand larceny were involved.

The defendant’s main contentions concern statements made by the prosecutor during summation and the court’s charge to the jury. The record clearly indicates that the prosecutor stayed within the four corners of the evidence in his summation, and that the jury, after hearing the entire charge, could gather from its language the correct rules to be applied in arriving at its decision.