Articles Posted in Drug Possesion

On 19 October 1987, at approximately 7:00 a.m., the bodies of two victims, a reputed drug dealer, and his girlfriend were discovered in the passenger compartment of a grey Plymouth in the vicinity of Bronx River Avenue and the Cross Bronx Expressway. The drug dealer’s body was slumped over that of his girlfriend, which was in a seated position in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. The defendant was arrested and charged in relation to the crime.

At trial, four photographs of the bodies were introduced in order to illustrate the position of the bodies and the crime scene. The evidence which connected the defendant to the homicides was the testimony of a witness, who stated at trial that he was privy to a conversation in the home of his brother-in-law, in which the defendant told him the details of the crime and his reason for the murder the victims.

On 7 February 1990, the Supreme Court of Bronx County rendered judgment convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment of from 15 years to life and from 25 years to life.

The criminal Defendant had prior dealings with a group known to be engaged in drug trafficking, specifically, heroin trafficking, and specifically raised money to purchase from an undercover agent in Boston the four kilograms of heroin at issue, which they planned to resell in New York. Defendant, who held a doctorate in pharmacology, met with the head of the criminal organization in New York, A, and later that day traveled to Boston with two other members of the organization, B and C, under assumed names, taking with them $120,000 for the undercover agent’s courier fee, as well as equipment that could be used for testing the purity of heroin. When defendant, B and C arrived in Boston, they checked into a hotel (under assumed names) and had frequent telephone contact with A, who was still in New York. A briefly visited the three men in Boston, after which he returned to New York, where he made telephone contact with the undercover agent, to whom A provided the name, location and telephone number of B, who would carry out the drug transaction. The next day, the undercover agent spoke over the telephone with B, who told the agent to wait until he switched hotels. When they did meet, B showed the agent the $120,000 courier fee, told the agent that he planned to sell the heroin in New York, and then took a sample of heroin, which was then tested for its purity level. However, B ran into a plainclothes State Trooper in the stairwell whom B suspected of being a law enforcement official, and shortly thereafter called off the deal, on the ground that the heroin was of insufficient purity. This is a felony.

Here, the evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant and his accomplices came dangerously close to possessing the heroin in New York, even though the heroin was rejected on the ground of inferior quality. Defendant’s attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence were unpreserved and the court declined to review them in the interest of justice. If the court were to review the claims, it would still be found that the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence. Further, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Moreover, defendant’s jurisdictional claims were rejected. Jurisdiction for both crimes was established under CPL 20.20 (1) (a), since defendant committed an element of the offenses in New York. Defendant formed the intent to possess heroin in New York, and he and his codefendants took many steps in New York towards the completion of that crime, though they did not fully amount to an attempt until the Boston actions were effected. On the conspiracy count, defendant formed the intent and the agreement in New York, as well as many overt acts, and thus the entire crime was committed in New York, not just one element. Clearly, New York also obtained jurisdiction over both crimes pursuant to CPL 20.20 (2) (b), since both the possession and conspiracy statutes were designed to prevent the occurrence of a particular effect in New York, and the conduct of defendant and his codefendants was committed with the intent that it have such an effect in New York, regardless of whether any conduct took place in New York. As provided for under CPL 20.10 (4), when conduct constituting an offense produces consequences which, though not necessarily amounting to a result or element of such offense, have a materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare of a particular jurisdiction, or result in the defrauding of persons in such jurisdiction, such conduct and offense have a particular effect upon such jurisdiction. The court rejected, as contrary to the statutory language and logic, the interpretation of CPL 20.10 (4) advanced in the landmark case of People v Puig that the term “community welfare” applied only to CPL 20.40, the county venue statute, and not to CPL 20.20, the State jurisdiction statute. The possession of illicit drugs in New York with intent to sell them to New Yorkers does have a materially harmful impact upon the jurisdiction at bar. What’s more, the jurisdiction was established over the attempted possession count under CPL 20.20 (2) (c), there being ample evidence of an attempt to possess heroin in New York, and over the conspiracy count under CPL 20.20 (2) (d). On defendant’s remaining arguments, these were considered but rejected including those contained in his pro se supplemental brief.

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Sometime in early February 1970, the police learned from a reliable informant that a certain person (the defendant) along with a friend of his were engaged in extensive heroin trafficking. The two criminal men were investigated and kept under surveillance. On 5 March 1970, a detective received information that defendant and his friend would be in possession of heroin at a service station in the Bronx. A warrant authorizing a search of both men was obtained. The friend was the first to arrive at the gas station. No heroin was found on his person. He is said to have consented to the search of his automobile which was on the apron of the gas station where five ounces of heroin were found. A few minutes later, the defendant arrived at the scene. He was searched and once again no contraband was found, but automobile keys were recovered. Defendant was asked if he had a car and if it might be searched. He identified his car and agreed to the search. Ten ounces of heroin were found in the trunk of the car.

Defendant was then arrested and for the first time advised of his rights. Following a Huntley hearing, the Trial Court concluded that the search of defendant’s car flowed directly from the questions and answers suppressed by the order of 15 January 1971. On 26 January 1971, the Supreme Court of Bronx County issued an order suppressing the evidence obtained from defendant’s automobile. Assault was not involved although other criminal activities were suspected.

On appeal, the Appellate Court unanimously reversed, on the law and on the facts, and the defendant’s motion to suppress the heroin seized from his automobile was denied.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered September 25, 1990, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

A Lawyer said that, on October 14, 1989 at approximately 2:30 A.M., the victim was killed during a robbery on the 10th floor of an apartment building in Brooklyn. Later that day, the investigating detective, received a phone call from a known person, who stated that she had information regarding the victim’s murder. The person, who lived on the ninth floor of that building, told the said detective and another detective, to whom she had previously provided information in another case leading to the arrest of three perpetrators for robbery in the third degree, that at approximately 2:30 A.M. she had heard three gunshots.

She further stated that she then saw the defendant, whom she had known for 12 years; emerge from the stairwell from the tenth floor to the ninth floor, while wrapping a long-sleeved, light-colored shirt around a .25 caliber silver handgun. She stated that she then saw the defendant enter an apartment, also on the ninth floor. A Kings Cocaine Possession Lawyer said that, based on this information, the police, referring to the caller as an unidentified informant, obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s apartment. The search produced 322 vials of crack cocaine and a black leather bag containing a chunk of crack cocaine. The combined weight of the crack cocaine from these sources was over two ounces.

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This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered June 6, 1992, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (four counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of his omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and statements made by him to the police.

A Kings Drug Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant’s conviction results from his sales of vials of crack-cocaine to several individuals during approximately a one-hour period, as well as the recovery from him of eight vials of crack-cocaine possession at the time of his arrest. The defendant’s actions were observed by an experienced narcotics police officer, using binoculars, who was stationed on the roof of a seven-story building approximately one block away. The defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree arose out of an undercover narcotics operation conducted by the police on November 19, 1985. An undercover officer purchased a tinfoil packet of cocaine through a slot in a steel door located on the third floor of a semi-abandoned apartment building in Brooklyn. A few minutes later a backup team arrived and battered down the door. Upon entering the apartment, the police found the defendant standing between the kitchen and living room within two feet of a rifle and weapon which were lying on the floor. The police also found several tinfoil packets containing cocaine, paraphernalia relating to drug selling, and a pile of loose cocaine, all of which were in plain view.

A Lawyer said that, the back-up team arrested the defendant, as well as four of the five individuals who had been observed buying drugs from him. While processing the arrest paperwork at the police precinct, the officers discussed the order in which the buyers had approached the defendant. The defendant, who was in a holding cell approximately three feet away with the four buyers who had been apprehended, interjected: “I did not sell to those, those guys. I sold to him and him”, indicates two of the four individuals who had been arrested with arraignment coming.

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A post-conviction hearing was held pursuant to section 208 of the Mental Hygiene Law on defendant’s denial of addiction to a narcotic drug.

On 16 January 1969, defendant was examined by the jail physician. The physician executed a certificate on the regular form provided by the Narcotic Control Commission, which indicated that, pursuant to the order to perform a medical examination to determine addiction, he has personally observed and examined the defendant or the alleged criminal narcotic addict, examined the report of the interviewer, the Petition or the Officer’s report, and/or appended papers, and as a result, found insufficient evidence upon which to certify that the said defendant is a narcotic addict, within the meaning of such term, as defined by 201 of the Mental Hygiene Law. Annexed to the certificate was a form setting forth the following facts: defendant used the drug heroin by vein three times daily for five years; defendant’s last fix of heroin was April 1968; and defendant had pigmented scarred tracks both arms.

At the hearing, the jail physician stated his opinion that defendant was not addicted at the time of his examination as the term addiction is defined in section 201 of the Mental Hygiene Law. Moreover, a record from a certain State Hospital was received in evidence. This record set forth the following pertinent facts: defendant was admitted to the hospital on 8 March 1966; his diagnosis was: Drug Addiction—Heroin; he was arrested four times with three convictions including charges of petty larceny and possession of narcotics; he used heroin since 1957; on 7 June 1966, he was released on convalescent care; his subsequent police record showed a conviction for criminal possession of narcotics on 20 November 1967 based on an arrest on 9 August 1967 and a similar conviction on 27 November 1967 based on an arrest on 23 October 1967. No weapons were found.

Defendant was charged and convicted of criminal possession with intent to distribute 6¼ grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), a drug crime. The defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant attacked the sufficiency of the evidence; the admission of certain testimony concerning drugs possession other than those he was charged with possessing in the indictment; and the trial judge’s charge to the jury.

The appellate court affirmed the conviction.

First, the standard utilized by the Court is not whether in its opinion the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilty, but whether the jury might so conclude. The defendant’s argument here that he intended to use the heroin solely for himself is but one hypothesis of innocence, which the defendant suggested might satisfy the Court’s sense of reasonableness. The court has often held that this is not enough to permit a reversal of the verdict. As a rule, the court must uphold a guilty verdict if there is any theory of the evidence from which the jury might have excluded every hypothesis except guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard was met in this case.

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A Drug Possession Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered December 15, 1988, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress certain physical evidence and statements made by him to the police.

The issue in this case is whether the court erred in refusing to suppress the physical evidence seized by the police in this drug possession case. Neither arson or another crime was charged.

The court held that, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the hearing court did not err by refusing to suppress physical evidence seized by the police. The arresting officer testified at the suppression hearing that while on patrol with his partner he observed a car which was poised to make a right-hand turn suddenly back down the one-way street from whence it had come and stop in a double-parked position. The officer followed the car by driving the wrong way down the one-way street and stopped the police car in a head-on position to the other car. As the officer exited his vehicle he observed the defendant, who had been a passenger in the backseat of the other vehicle, open the back door and step out of the vehicle. As the defendant did so, a brown bag dropped to the ground at his feet and he began to quickly walk away. The officer picked up the brown bag and looked inside. Upon seeing two clear plastic bags containing a white powdery substance found to be cocaine, the officer pursued the defendant and placed him under arrest.

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At trial, the complainant presented evidence against a man, who was alleged member of a group who brought cocaine from San Francisco to New York. The man’s conviction was the result of a multistate investigation of a drug conspiracy involving parties in San Francisco, New York and Chicago. The drug enforcement task force began the investigation and the transportation coordinator for the drug network was known for an alias.

The possession counts against the criminal offender were for the cocaine possession on a white Mazda, cocaine possession on a blue Volvo and cocaine searched at a stash house.

Phone calls between the offender and other members of the conspiracy were frequent. The offender, from California, had most of his conversations about the status of the drugs and their shipment with leader of the drug enforcement task force. The leader, from New York, originated the majority of the phone calls between the two.

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A man was convicted after a jury trial of one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and one count of criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree.

Prior to judgment, the complainant filed and served on the man two statements of predicate felony conviction. It alleges that the man was convicted of the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon. It is also alleged that the ten years time period within which a predicate felony conviction must have occurred in order for the conviction to enhance the man’s sentence.

The second statement of predicate felony conviction alleges that the man was convicted on the same date in the same court of possession with Intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance. The statement also alleges that the ten years time period provided by the criminal law for predicate felony convictions is similarly extended by the same term of imprisonment.