Articles Posted in Grand Larceny

Petitioner commenced a proceeding requesting that the Court vacate the five year post-release supervision (“PRS”) period added to his sentence by the respondent. Petitioner argues that the neither the sentencing minutes nor the Sentencing and Commitment Order include, as part of petitioner’s sentence, a five year PRS term and therefore respondent’s administrative imposition of the five year PRS sentence is invalid.

A Queens County Criminal lawyer said that Petitioner was convicted of two counts of Second Degree Robbery and Attempted Grand larceny in the 2nd degree. Thereafter, the Court sentenced the petitioner to two five-year determinate terms of incarceration for the robbery conviction and a three to six year term on the attempted grand larceny conviction.

Notwithstanding the sentence as set forth in the sentencing minutes of the hearing, in the preparation of the Sentence and Commitment Order, the sentence for the attempted grand larceny conviction was set forth as a two and a third to seven year sentence. Petitioner brought a motion pursuant to CPL §440.20 alleging, among other things, that the sentence on the grand larceny conviction was illegal and had to be corrected.

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A Queens Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, following a hearing, Criminal Term denied the motion to suppress the conversation on the ground that the former police officer was acting in the interest of the bank, that he was not acting in co-operation with the police, and that there was no duty incumbent upon the police to prevent him from talking with the defendant. Thereafter, defendant entered a plea of guilty.

The issue in this case is whether the court erred in convicting defendant of petit larceny, upon his plea of guilty and imposing sentence.

It is axiomatic that the constitutional protections against self-incrimination do not apply to confessions elicited by private individuals. The actions of private individuals, however, do become subject to scrutiny for violations of constitutional limitations when those individuals act as agents of the government or when government officials participate in the act.

A Queens Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered November 19, 1981, convicting him of petit larceny, upon his plea of guilty and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of defendant’s pretrial motion which sought suppression of oral statements.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, the testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that on October 28, 1980, defendant entered the Jamaica, Queens, and branch of the National Bank of North America and attempted to withdraw funds from a nonexistent account. The police were summoned and defendant was placed under arrest. While still in the bank, arresting officer Detective advised defendant of his Miranda rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to consult with an attorney. Defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights, but remained silent when asked if he was willing to answer questions without an attorney being present. The Detective testified that from this he assumed that defendant did not wish to be questioned. Thereupon, the Detective brought defendant to the precinct, which was across the street from the bank.

A Queens Robbery Lawyer said that, once at the precinct, the Detective took defendant to a squad room to begin processing the arrest. Several minutes later, a former New York City police officer and now chief of security for the National Bank of North America, entered the room. After identifying himself, he informed the Detective that defendant was wanted in connection with a similar incident at another branch of the bank. According to the Detective, he did not speak with the defendant in the detective’s presence. While the detective may have left the former New York police and the defendant in the room for a time, there were other police officers present. He asserted that he made no promises or threats to the defendant. He also asserted that he did not ask the police officers to question defendant for him, nor did they prompt him to question defendant. He did, however, acknowledge that defendant may have been handcuffed to a chair at the time. After speaking with defendant, he stayed in the squad room another 15 or 20 minutes conversing with some of the detectives with whom he was acquainted.

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A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, this is a motion for an order to produce the defendant before this Court for the purpose of re-sentencing the said defendant as a third felony offender. The basis for the defendant’s application for this order is a claim that he should be re-sentenced as a third felony offender, claiming that a prior Federal conviction for Violation of the Dyer Act entered against him on October 24, 1941, in the United States District Court, Missouri, should be used to make him a third felony offender.

A Queens Robbery Lawyer said that, this defendant, together with others, was indicted on January 18, 1961, under indictment 1900-61, and charged with the crimes of in the First Degree (3 counts); Grand Larceny in the Second Degree (5 counts); Assault in the Second Degree (3 counts); and Carrying a Dangerous Weapon as a Felony. On the same date, under indictment 81-61, the defendant, together with another, was indicted for the crimes of Robbery in the First Degree (2 counts); Grand Larceny in the First Degree; Grand Larceny in the Second Degree; Petit Larceny, Assault in the Second Degree (2 counts).

A Queens Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, this defendant was arraigned on both indictments on January 25, 1961, and, in the presence of counsel, pleaded not guilty. On February 17, 1961, on motion of the District Attorney, Indictment No. 81-61 was ordered consolidated with Indictment No. 1900-60 for purposes of plea. On the same date this defendant withdrew his former plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty before trial to Robbery in the Second Degree under the first count of Indictment No. 1900-60 to cover all counts of the consolidated indictments. On May 4, 1961, the defendant was arraigned on a prior offense information accusing him that on or about September 20, 1955, he was duly convicted upon his own confession and plea of guilty of the crime of Assault in the Second Degree in the County Court of Queens County, and was sentenced thereupon to imprisonment in the New York City Penitentiary. The defendant admitted one prior felony conviction. Thereafter on the same date, after waiving 48 hours notice of sentence, the defendant was sentenced to Sing Sing State Prison for a period of 10 to 20 years as a second felony offender.

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Defendant moves pursuant to § 440.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law for an order vacating his judgment of conviction. His conviction followed a negotiated guilty plea to one count of the Class D felony of Insurance Fraud in the Third Degree and one count of the Class E felony of Grand larceny in the Fourth Degree.

The thrust of the instant motion is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by Defendant’s two former attorneys.

A Queens County Criminal attorney said that defendant entered a plea of guilty to a Superior Court Information charging a single count of Insurance Fraud 3° and a single count of Grand larceny 4°, with a promise of indeterminate concurrent sentences of one to three years, and a restitution judgment in the amount of $77,199.00. Defendant was originally charged with three counts each of Insurance Fraud 3° and Grand larceny 3° relating to the submission of allegedly false automobile damage claims to certain insurers. Defendant contends that the lawyer was obligated to advise him that his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation. Defendant maintains that the lawyer’s failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because the federal law pertaining to the immigration consequences of a plea to such crimes is, Defendant asserts, “simple and straightforward” since both crimes are allegedly deemed “aggravated felonies” within the meaning of the immigration statute, the conviction for which mandates deportation.

A man pleads guilty to the crime of grand larceny in the second degree and was sentenced to the state vocational institute.

After two years, the man again pleads guilty to the crime of attempted grand larceny in the second degree and was sentenced for a term of two and half to five years.

After seven years, he again pleads guilty to the crime of forgery in the second degree.

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A Queens Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the indictment in this case charges the defendant with the crime of grand larceny in the first degree in that he stole an automobile with the intent to deprive the lawful custodian and owner thereof. Upon appropriate waiver by the defendant of the right to trial by jury the cause was tried before me without a jury. The contention of the District Attorney is that the automobile was stolen by the defendant in Queens County, and was thereafter transported by him to the State of Indiana where, on an alarm issued by the New York City police, the defendant was taken into custody.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that it appears that on March 23, 1964, the owner of the automobile, as complainant, swore to a complaint charging the defendant with its theft, and that on the same day, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant was issued by a Criminal Court judge. Ten days later, in the State of Indiana, and thereafter in New York, the arresting officer interrogated the defendant with reference to the complainant’s automobile and obtained the defendant’s confessions to the stealing thereof.

A Queens Robbery Lawyer said that, the proffer of the testimony with respect to the alleged confessions made by the defendant was objected to upon the ground that they were obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights in that he was not represented by counsel.

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The indictment charged the defendant with three counts of grand larceny in the second degree in stealing $46,500 from the estate, in stealing $16,500 from a husband and in stealing $2,500 from an attorney. The jury convicted the defendant of the third count but acquitted him of the first two counts. The Appellate Division affirmed, without opinion. The appeal is by leave of a Justice of the Appellate Division.

Larceny is committed when one wrongfully takes or withholds property from an owner thereof with intent to deprive the owner of it or appropriate it to himself or with such intent takes or withholds another’s property by common law larceny by trespassory taking. Property means money thing in action or any article, substance or thing of value and an owner is defined as a person who has a right to possession thereof superior to that of the taker or withholder. While the statute itself does not require proof that the defendant intended to deprive the specific true owner of his property, but rather requires proof only of the fact that the defendant intended to deprive another, the People in this case explicitly limited their claim on the third count to the concept that defendant stole specifically from the attorney. By reason of the order, it was claimed, $2,500 of the money held in the defendant’s attorney’s account became the property of the attorney and he became the owner of that $2,500 within the meaning of the foregoing statutes. Nothing in the order or in statute, rule or decision sustains that concept.

An understanding of the effect of the order requires review of the rights and obligations of an attorney with respect to fees and to money held in so-called special accounts. With but two exceptions the rendition of services by an attorney gives rise to nothing more than a contract claim, express or implied, by the attorney against his client. The two exceptions are the attorney’s retaining and charging liens. The first entitles the attorney to retain all papers, securities or money belonging to the client which come into his possession in the course of his professional employment until the amount of his fee is fixed by agreement or by litigation and is paid. While it is possessory, it has no bearing on this case because the attorney never had possession of the proceeds of the action and in any event never asserted such a lien. The second entitled the attorney at common law to a lien upon the judgment only, but has been expanded by statute to give a lien upon the client’s cause of action from the commencement of the action, which attaches to the judgment and the proceeds of the judgment and cannot be affected by settlement between the parties.

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A man was convicted of the crime of issuing a fraudulent check and of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree, and from the decision of the Supreme Court that unanimously affirming the decision of conviction, the man appeals by permission.

In connection with the man’s purchase of a quantity of lumber, the man gave to the seller a check upon a bank where payment thereof was refused because of insufficient funds to the man’s credit. As a result of the transaction the man stands convicted of a violation of the penal law.

Based on records, grand larceny in the second degree is the appropriating, taking, stealing the property of another the value of which is over $100 and less than $500 in any manner whatsoever. Further, larceny is just another name for stealing and it is the taking of another man’s property with a view of depriving him of it and appropriating it to your own use and benefit, stealing. Forgery was an element.

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In two related juvenile delinquency proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeals are from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Queens County, which, after a fact-finding hearing, found that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree , (2) an order of disposition of the same court, which, upon the fact-finding order, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation with the “Probation Department of the County of Queens” for a period of 18 months, (3) a fact-finding order of the same court, which, after a fact-finding hearing, found that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and (4) an order of disposition of the same court which, upon the fact-finding order, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation with the “Probation Department of the County of Queens” for a period of 18 months,

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, the Court found that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and attempted criminal robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree.

Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented is primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses. Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record. Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight of the evidence.

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