Articles Posted in Grand Larceny

This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered March 16, 1967, convicting him of attempted grand larceny in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, defendant, along with two others, was indicted for robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree and assault in the second degree. The charges stem from a robbery allegedly committed in a hallway against a certain victim. The said victim is deaf and illiterate, but able to read lips. He does not know ‘sign language’ and communicates by making verbal sounds which can be understood only by those with special training. When he was called to testify, the People introduced his sister to the court and offered to have her sworn for the purpose of assisting the court and jury in understanding his testimony. A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, defense counsel objected to the use of a relative for such a purpose and insisted upon using a disinterested person. The objection was sustained and a speech therapist was used instead of the victim’s sister.

A Kings Robbery Lawyer said that, with considerable difficulty, the victim ‘testified’ that he was kicked by one of the defendants and that a sum of money was taken from his person. The Detectives testified that their unmarked patrol car was stopped for a red traffic light when they observed a group of people in the hallway in question. The first detective testified further that he got out of the car and approached the hallway to investigate. When he was within approximately six feet of the group in the hallway, he ‘observed 4 men going through the pockets of the complainant, who was on the ground.’ As the first detective approached the hallway door, defendant ran out of the building, but was apprehended by the second Detective. A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the jury acquitted defendant of the robbery and assault counts of the indictment, but convicted him of attempted grand larceny in the first degree, under the count of the indictment charging him with grand larceny in the first degree.

The issue in this case is whether the court properly convicted defendant of grand larceny in the first degree.

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, The defendant has made a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(b), (f) and (h) for an order vacating the judgment of conviction on the grounds that the judgment was obtained in violation of his “constitutional rights, ineffective counsel, and the judgment was procured by trickery, deceit and prejudical conduct on the part of my assigned attorney.” On June 14, 1994 this defendant was found guilty after trial of one count of robbery in the first degree; one count of grand larceny in the fourth degree; one count of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree; and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. On July 6, 1994, defendant was sentenced as second felony offender, to an aggregate term of imprisonment of twelve and one-half to twenty-five years.

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, at trial it was sufficiently and credibly proven that on January 30, 1994, the defendant threatened the victim with a razor and forcibly stole property from him. In his motion the defendant specifically alleges the following: 1. He was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because his assigned attorney did not “secure” his right to testify before the grand jury. 2. He was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not call a witness who would have allegedly provided exculpatory testimony. 3. He was also denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not call him (the defendant) to testify at trial. 4. “The judgment was procured by trickery, deceit, and prejudical conduct on the part of my court assigned attorney not appearing in the trial record.”

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that in support of the defendant’s first allegation that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the defendant did not testify before the grand jury, the defendant, in his affidavit in support of his motion, dated March 25, 1995, stated the factual issues exist in my case as to whether my attorney received notice of the scheduled grand jury presentment, informed the people of my desire to testify, and/or signed a waiver without my knowledge. The record is completely barren with respect to why no motion was made to dismiss the indictment by my attorney when he learned I did not testify before the grand jury.

Continue reading

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, this is a motion to vacate a judgment dated February 4, 1959 convicting the defendant on his own plea of guilty to Attempted Grand Larceny in the Second Degree, upon an indictment charging Grand Larceny in the First Degree, and sentencing him as a third felony offender to two to three years.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, as set forth by the Assistant District Attorney in his affidavit in opposition the motion may be summarized as follows: On November 20, 1958, the defendant offered to plead guilty to Attempted Grand Larceny in the Second Degree. It was upon an agreement that if it should ultimately appear that the plea would make him a fourth felony offender, the plea would be permitted to be withdrawn and he be permitted to plead to a misdemeanor. When he appeared for sentence on February 4, 1959, the District Attorney filed against him an information showing two former convictions: one in New Jersey in 1951 for armed robbery and one in this Court in 1955 for attempted grand larceny in the second degree.

A Kings Robbery Lawyer said that, the defendant, although admitting his identity and the fact of these convictions, claimed through his attorney that he had also been convicted in Federal Court with the result that he should be deemed and adjudicated a fourth felony offender. Nevertheless, he was adjudicated as a third offender and sentenced as aforementioned.

Continue reading

A Kings Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant, charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (Penal Law (PL) § 220.03), Criminally Using Drug Paraphernalia in the Second Degree (PL § 220.50[2]) and Unlawful Possession of Marijuana (PL § 221.05) moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds alleging that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the applicable ninety day statutory period mandated by CPL 30.30(1)(b).

A Kings Drug Possession Lawyer said that, the People concede, in their Affirmation in Opposition, that their announcement of readiness for trial was not made until the ninety-first day after the filing of the accusatory instrument. They assert, nonetheless, that their announcement of readiness was timely for two reasons, namely: (1) that the defendant’s pre-conversion oral request for a copy of the search warrant underlying the defendant’s arrest, is an excludable pre-trial delay as provided in CPL 30.30[4][a] ; and (2), even if the Court would disallow the request for a copy of the search warrant as an excludable pre-trial delay, as the day on which the People would have been required to announce their readiness for trial fell on a Sunday, the General Construction Law permits a timely announcement of readiness on the following business day in the instant case, the ninety-first day which fell on a Monday.

A Kings Drug Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant was arrest on the aforementioned charges on November 8, 1996. The misdemeanor complaint, in relevant part, reads as follows: Deponent is informed by P.O. Brooks that deponent entered the above premises pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Judge on 11/97/96 and observed the defendant standing in a bedroom with a quantity of crack/cocaine possession and a quantity of marijuana possession on top of a dresser in open view.

Continue reading

Intervenor moves pursuant to CPLR § 3212 for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint seeking foreclosure of a mortgage against her home which was fraudulently given by movant’s son, Defendant, and declaring that such fraudulently obtained mortgage and the fraudulent deed upon which it was based are null and void and that the prior deed of Intervenor is valid and in full force and effect together with all real property tax exemptions appurtenant thereto. The property at issue was purchased on February 5, 1975 by Intervenor and her husband, who took title as tenants by the entirety. On February 23, 1994, the husband died, leaving Intervenor as the sole owner.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, plaintiff’s company obtained the rights to a mortgage upon Intervenor’s premises at 2246 East 12th Street, Brooklyn, New York, executed by defendant on November 22, 1999, to a mortgage corporation of Woodland Hills, California, by assignment to Plaintiff on November 29, 1999. The deed upon which defendant premised his mortgage was also executed on November 22, 1999, purportedly by his mother, conveying title to said premises to her son. Intervenor first became aware of the fraudulent mortgage sometime in 2000 when mail from Plaintiff to her son defendant herein began accumulating at her home unopened by defendant. Upon further investigation, Intervenor learned that title to her home had been transferred to her eldest son, defendant, without her knowledge or consent, whereupon she took her complaint to the Kings County District Attorney. The instant mortgage foreclosure action was commenced by complaint dated June 24, 2002.

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, defendant was indicted on July 30, 2002 on charges of Grand Larceny in the Second Degree, Forgery in the Second Degree and Offering a False Instrument for Filing in the First Degree, all related to Defendant’s forging of a false deed and mortgage upon his mother’s home and the resultant theft of that home and the mortgage proceeds. Complainants named in the indictment were Intervenor and the Mortgage Corporation, Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest. Prior to indictment, by letter dated July 12, 2002, Assistant District Attorney counsel to Plaintiff herein, advising of the “ongoing criminal action affecting defendant and the subject real property” and relating the entire substance of confession to the crime, including that someone posing as Intervenor had actually appeared at the closing on the mortgage to said corporation. The Assistant District Attorney enclosed a copy of the criminal complaint dated May 13, 2002, and closed by soliciting cooperation in “a resolution of the entire situation.” In addition to the District Attorney’s efforts to engage Plaintiff, and even prior to his letter, Intervenor’s counsel asserts that he left a telephone message for Plaintiff’s counsel alerting him to Defendant’s arrest.

Continue reading

The defendant moves by way of coramnobis to vacate and set aside a judgment dated February 3rd, 1958, convicting him, on his own plea of guilty, of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of not less than one and not more than two years in State Prison. A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the defendant frames his present application on the grounds that he was not advised of his right to counsel; that he did not have the aid of counsel at the time of conviction; that he did not understand the nature and consequences of his plea and that when the judgment of conviction was vacated, he should have been granted the option to withdraw his plea of guilty.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer sad that, on April 16th, 1956, the defendant was sentenced to a term of 2 1/2 to 5 years in State Prison, on his own plea of guilty to the crime of grand larceny in the second degree. Thereafter, he made application in the nature of a writ of error coramnobis to vacate that judgment upon the ground that, prior to pleading guilty, an Assistant District Attorney promised him that his sentence would not exceed a term of 1 to 2 years if he cooperated with the authorities in certain matters; that in reliance on that promise, he did cooperate with the authorities but the promise was not kept. At a hearing held, with the consent of the District Attorney, the evidence adduced warranted the granting of his application, and on February 3rd, 1958, the defendant was resentenced to the term of which he now complains. Burglary was not involved.

A Kings Robbery Lawyer said that, the minutes of the proceedings of February 3rd, 1958, disclose that the defendant advised the Court that his former lawyer no longer represented him. That the clerk entered the defendant’s plea of guilty to grand larceny in the second degree and his pedigree was taken; that the defendant waived the two days notice of sentence; that pursuant to the provisions of sec. 480 of the Code Criminal Procedure, the defendant was asked if he had any legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced and he stated that he had no legal cause to show why the judgment of the law should not be imposed upon him; that he was thereupon sentenced to a term of not less than one and not more than two years in State Prison.

Continue reading

An appeal was made by the accused man as limited by his motion, from four sentences of the County Supreme Court upon his convictions of four counts of grand larceny in the second degree, upon his pleas of guilty, the sentences being concurrent indeterminate prison terms of two to six years on each count.

In four separate criminal indictments, the accused was charged with a total of 42 counts of grand larceny in the second degree, 3 counts of grand larceny in the third degree and 1 count of scheme to defraud in the second degree. He agreed to plead guilty to four counts of grand larceny in the second degree in exchange for the trial court’s promise to impose an indeterminate term of 2 1/3 to 7 years incarceration on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. In the event full restitution in the total sum of $500,000 (the losses suffered by the victims of the larcenies) was made to all the complainants named in the indictments, the court promised to impose concurrent, indeterminate prison terms of 1 1/2 to 4 1/2 years. The record does not reflect any other promises made by the court to the accused man at the time the pleas of guilty were entered. Since restitution was not complete as of the date of sentence, the court was not bound to fulfill its promise to impose the lesser sentences. Although the accused man’s counsel has recently written the court to indicate that the court-appointed receiver has now accumulated sufficient funds to make restitution to those who were promised restitution, there is still no basis for the court to rule that the sentencing court abused its discretion or exercised it in an inappropriate manner when it imposed sentence more than two years ago.

The record also indicates that, from the outset, the accused man understood that his cooperation in criminal investigations conducted by various law enforcement agencies might not lead to a reduction in the sentences which the court promised to impose at the time the pleas of guilty were entered. It is noteworthy that at the time the pleas were accepted, the court was not informed of the fact that the accused man had begun to cooperate with various law enforcement offices. The prosecutor and the Office of the United States Attorney complied with their respective promises to the accused to bring the nature and the extent of the accused man’s cooperation to the sentencing court’s attention. Neither the prosecutor’s nor the Assistant United States Attorney’s recommendation that the accused be sentenced to a term of probation, in light of the services he provided, was binding on the sentencing court, as was obviously well known to the accused who is a former attorney. Nevertheless, the court did reduce the maximum term of the promised sentence by one year and the minimum term by four months.

Continue reading

In one case, a criminal defendant filed an Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the second degree, and grand larceny in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The court Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reducing the defendant’s conviction of grand larceny in the second degree to petit larceny, and vacating the sentence imposed thereon; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The Court agrees with the defendant’s contention that the value of the stolen jewelry was not established in accordance with Penal Law § 155.20(1), which requires proof of “the market value of the property at the time and place of the crimes, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime”.

Accordingly, his conviction for grand larceny in the second degree cannot stand. However, the evidence presented did establish the crime of petit larceny, which requires no proof of value. Accordingly, the judgment is modified to reduce his conviction of grand larceny in the second degree to petit larceny. There is no need to remit the matter for resentencing on that count as the defendant has already served the maximum period to which he could have been sentenced on the conviction of petit larceny.

The indictment contains 12 counts pertaining to two transactions (the sale of two stolen automobiles from the premises of the defendant man’s gas station). The jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of grand larceny in the first degree, of two counts of criminal buying and receiving stolen property and of two counts criminal receiving and withholding stolen property.

At the threshold, the defendant contends that he has been convicted of crimes for which he has not been indicted. Clearly, his position is untenable and his reasoning fallacious. The cases holding that convictions must be reversed where the defendants charged in common law language have been convicted of the statutory crimes enumerated in the Penal Law are not applicable. The evidence showed that the defendant was a dealer in automobiles and, consequently, the Presumption embodied which contains a mere rule of evidence, could be drawn by the jury. Of course, that inference is implicit in its verdict. However, the presumption is not the foundation underlying a statutory crime and the language contained therein does not have to appear in the indictment.

The defendant raises the point that simultaneous verdicts of guilty of grand larceny and guilty of criminal receiving and concealing the property involved in the grand larceny cannot stand. Although a thief cannot be convicted of grand larceny and criminally receiving and concealing the same stolen property, a non-accessory to the original taking may be convicted of grand larceny by false pretense, for fraudulently obtaining the proceeds from the sale of the stolen item, and of receiving and concealing said property. Conviction on both counts is not inconsistent.

Continue reading

The complainant appeals from an order of the County Supreme Court granting the accused man’s motion to dismiss the indictment because of the prosecutor’s alleged failure in his opening statement to the jury to state a legitimate case. The appeal is dismissed.

The accused was charged in the indictment with two counts of grand larceny in the second degree. Upon the trial the prosecutor’s opening consisted of a reading of the indictment and a short statement of what he intended to prove. When he had concluded his opening, the accused moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the opening had not made out a case of grand larceny.

In answer, the court said that it found deficiencies in the opening and indicated that it was inclined to grant the accused man’s motion. The prosecutor then moved to be permitted to add to his opening statement. The motion was denied.

Continue reading