Articles Posted in Sex Crimes

The respondent, before the court for a risk level determination pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), moves for an order rejecting the recommendation of the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (the Board) that the respondent be designated a risk level three. The respondent further seeks an order holding that he is not required to register as a sex offender.

A New York Sex crimes attorney said that in November 1988, the respondent was arrested in Kings County and subsequently indicted for robbery in the first degree and related offenses. Thereafter, he entered a plea of guilty to attempted robbery in the first degree.

Subsequent to the issuance of the Kings County warrant, the respondent was arrested in North Carolina and charged with having sexual contact with four children. Later, following a three-day trial, he was convicted of one count of first degree sex offense and related charges and was sentenced to life in prison.

Respondents in these cases are the subjects of sex crimes offender civil management petitions pursuant to Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law. On April 17th, April 21st and April 28th 2008, the State moved to transfer the venue of these proceedings from New York County, where they are currently located, to the jurisdictions where the crimes committed by the offenders in these cases occurred. Although each of these motions was brought separately and these cases have not been formally consolidated, the legal issues, procedural history, counsels for the parties and many of the factual issues in these motions overlap.

Respondent was convicted of one count of Sex Abuse in the Third Degree in 1980, one count of Sex Abuse in the First Degree in 1984 and Sodomy in the First Degree in 1993. He was sentenced on the latter conviction to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 6-12 years. Respondent was conditionally released in October of 2001 but violated his parole by possessing pornography. He was then re-incarcerated and subsequently transferred to the Manhattan Psychiatric Center, as noted above, at the completion of his sentence in 2005.

These cases all arose pursuant to a unique procedural history. In the fall of 2005, after failing to achieve passage of legislation to provide for the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders for a number of years, the Governor charged state officials to “push the envelope” and use the provisions of the existing Mental Hygiene Law to civilly confine convicted sex crime offenders whose prison terms were ending. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, twelve convicted sex crime offenders were confined at the conclusion of their prison terms at the Manhattan Psychiatric Center between September 23 and October 21, 2005 pursuant to this directive. The Governor relied upon M.H.L. § 9.27(a) for these actions, which authorizes the involuntary confinement of persons who are mentally ill, in need of involuntary care and treatment and pose a danger to themselves or society. Some of these first twelve offenders were later transferred to the Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center also located in New York County.

A New York Prostitution Lawyer said that, this is a multiple non-payment proceeding instituted by the owner of a high-rise dwelling which contains 350 apartments to recover possession of the several apartments. Eighty-four separate proceedings were brought and it was stipulated by the parties that the special referee may try all of them together and that the evidence be applied to each proceeding, and that the referee may render a separate judgment in each proceeding.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the tenants appearing by the same attorneys interposed three defenses, but at the hearing two of them were withdrawn and the only defense relied upon is defense of un-inhabitability and Sec. 755 Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, as set forth in paragraph 2 of the answer, in that the premises are not habitable because the petitioner knew or should have known for a long time prior to the commencement of these proceedings that its premises were and are being used for immoral purposes, thus interfering greatly with the quiet enjoyment of the premises by the respondents.

A New York Patronizing Prostitution Lawyer said that, from the evidence it appears that prior to the institution of these proceedings many of the tenants formed the Westerly Tenants’ Association and this Association met with the landlord and his attorneys, at which time the tenants presented complaints relating to unlawful activities by alleged prostitutes and procurers and the existence of so-called massage parlors in the building. The tenants were informed by the landlord’s attorneys that necessary steps would be taken to remove any undesirables from the premises and to seek to oust them, but it had to be done legally. Requests were made for rent, which the tenants refused to pay. Whereupon, the petitioner-landlord instituted these proceedings. The rentals are on the average of $350 per apartment per month, and some of these apartments rent for about $600 per month. At the outset, about 110 tenants refused to pay their rents to the landlord. Presently, 84 tenants have not paid their monthly rentals for a period of two months. There was no burglary.

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This is an action for personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff, when he was under arrest on two separate occasions. According to the City’s papers for the instant motion, the first arrest was based on allegations of sexual assault made by a foster child who used to live next door to Plaintiff. In July 31, 2004, two police officers and a worker from Children’s Services arrived at Plaintiff’s apartment and questioned Plaintiff’s three daughters regarding said allegations. It is Plaintiff’s position that one of his daughters told the officers that the allegations were untrue. That day, Plaintiff was arrested and arraigned on charges of forcible touching and endangering the welfare of a minor. A Grand Jury indicted Plaintiff in September 2004. Plaintiff had a trial on these criminal charges and was acquitted in May 2006.

A Nassau Sex Crimes attorney said that in December 2005, Plaintiff was again arrested. However, this time, the complaining witness was Plaintiff’s daughter. According to the testimony of a Detective, in November 2005, the police received a report from the Children Services sent from a Hospital that the daughter claimed Plaintiff sexually abused her. Thereafter, Detective met with the daughter who told him that she was raped by Plaintiff in November 2005, and over a period of time since she was ten years old. At the time of the complaint, she was fifteen years old. That same day, the Detective set up a meeting for the daughter to speak to the District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s Office”) who thereafter approved Plaintiff’s arrest.

Thereafter, Plaintiff testified before a Grand Jury. In December 2005, he was indicted on charges of rape, sexual conduct and endangering the welfare of a minor. Plaintiff had a trial by jury on these charges and was acquitted in November 2006.

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This is a proceeding wherein the defendant was charged in two separate counts with committing sodomy upon A, age 14, and B, age 16. He was also charged in a third count with a violation of section 483, Penal Law, impairing the morals of the younger complainant A. The case was tried without a jury.

The court finds that with regard to all three crimes charged, the evidence establishes that the complainants not only consented to but actually solicited the acts. The complainants clearly would be accomplices in fact if under the controlling statutes based on Sodomy, Penal Law, § 690 and Impairing, Penal Law, § 483. They can also be accomplices as a matter of law.

This is one of the issues before the court. If they are accomplices as a matter of law, their testimony must be corroborated under Code of Criminal Procedure, § 399. Another issue presented is the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence.

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A Queens Sex Crimes Lawyer said that, the People move to have this Court reconsider its April 24, 1998 classification of the defendant for purposes of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art. 6-C, Section 168 et seq., hereinafter “SORA”). After reviewing the People’s motion, the applicable case law and the Court files, the Court rules as follows.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant pled guilty before this Court on March 25, 1998 to violating Penal Law Section 130.60, Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, a class “A” misdemeanor, with a promised sentence of one-year incarceration. The case was adjourned to April 24, 1998 for a sex crime offender risk determination pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (commonly known as “Megan’s Law”, hereinafter “SORA”). On April 24, 1998, the District Attorney advised this Court that a stipulation had been entered into with the defendant’s attorney providing for the offender to be classified as a “level two” sex offender, despite the defendant’s prior record, which included a previous felony conviction for a sex crime offense. Albeit erroneously, the Court agreed to honor the stipulation of the parties, and thereby made a risk-level determination that the defendant be classified a level two (moderate risk). The defendant was released from custody on April 1, 1998. The Court was not provided with a recommendation from the Board of Examiners until August 16, 1998, just prior to the People’s application herein. The Court was not therefore given the opportunity, prior to the defendant’s discharge into the community, to review the Board’s recommendations that the defendant be deemed a level three sexually violent predator. The People made the instant application to revisit this Court’s classification on September 8, 1998, more than four months after the Court’s determination. The Court adjourned the matter to October 1, 1998 for responsive papers from the defendant’s attorney and for oral argument. On that date, the matter was deemed submitted and set down for Court decision.

The issue in this case is whether the Court that adopted a Sex Offender Risk Level determination stipulated to by the People and the defendant’s counsel for purposes of the SORA vacate the stipulation to correct an error in the risk-level classification.

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This matter is before the court for a judicial determination of defendant’s duration of registration and level of notification pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), based on his June 9, 1999 plea of guilty to one count of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and one count of sodomy in the first degree. On October 4, 2005, this court received a risk assessment recommendation from the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders pursuant to Correction Law § 168-l (6), recommending that defendant be designated a level three sex crimes offender.

On November 3, 2005, this court held a hearing pursuant to Correction Law § 168-n (3). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court was required to designate defendant a “sexually violent offender”, as the crimes of which the defendant stands convicted are both designated as “sexually violent offenses” requiring lifetime registration. This court also rendered a determination designating defendant a level one sex crime offender. This written opinion further explains this court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in its oral ruling, in conformity with Correction Law § 168-n (3).

A New York Rape Lawyer said that, the instant charges arose from incidents commencing in February 1995, when defendant was 13 years old and the victim was 4 years old, and continuing through March 31, 1998, when defendant was 17 years old and the victim was 7 years old. During those years, the victim’s mother regularly brought the younger child to defendant’s home for babysitting by defendant’s mother. The conduct at issue occurred when defendant’s mother left the victim in defendant’s sole care while she left the home to run errands. No gun was involved.

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A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an emotionally charged CPLR article 78 proceeding which has its genesis in a tragic incident in which two young pedestrians, were killed when a motor vehicle operated by the defendant struck them. Defendant was DWAI. The accident occurred in Nassau County. Flaherty, in response to the filing against him of a superior court information, entered a guilty plea in Nassau County Court to two counts of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree and one count of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. On May 2, 1988, he was sentenced to two concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment with a minimum sentence of two and one-third years and a maximum sentence of seven years on the vehicular manslaughter convictions and a concurrent definite term of one year in prison for driving while under the influence of alcohol. He was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Correctional Services (DCS) to serve his sentence.

A Nassau Rape Lawyer said that, in 1987, the New York Legislature added Article 26-A to the Correction Law which created a shock incarceration program. The program’s stated purpose is to deter young, non-violent offenders from future crime. Correction Law § 865(1) specifies the eligibility requirements for the program. On June 27, 1988, respondent Flaherty was received into the custody of the Corrections Department at the Downstate Correctional Facility Reception Center. While at the reception center, his eligibility was reviewed and the selection process commenced. The Shock Incarceration Selection Committee, established by Correction Law Section 866(2), approved respondent Flaherty’s application on July 29, 1988 for permission to participate in the shock incarceration program and forwarded his application to DCS’s central office for final review.

On August 2, 1988 defendant was selected and approved by the central office for the program. He satisfied the then-existing eligibility criteria. He was under the age of 26, his sentence was indeterminate, he would be eligible for parole within three years, this was his first felony conviction, he was between the ages of 16 and 26 when the crime was committed and he was not convicted of any specifically enumerated disqualifying crimes. On August 22, 1988, he commenced his actual participation in the program. It was not until August 22, 1988 that enough inmates had been selected to form a “platoon” to commence the program. After he entered the program, a form letter was sent on August 29, 1988 by the New York State Division of Parole to the sentencing judge, the Nassau County District Attorney’s office and defendant’s attorney advising that he would be eligible for parole release consideration, was scheduled to appear before the New York State Board of Parole during the month of January, 1989 and that a determination whether to release him to parole supervision would be made at that time. The letter sought any statements or recommendations the recipients might care to present with regard to his or her knowledge of the case. The letter contained the following sentence:

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant in this case is charged with a violation of Correction Law Section 168-t, in that he is alleged to have failed to personally register with the local law enforcement agency as a sexually violent predator, within ninety (90) days after his “initial release or commencement of” probation, as mandated by Corr.L. §§ 168-f(3) and 168-h 1. On January 22, 1992, defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of Penal Law, Sex Abuse (by forcible compulsion) in the First Degree, and was sentenced to six (6) months in jail and five (5) years probation. On July 25, 1995, the New York legislature approved passage of the Sex Offender Registration Act (“the Act”), Section 2 of Chapter 192 of the Laws of 1995, Correction Law Art. The Act became effective on January 21, 1996, almost four years to the day that the defendant completed four of the five years of his probationary term.

A New York Sex Crime Lawyer said that, intended to provide “law enforcement with additional information critical to preventing sexual victimization and to resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and exploitation promptly”, the Act imposed registration requirements on sex offenders and established procedures for the release or notification 2 to the law enforcement community and the public of information pertinent to the identity and location of convicted sex crimes offenders.

The issue in this case is whether defendant covered by the SORA.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, section B32-127.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York makes it unlawful for any person to act as a dealer in second-hand articles without a license therefor. The Commissioner of Licenses of the city has charge and control of issuing, transferring, renewing, revoking, suspending and canceling such licenses (New York City Charter, § 773). Applications therefor must be made to him in such form and detail as he shall prescribe. No person shall be licensed unless a citizen of the United States or has regularly declared his intention of becoming a citizen. Petitioner, a citizen of the United States, applied for such a license, the Commissioner denied her application, and she brings this proceeding to compel him to grant it. Neither robbery or burglary were involved.

A New York Prostitution Lawyer said that, in the form of application prescribed by the Commissioner there was a question: ‘If applicant has ever been arrested or summoned for any offense, such facts must be stated in full, giving number of times and final disposition.’ In her sworn answer to that question petitioner stated that in 1947 she had been arrested for maintaining a house of prostitution and sentenced to 15 days in the workhouse.

A New York Patronizing Prostitution Lawyer said that, by co-operation with the Police Department the Commissioner ascertained that in addition to what petitioner thus disclosed, she had been arrested on the same charge in 1936 and again in 1939 and in each of those instances she had received a suspended sentence; also that in each instance her record was under a different name, no one of which names was the name in which she institutes this proceeding and which she presumably used upon her application for the license.

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