Articles Posted in Sex Crimes

This is an action for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and civil rights violations which stems from plaintiff’s arrest in the Village of Lake Placid, Essex County, on 2 November 1995 for rape and sodomy in the first degree.

The criminal complainant was a woman that plaintiff had met at a party the previous evening. At approximately 3:30 A.M. on 2 November 1995, plaintiff arrived at the cottage where the complainant was staying—an encounter which he claims was prearranged—and was led to the complainant’s bedroom by her cousin, CS. After some small talk, according to plaintiff, they engaged in consensual oral sex and sexual intercourse which did not last for long because the complainant became sick. When she did not respond to his inquiries about “what was going on”, plaintiff got mad and left to drive JC, a friend who had accompanied him to the cottage, home. When plaintiff returned to the cottage shortly thereafter to check on the complainant, she was crying and had told CS that plaintiff raped her. After contacting the police, the complainant was taken to a local hospital by two Village of Lake Placid patrolmen for a rape kit examination.

Thereafter, she was taken to the police station and interviewed by Village of Lake Placid Police Detective D. She gave him an oral statement accusing plaintiff of having nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her, which was later reduced to writing, albeit after plaintiff’s arrest.

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The rules of evidence in regards to admissibility of evidence are important to be successful in a trial. The jury should not be exposed to prejudicial material which may put the defendant in a precarious position to ensure that the trial is fair. In the People v Asmar the prosecution sought permission to adduce evidence about the defendant’s past with the complainant.

Mr. Asmar, the defendant was charged with rape, sodomy and sexual abuse. The Defendant however, stated that the sex acts between them were consensual and began taking place 2 months prior to the acts complained of. As a result the prosecution sought to introduce in their case-in-chief testimony from the complainant and her employer, to the effect that one month before the alleged rape, sodomy and sexual abuse took place, the defendant accosted the complainant, sexually touched her and made a lewd proposal. As a result to the defendant’s actions, the complainant took certain actions designed to impede the defendant’s access to the store and to herself. Authorization was sought to allow the testimony that the complaint orally reject this defendant’s advances but also that she told her employer to contact the defendant’s employer for the purpose of requesting that the defendant make deliveries at times while the complainant was not at work. Additionally, the prosecution also sought authorization to permit testimony that two week earlier the complainant asked a customer to remain in the store when the defendant appeared and that that she told her husband and another friend about the defendant’s words and acts and contends that another friend told her that defendant attempted to kiss her. It was asserted by the district attorney that the request was relevant and non-prejudicial and that it reflects the complainant’s state of mind on the issues of consent, forcible compulsion, fear and her relationship with the defendant.

A criminal court employs a two-part test for determining when evidence of other acts is admissible under the other-act rule; first, the evidence offered must be relevant to prove a material issue other than the defendant’s character, and second, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh the prejudicial effect. Evidence otherwise relevant to prove some material fact is not necessarily rendered inadmissible even though it reveals that defendant has committed another crime; however, court must balance probative value of evidence against its potential prejudice to defendant. In order for such evidence to be probative, the prosecution must establish a logical link between the evidence of the past assaults by the defendant on the complainant and the material issues of forcible compulsion and lack of consent.

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There is a well-known rule in the area of criminal law that every count in an indictment should contain one offence. This rule is to ensure that an accused has a fair trial because he/she ought to know with certainty what the charge is. The accused person should be able to prepare a defense against the charges. In the People v Keindl this was issue along the alleged prejudice of the jury with the testimony of expert witness.

The defendant, Mr.Keindl was convicted of eight counts of sodomy in the first degree, ten counts of sex abuse in the first degree, five counts of sexual abuse in the second degree, and three counts of endangering the welfare of his stepchildren in the Supreme Court, Queens County and appealed. The defendant appealed because the twenty-six counts of the indictment alleged that the offenses occurred during designated periods of time, extending for as long as two years charged him with multiple offenses in individual counts in violation of rule against duplicity. The indictment also failed to allege with sufficient specificity the time of occurrence of the alleged offenses as required by criminal procedure law. He also asserted the counts of endangerment were invalid and that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Gannon, a psychiatrist, presented to explain how children, who have been repeatedly sexually abused by their stepfather, are likely to suffer psychologically. He argued that such expert testimony is inadmissible because it went to the ultimate question of whether defendant was guilty of endangering the welfare of a child which was within the sphere of the jury to decide.

The rule in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) states that each count of an indictment may charge one offense only. Where there is more than one offence in a count it is duplicitous. Duplicity is the joining in a single count of two or more distinct and separate offenses. It is important that an indictment is not duplicitous because it essential to the defendant’s ability to make a defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecution that he not be called upon to answer for more than one offense in each count of an indictment. The CPL requires not only that each count specify a time when or during which the crime was committed, but also specifically demands that each count of an indictment charge only one offense. The indictment is not required to state the correct date as long as it does not invalidate the indictment, and the time element does not have to be specific as long as it is within reasonable limits. The “continuous crime” theory, which would permit repeated acts of sexual molestation on young children within the family to be treated as “one continuous crime”, is not applicable to the crimes of sodomy and sexual abuse of which defendant has been convicted, since sodomy, rape and sexual abuse, as those crimes are defined in the Penal Law. The counts of sodomy and sexual abuse against the defendant which spanned periods of time extending for ten, twelve and sixteen months were so excessive on their face that they were unreasonable where victims were between eight and thirteen years old during time of offenses. Thus the prosecution was capable of discerning seasons, school holidays, birthdays or other events which could establish frame of reference to narrow time spans alleged.

In this Sex abuse case, Defendant pled guilty before the Court in violating Penal Law Section 130.60, Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, a class “A” misdemeanor, with a promised sentence of one-year incarceration.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that the case was adjourned for a sex offender risk determination pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”). Thereafter, the District Attorney advised this Court that a stipulation had been entered into with the defendant’s attorney providing for the offender to be classified as a “level two” sex offender, despite the defendant’s prior record, which included a previous felony conviction for a sex crime offense. Albeit erroneously, the Court agreed to honor the stipulation of the parties, and thereby made a risk-level determination that the defendant be classified a level two. The defendant was released from custody. The Court was not provided with a recommendation from the Board of Examiners until prior to the People’s application herein. The Court was not therefore given the opportunity, prior to the defendant’s discharge into the community, to review the Board’s recommendations that the defendant be deemed a level three sexually violent predator. The People made the instant application to revisit this Court’s classification, more than four months after the Court’s determination. The Court adjourned the matter for responsive papers from the defendant’s attorney and for oral argument. On that date, the matter was deemed submitted and set down for Court decision.

Since its effective date, there has been a significant body of case law devoted to the constitutional and procedural implications of SORA.

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Sometime in August 1998, the defendant was released from state prison after serving a three year sentence following his conviction on October 25, 1995 to sexual abuse in the first degree. The defendant, who was a Cadet Leader of an eight year old boy, pled guilty to fondling the boy’s penis while staying overnight at the boy’s home. The court must now make a risk assessment determination pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders has recommended to the court that the defendant be assessed a risk level two. This recommendation was based on the Board’s use of its objective risk assessment instrument which assigns a numerical value to the existence of certain risk factors and totals the numerical points to arrive at the offender’s presumptive risk level. The Board found that the defendant’s total risk factor score was 100 points. This score, being more than 70 points but less than 110 points, falls within the numerical parameters set forth for a presumptive risk level two category. A level two designation indicates that the risk of repeat offense is moderate.

After receiving a risk assessment recommendation from the Board, the sentencing court must make a final judicial determination with respect to the level of notification. The phrase “sentencing court” is not defined within the Act. Other States have held that the phrase “sentencing court” refers to the forum that had jurisdiction over the case, as opposed to the specific judge. Although this State has not set forth a definition in statute or case law for the phrase “sentencing court,” it has been held that a judge is not “the court” as a “court” is defined as an organized body with defined powers, meeting at certain times and places for the hearing and decisions of causes and other matters brought before it

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In June 1998, respondent pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to an information charging one count of computer transmission of material involving sexual exploitation of minors. That charge arose from allegations that respondent had transmitted via the Internet three photographs of juveniles engaged in sex abuse explicit conduct. Respondent was sentenced to home detention for a period of 15 months and five years’ probation, and was directed to undergo mental health treatment during the entire term of his probation.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that the Board informed respondent that since he had been convicted of a sex crime in another jurisdiction and resides in New York State, he may be required to register as a sex offender under the provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act. The letter invited respondent to submit any materials that he wished the Board to consider in making their determination.

In a letter to the Board, respondent’s counsel argued that respondent should not be required to register as a sex offender because the Federal crime of which respondent was convicted does not contain all of the essential elements of any New York State sex offense. Specifically, respondent contended that whereas the Federal crime requires that a defendant transmit sexually explicit images of an individual under the age of 18, the analogous State statutes criminalizing such prostitution conduct apply only where the images are of children less than 16 years old. Thus, respondent argued, under the strict statutory construction rules developed by the Court of Appeals for using out-of-State convictions to adjudicate defendants as prior felony offenders, respondent’s Federal conviction does not qualify as a sex offense under SORA’s definition of that term.

Defendants are charged with acting in concert to commit the sex crime of Prostitution. Co-Defendant was originally charged with Promoting Prostitution in the third degree (P.L. 230.25[1] ) and Possession of a Gambling Device . The promoting prostitution charge was reduced to Promoting Prostitution in the fourth degree

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer, the charges as to all three defendants arise from allegations of an undercover police officer that he entered premises at the Bronx and was approached by defendants who offered and agreed to engage in sexual contact with him in exchange for money. Specifically, defendants are alleged to have agreed to allow the officer to touch the defendants’ naked breasts and buttocks and the defendants are alleged to have agreed to perform what is commonly known as “lap dancing”. This “lap dancing” consisted of sitting on and moving around on the officer’s lap. The basis for defendant’s charge of promoting prostitution is that he was observed by the undercover officer to be managing the subject premises and did in fact state that he was the manager and possessed keys to the premises.

All three defendants have moved for dismissal of the accusatory instruments on the basis of facial insufficiency. Defendants have also moved to dismiss in the interests of justice pursuant to C.P.L. 170.40. These motions have been consolidated for purposes of this decision.

The defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered 5 May 2008, convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty and imposing sentence. The sex appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of suppression of identification testimony.

The criminal court orders the judgment reversed, on the law. Further, it orders that the plea be vacated, the identification testimony suppressed and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County for further proceedings consistent with the case.

The defendant agreed to plead guilty to rape in the first degree in exchange for a promised determinate sentence of nine years of imprisonment. The defendant made this on the day after the Supreme Court denied suppression of identification testimony. During the course of the ensuing plea allocution, the Supreme Court advised the defendant of the terms of its sentencing commitment, and briefly explained that he would be waiving his right to appeal.

On 12 May 2008, the County Court of Suffolk County rendered judgment convicting a certain defendant of criminal sexual act in the first degree (two counts), attempted rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict. Domestic violence could be involved.

On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.

Here, the criminal defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was unpreserved for appellate review. This is pursuant to CPL 470.05[2] and the court’s ruling in the case of People v. Hawkins. In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and pursuant to the case of People v. Contes, the court found that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

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In this Sex Crime, Petitioner commenced this Article 78 proceeding against the respondents Police Department (PD) and its Commissioner to compel the production of records relating to raids on certain bondage, dominance, sadism and masochism establishments, pursuant to New York’s Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”), and for attorneys’ fees and costs related to this action.

A New York Criminal lawyer said that is a New York not-for-profit legal and social services corporation. One of its divisions, Sex Workers Project, is engaged in protecting the rights of people referred to as “sex workers,” people profiled as “sex workers” and victims of human trafficking. Thereafter, in 2008, Petitioner made a FOIL request to PD for certain documents relating to raids conducted between April and September of 2008 by the Police District on BDSM establishments.

Petitioner’s request sought the production of records that fell into two distinct categories: (1) training manuals as to arrests for prostitution and (2) memos and manuals of policies and investigation records of bondage and domination establishments. No arson and no assault were involved.

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