Articles Posted in Sex Crimes

The complainant commenced an action by filing information that accuses a man of sexual abuse in the second degree. The complainant and a detective, attests that the man did enter the bedroom of the mentally retarded 16 year old female and did expose his erect penis. The man did allegedly take the victim’s hand in his own and put the victim’s hand on his erect penis and did masturbate himself.This is a sex crime and a criminal act.

The source of the said information and the basis of the belief are the interview and statement of the victim and the interview and statement of admission of the man

.

Sometime in January 2005, the defendant allegedly engaged in a sexually explicit textual internet communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl. In June 2006, the defendant purportedly waived indictment and entered a plea of guilty to the sex crime of attempted rape in the third degree in satisfaction of a Superior Court information, which also charged two counts of attempted disseminating indecent material to a minor in the first degree. The transcript of the plea hearing disclosed that there was a pending indictment, at the time of the waiver and plea. That criminal indictment charged the defendant with two counts of attempted disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree, arising out of the January 2005 textual internet communications. At the plea hearing, the People stated that the defendant’s plea was also in satisfaction of the indictment and moved for its dismissal, which motion was granted by the County Court. Shortly after the defendant’s plea, and prior to the imposition of sentence, the Court issued its decision and order, holding that the offense or criminal act of disseminating indecent material to a minor in the first degree required the communication of visual sexual images, and not merely sexually explicit text. The defendant then moved pursuant to CPL 220.60 (3) to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss the Superior Court Information pursuant to CPL 210.20. The County Court granted the defendant’s motion on the ground that there were insufficient factual allegations to support any of the counts in the Superior Court Information. A weapon was not involved.

On appeal, it was found that the Superior Court information was properly dismissed, albeit for a different reason. The order was modified, on the law, by adding a provision thereto reinstating the indictment, and, as so modified, the order was affirmed, and the matter was remitted to the County Court of Suffolk County, for further proceedings on the indictment.

In the landmark case of People v Kozlow in 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court’s decision and order, holding that a defendant could be convicted under Penal Law former § 235.22, which was applicable to the defendant’s conduct here, even though his or her communications contained no nude or sexual images. Applying the statutory interpretation employed by the Court of Appeals in that case, the two counts of attempted disseminating indecent material to a minor in the first degree are, by definition, supported by legally sufficient allegations. However, based on the records of the case, the procedure utilized by the County Court and the People in securing the defendant’s plea of guilty was in contravention of article 195 of the CPL and the holding of the Court of Appeals in the case of People v Boston in 1990. CPL 195.10 (2) (b) specifically provides authority for a defendant’s waiver of an indictment and entry of a plea under a Superior Court information in a superior court only prior to the filing of an indictment by the grand jury. According to the Court of Appeals, in the case of People v Boston, the failure to adhere to this statutory procedure was jurisdictional, affecting the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law. The Court there held that the waiver and the plea made in satisfaction of the relevant Superior Court information had to be nullified. Clearly, the defendant’s waiver of indictment here was similarly a nullity, and the Superior Court Information was thus properly dismissed. Since the defendant’s waiver of indictment was jurisdictionally defective, the subject indictment must be reinstated, and the matter must be remitted to the County Court of Suffolk County, for further proceedings on the indictment. The People’s remaining contention was without merit.

In 1998, respondent was charged in two criminal indictments with breaking into four different homes and attempting to rape or sexually abuse the female occupants of each. In January 2000, he entered guilty pleas under both indictments in exchange for concurrent sentences of eight years imprisonment in each case. Specifically, respondent pled guilty to Burglary in the Second Degree and Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree and pled guilty to Burglary in the Second Degree and Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, and the promised sentences were subsequently imposed. The victim in one of the cases was a five-year old girl.

A Nassau County Sex Crime attorney said that at the probable cause hearing, petitioner presented the testimony of a psychiatrist licensed to practice in the State of New York since 1974. According to the reports of the psychiatrists who evaluated him, respondent suffered from severe physical and sexual abuse as a child, and eventually began to use and abuse marihuana. Before being convicted of the felonies that led to his lengthy incarceration, respondent was arrested various times for indecent exposure. The certificates of conviction introduced into evidence at the hearing confirm that, in addition to the felonies described above, respondent was convicted of Criminal Possession of Marihuana in the Fifth Degree, Public Lewdness, and Public Lewdness and Exposure of a Person.

The psychiatrist has known respondent since October 2005, when respondent was first civilly confined at the hospital after being incarcerated. In addition, he interviewed and evaluated respondent and reviewed several documents in connection with the evaluation: respondent’s medical records, respondent’s pre-sentence report, respondent’s criminal history, and the reports of the other psychiatrists who had evaluated respondent. The psychiatrist relied on these materials in diagnosing respondent, and testified that mental health professionals regularly rely upon such materials in diagnosing and treating psychiatric disorders.

Continue reading

A case has been filed against the defendant. He is accused of the crimes of Rape in the First Degree (2 Counts), Sodomy in the First Degree (2 Counts), Sexual Abuse in the First Degree (2 Counts), and Burglary in the Second Degree.

The charges are that defendant on 18 November 1987 knowingly entered unlawfully in a dwelling with intent to commit the crimes of Rape and Sodomy therein, and engaged in sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse with a female by forcible compulsion.

On 21 April 1988 the defendant entered a plea of guilty to Attempted Rape in the First Degree in Violation of Sections 110/130.35(1) of the Penal Law, a Class “C” violent felony, in full satisfaction of the charges against him. The defendant will be sentenced as a second violent felony offender to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment having a maximum term of 15 years and a minimum of 7 years 6 months.

Continue reading

The Suffolk County Grand Jury indicted a certain respondent for rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (three counts) and sexual abuse in the second degree (three counts). During trial, the respondent presented two witnesses to testify before the Grand Jury. The prosecutor interviewed these witnesses at the time the charges were presented to the Grand Jury, concluded that their proposed testimony was irrelevant, and therefore limited the scope of their testimony. The proposed testimony by the respondent’s wife (the first witness) which was excluded by the prosecutor concerned the family background of the victim, who was her niece. The other witness (the second witness), a friend of the victim, had indicated to the prosecutor that she thought that the victim was fantasizing, but that testimony was also excluded. Thereafter, the County Court of Suffolk County granted the criminal respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment holding that the testimony of the two defense witnesses concerning their knowledge of the victim’s background had a bearing on her credibility and should have been presented to the Grand Jury. The juvenile was questioned about any domestic violence.

On appeal, the Appellate Court disagreed. The order was reversed, on the law, the indictment was reinstated, and the matter was remitted to the County Court of Suffolk County for further proceedings.

Well settled is the rule that, except to the limited extent that CPL 190.50(6) allows a defendant the right to testify or the right to request that certain witnesses be presented to the Grand Jury, a Grand Jury proceeding is not adversarial in nature. Rather, the primary purpose of the Grand Jury is to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to accuse a person of a crime and to commence criminal proceedings against him. Subject to a duty of fair dealing, the People enjoy wide discretion in presenting their case to the Grand Jury.

Continue reading

This action was commenced as the result of an incident which occurred between the plaintiff and the criminal defendant culminating in the plaintiff being arrested and accused of sodomy and rape but six months after, the charges were dropped. The complaint alleges six causes of action against the defendant including libel per se, slander per se, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution/abuse of process and prima facie tort.

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint, alleging that there are no issues of fact regarding her liability in this action. In support of her motion, the defendant submits, inter alia, the pleadings, written statements given to the Suffolk County Police Department by the parties and a nonparty witness, and the depositions of the parties and a nonparty witness.

The defendant now files for a motion for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Continue reading

The defendant father was indicted in 1994 in a twenty-eight count indictment charging that he engaged in sex relations with his 15 year old daughter, during a three month period. He entered into a negotiated Alford-Serrano plea to one count of rape in the third degree with the assistant district attorney, with the knowledge and consent of the victim’s mother. The court in view of the representations of the prosecutor, and the defense along with the victim’s mother, accepted the plea bargain based on the fact that the victim was of limited intelligence and would be unduly traumatized by testifying in court against her father. While the father maintained his innocence he claimed that a jury might convict him of rape in the first degree rather than the statutory rape charge to which he pled. Domestic violence at its worst.

The criminal defendant father argues that since he took an Alford-Serrano plea, whereby he maintained his innocence, yet acknowledged that the prosecutor may have been able to obtain a conviction, it should not be used against him in calculating his classification as a sex offender.

After the plea, the assistant district attorney moved pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law that the defendant submit to a human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) test. Attached to the motion was an application for HIV testing signed by the allege victim. The defendant father steadfastly refused to take the HIV test on the ground that he still maintains his innocence and no proof otherwise was ever presented to the court. He also argues that the disclosure of a positive test result if it occurred would harm his reputation in the community since the victim’s family has in the past proliferated defamatory written materials attacking him and his employer.

Continue reading

A Nassau Sex Crime Lawyer said that, in this case, plaintiffs, members of five same-sex couples living in New York City, move for summary judgment declaring that, under the New York State Constitution, they are entitled to treatment equal to that of opposite-sex couples with regard to the issuance of marriage licenses and access to civil marriage. They contend that, insofar as New York State’s Domestic Relations Law denies marriage licenses and access to civil marriage to same-sex couples, it violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the New York State Constitution. In addition to declaratory relief, plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring defendant to grant each of the couples a marriage license.

A Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant, who is sued in his official capacity as City Clerk of the City of New York, cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant is the administrator of the New York City Marriage License Bureau and has responsibility for the issuance of marriage licenses and the solemnization of civil marriages in New York City.

A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, the partners in each couple have been devoted to one another for periods ranging from 3 to 22 years and represent the rich diversity of New York. Several of the couples are raising children conceived during the relationship or adopted into their homes. The individual plaintiffs come from an array of racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and include health care professionals, a computer specialist, a textile stylist, a waiter, city planners, and a director of an emergency food assistance program. Each couple wishes to enter into a civil marriage, but was denied a marriage license by defendant clerk. Plaintiffs allege that they have suffered serious hardship because of their exclusion from civil marriage. Plaintiffs claim that without this State’s recognition of same-sex marriage, they are denied the protections, benefits, and mutual responsibilities automatically afforded to married couples by New York state law. Grand larceny was not an issue.

Continue reading

The defendant was indicted in 1994 in a twenty-eight count criminal indictment charging that he engaged in sexual relations with his 15 year old daughter, during a three month period. A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant entered into a negotiated Alford-Serrano plea to one count of rape in the third degree with the assistant district attorney, with the knowledge and consent of the victim’s mother. The court in view of the representations of the prosecutor, and the defense along with the victim’s mother, accepted the plea bargain based on the fact that the victim was of limited intelligence who would be unduly traumatized by testifying in court against her father. While the defendant maintained his innocence he claimed that a jury might convict him of rape in the first degree rather than the statutory rape charge to which he pled.

A Sex Crime Lawyer said that, the defendant argues that since he took an Alford-Serrano plea, whereby he maintained his innocence, yet acknowledged that the prosecutor may have been able to obtain a conviction, it should not be used against him in calculating his classification as a “sex offender” pursuant to the SORA.

A Lawyer said that, after the plea, the assistant district attorney moved pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section 390.15 that the defendant submit to a human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) test. Attached to the People’s motion was an application for HIV testing signed by the alleged victim. The defendant steadfastly refused to take the HIV test on the ground that the defendant still maintains his innocence and no proof otherwise was ever presented to this court. He also argues that the disclosure of a “positive” test result if it occurred would harm his reputation in the community since the victim’s family has in the past proliferated defamatory written materials attacking him and his employer. A defendant who takes an Alford-Serrano plea “does not accept responsibility for the offense.” Quite the contrary, the defendant here vehemently protested his guilt and maintains his innocence. However, the defendant cannot have it both ways; he cannot maintain innocence and thereby circumvent the collateral consequences of his plea of guilty or the nature of his plea. No robbery or gun possession was involved.

Continue reading