Articles Posted in Sex Crimes

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department. At all times relevant to these proceedings, respondent maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.

A New York Criminal attorney said in November 2006, respondent was served with a notice and statement of charges alleging that he engaged in illegal conduct that adversely reflected on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, and further engaged in conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness as a lawyer. Both charges arose from respondent’s guilty plea in Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to the crime of attempted criminal sex act in the third degree, a class A misdemeanor. Underlying the guilty plea was respondent’s admission that he engaged in sexually explicit conversations over an Internet chat room with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl, followed by his attempted meeting with the presumed minor for purposes of sexual contact. Respondent filed an answer in this proceeding, admitting the charges and requesting a hearing on mitigation.

A hearing was held before a Referee. For the most part, the dissent has accurately stated the evidence adduced at the hearing, which will not be repeated herein. The only omission was the testimony of two character witnesses. The first character witness, the chair of the intellectual property practice at a law firm, testified that he first met respondent in 1998, when he was respondent’s supervising criminal attorney at a New York City law firm. After his arrest, respondent called this attorney and told him what he had done. The witness testified that respondent had a reputation for honesty and integrity, notwithstanding the events leading to his conviction, and that respondent has a pending job offer with his current firm once these disciplinary proceedings are concluded. A second character witness testified that she grew up with respondent, and was close friends with his sister. She further testified that she had kept in touch with respondent, who had a reputation for being a smart and honest person, even after his conviction.

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This is a proceeding wherein the Attorney General of the State of New York filed a petition on 19 July 2010 contending that Criminal Respondent RV is a detained sex offender who has a mental abnormality as that term is defined in Article 10 of the New York State Mental Hygiene Law, § 10.03, such that Respondent should be confined or supervised by the Office of Mental Health once his prison sentence is completed.

On 7 February 2011, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition contending that he was not convicted of any sex crime and that the provision in Article 10, Section 10.07(c) that would allow a jury to determine whether Respondent’s robbery and attempted robbery convictions were “sexually motivated” is unconstitutional in that it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Respondent asserts that Section 10.07(c). The relevant provision of the criminal statute and its concomitant definitional paragraphs serve to retroactively transform a non- sex crime into a new “sexually motivated felony” and that it increases the punishment for the prior crime.

The court denies respondent’s motion to dismiss.

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This is a proceeding wherein the respondent, P, a 14 year old female was alleged, inter alia, to have offered to perform a deviate sexual act for U.S. currency, an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of prostitution under Penal Law Section 230.00, a class B misdemeanor. P is before the court on the complaint of D.

The court notes that D was not charged with the violation of patronizing a prostitute, P.L. § 230.05 nor was he charged with any other crime applicable to these facts.

Paragraph Ten of the Bill of Particulars of the Corporation Counsel describes the incident as follows:

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, ten years ago, the Legislature enacted the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), which required certain sex crime offenders to register with the Division of Criminal Justice Services within 10 calendar days after discharge from incarceration, parole or other release. The legislation created procedures to weigh the threat posed by the offender’s release and classifications geared to the offender’s risk level. SORA contemplates three levels of risk, from level one (the lowest) to level three, with reporting requirements increasing for each level. A five-member Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders is charged with the responsibility for developing risk assessment guidelines and recommending to a sentencing court the risk level involved upon the release of an offender.

A New York Sex Crimes Lawyer said that, pursuant to Correction Law § 168-a (2)(d), certain defendants convicted of sex offenses in other jurisdictions must register as sex offenders in New York. The case before us involves the application of this subsection to defendant’s United States Navy court-martial, following which the Board recommended, and County Court determined, that he be classified a level two sex offender under Correction Law § 168-a (2)(d)(ii). A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant was convicted in 2000 by a general court-martial under a generic provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibiting, among other things, “all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces”. Within the general statutory provision, defendant seems to have been convicted of the specific regulatory offense of “indecent assault.” The Navy apparently sentenced defendant to a bad conduct discharge and reduction in pay grade, but no fine or term of imprisonment.

The issue in this case is whether the jurisdiction where defendant was convicted of a felony required registration as a sex offender for that crime.

This is a proceeding wherein the defendant is charged with the felony of Sexual Abuse in violation of Section 130.65 of the Penal Law and the misdemeanor of Assault, covered by section 120.00 of the Penal Law.

At a preliminary hearing the complainant, RM, testified that she had hitchhiked her way to New York from Montana where she had been employed as a waitress. Her purpose in coming to New York was to visit a male friend who had been hospitalized. At her friend’s urging she slept in the apartment of the defendant, an acquaintance of her friend, on the night of her arrival, and again some three nights later. On the first occasion, she testified that the defendant slept on a separate mattress in the apartment. She did some cooking and cleaning each day following the first night, but did not sleep there again until three nights later when she awoke to find the defendant fondling her. She repelled his advances thus apparently angering the defendant who then beat her about the head and body.

The complainant asserts she was treated at a hospital for her injuries, but the People offered no proof of such treatment or, for that matter, any evidence whatever to corroborate the complainant’s account.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the Respondent is the subject of a petition for sex offender civil management pursuant to Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act. He moves here to dismiss the petition on the basis that certain provisions of the statute as applied to him are violative of the United States and New York State constitutions.

A New York Sex Crime Lawyer said that, on May 3, 1995, the Respondent was sentenced in New York County Supreme Court for convictions of Kidnapping in the Second Degree, Promoting Prostitution in the Second Degree and Bail Jumping in the First Degree. He received concurrent indeterminate sentences of 9-18 years’ incarceration on the kidnapping charge, 4-8 years on the promoting prostitution charge and 3-6 years on the bail jumping charge. According to the State, Respondent’s kidnapping and promoting prostitution charges included conduct in which he restrained the victim, repeatedly raped her, forced her to engage in prostitution, beat her and forced her to ingest narcotics. These acts allegedly occurred in 1992. The Respondent also has prior convictions for unlawful imprisonment, attempted assault and forcing a person to engage in prostitution.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, a sex crime offender civil management petition was filed in Greene County Supreme Court on December 3, 2009 and an amended petition was filed in New York County Supreme Court on December 18, 2009. The Respondent was in DOCS custody pursuant to his sentence at the time of the filing of the initial petition and has been in DOCS or OMH custody since that time. On February 17, 2010, Acting Greene County Supreme Court Justice found that there was probable cause to believe that the Respondent was a detained sex crime offender who suffered from a mental abnormality. The venue of the instant proceeding was subsequently transferred to this Court where the Respondent is awaiting trial.

This is a proceeding wherein the petitioner, DK, petitions for an order and judgment, pursuant to CPLR 7801-7806, annulling and vacating the 25 January 2011 final determination of respondent Board of Examiners of Criminal Sex Offenders of the State of New York on the grounds the determination was arbitrary and capricious, was affected by error of law and involved an abuse of discretion.

The court dismisses the petition.

The petitioner claims that his Florida nolo contendere plea to the crime of indecent assault under former Fla Stat § 800.04[3] for which the court withheld adjudication and entered an order of supervision placing petitioner on sexual offender probation for four years, does not constitute a conviction for purposes of the Sex Offender Registration Act and that, as such, the Board erred in determining that petitioner was required to register under SORA.

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This is a proceeding wherein the defendant moves pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate his judgment of conviction on the grounds that, unbeknownst to criminal defendant, the complainant had recanted her accusation both to the court and the district attorney’s office prior to the entry of defendant’s plea of guilty, and the prosecutor’s failure to disclose this information constituted a Brady violation, that such recantation constitutes newly discovered evidence warranting vacatur of the conviction, that criminal defendant’s plea of guilty was involuntary because he was not aware that he would be required to register as a sex offender and that his counsel was ineffective in that he prevented the judge at arraignment from dismissing the charges.

The People assert that, in preparing their response to the motion, they learned that the files of the District Attorney’s office pertaining to this case have been destroyed, and the court file has been lost and is therefore unavailable. The People were, however, able to obtain the pre-sentence report. The People’s affirmation is based on information from records and files of the New York State Division of Parole, the New York City Police Department, the Florida Sex Offender Registry, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, and upon conversations with individuals from the U.S. Attorney’s office, the NYS Office of Sex Offender Management and the NYS Department of Correctional Services.

In April 1976, the defendant was charged with rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree. The defendant, who was then 24 years old, had known the complaining witness, then 20 years old, for several years. On 24 April 1976, at the complaining witness’s home, following a visit with the complainant’s family and defendant’s mother, the defendant had told the complainant that he wanted to have sex. Upon her refusal, he forced her to engage in intercourse. Thereafter, the complainant was later taken to Brookdale Hospital for examination. She was negative for the presence of semen. On 28 April 1976, the complaining witness identified defendant to the police in front of the complaining witness’s home. The defendant was arrested. In statements following his arrest, defendant admitted having had intercourse with the complainant but denied having used force. He claimed that the complainant had been angry over the fact that defendant had been seeing another woman.

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A New York Sex Crimes Lawyer said that, the defendants were indicted for the crimes of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree and assault in the second degree. Although the alleged crimes occurred on April 4, 1975, the trial did not commence until October 21, 1975. The trial court determined that the provisions of CPL 60.42 were applicable to the trial of this case.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, pursuant to CPL 60.42, the defendants made an offer of proof concerning the complaint’s prior sexual conduct. After a hearing and a review of the various exhibits submitted by defendants, the trial court ruled that subdivisions 1 through 4 were not applicable and that the evidence offered was not “relevant and admissible in the interests of justice” under subdivision 5. Evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual conduct was therefore barred at the trial. Defendants contend that application of CPL 60.42 violated section 10 of article I of the United States Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature from passing an ex post facto law.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in determining that the provisions of CPL 60.42 were applicable to the trial of this case.

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This is a proceeding wherein the defendant, a convicted sex crimes offender, appeals from an amended order determining that he is a “level three” risk under the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.

As a matter of first impression at the appellate level, the court must determine whether County Court, on the People’s request for reconsideration of a prior order determining defendant to be a “level two risk,” had statutory or inherent authority to depart from its prior order and make a new determination.

The court concludes that the appellate court was authorized to reconsider or correct its determination of risk level under SORA based on further argument by the People and/or additional information provided by them.

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