The issue before the court involves the petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision that the District Court of Appeal reported.
Case Background
The defendant was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana. He was tried by a jury and found to be guilty of this crime. The defendant appealed the charge and the appeal was granted by the district court. The district court found that there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant had possession and control of the marijuana.
The appellant in this case was a passenger in a car where marijuana was found. He is appealing his juvenile adjudication on the two counts of possession of contraband on the ground that the evidence did not support a finding of constructive possession.
Case Background
The majority of the case against the defendant consisted of testimony of the arresting officer. The officer stated that she was on patrol during the early morning hours when she saw two young men trying to change a tire on a car located in a public parking lot. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the officer approached the young men and offered to help by providing light with her flashlight. The deputy stated that the young men were friendly, but acted a bit nervous and suspicious.
The Facts of the Case:
On 18 November 2009, the State enacted Leandra’s Law, roughly one month after the DWI death of an 11-year-old in New York City. It demands, inter alia, that all first-time, misdemeanor DWI offenders install ignition interlock devices in every automobile they own or operate for at least 6 months; barring indigency, that offenders pay for installation and maintenance of the interlocks. However, Leandra’s Law exhibits numerous defects which put its constitutionality in question.
Meanwhile, a defendant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated or drunk driving pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Following Leandra’s Law, New York’s newest anti-DWI measure, the matter is now before the Court for sentencing under it.
A man moved for an examination of the stenographic minutes from a grand jury proceeding for the purpose of determining whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the charge contained in the indictment and whether the legal instructions given to the grand jury were sufficient. He also seeks dismissal of the charges on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence or for other defects in the proceedings.
The man stands charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI), a class E felony. Based on records, the felony status of the crime is based on a predicate conviction for driving a motor vehicle with in the violation of vehicle and traffic law, an unclassified misdemeanor.
The incident occurred one evening where a state officer’s attention was drawn to the man’s automobile because it was moving slowly. He estimated that the driver of the vehicle was driving about 25 miles per hour in a 30-mile per hour zone during the late evening when no traffic was present and the roads were clear and dry. The officer followed the vehicle and testified that the man was going about 20 miles per hour in the 30-mile per hour zone. At some point he verified the speed of the vehicle using radar. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the man consistently maintained the same speed up hill and downhill, including a steep hill, until he pulled over at the direction of the officer. He also testified that the man was driving on the right-hand side of the road. The man further testified that he pulled him over solely because of his driving. He also testified in saying that driving ten miles per hour below the limit is considered impeding traffic. The district attorney however did not reprimand the grand jury on the witness in advising on the law.
This is a direct criminal appeal from the defendant who has been convicted and sentenced for possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, tampering with physical evidence, possession of less than 20 grams of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
The two issues of the case are whether the dual convictions of the defendant for possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of marijuana of less than 20 grams violated the principals of double jeopardy. The second issue is whether the habitual felony offender sentence that was imposed on the defendant for the offense of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell constituted a sentence that was “illegal.”
Case Discussion and Decision
The defendant in this case was found guilty of possession of more than 20 grams of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that on appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for dismissal for the paraphernalia offense and the possession of a felony amount of marijuana offense because the state did not have enough evidence to support a conviction on these charges.
The defendant concedes that the state had enough evidence to convict her of the lesser charges of a misdemeanor offense for possession of marijuana for the two partially smoked joints that were in plain view.
Case Background
On September 15, 1983, a DWI roadblock, indicated by signs, was set up by a uniformed police unit at the westbound 181st Street Bridge. All vehicles proceeding through the roadblock were stopped. Each driver was then approached and asked how they felt. The vehicle operated by the defendant was driven into this initial area in a normal manner and was stopped solely in accordance with the questioning procedure. The Police Officer, while asking the defendant how he felt, made several observations. He noticed that the defendant’s eyes were watery, his speech was slurred, and he had the odor of alcohol on his breath.
A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant was then directed to drive his vehicle to the safety zone a few feet away. The Police Officer ordered the defendant out of his car and gave him a field sobriety test. Based on the defendant’s performance and his statement that he had consumed eight beers, the defendant was then placed under arrest and transported to a highway unit precinct. On the way to the precinct Police Officer gave the defendant his Miranda warnings. Upon arriving at the highway unit precinct, the defendant was again advised of his constitutional rights, whereupon he repeated his statements as to his alcohol consumption. He voluntarily consented to taking a breathalyzer test. The results indicated a reading of .12 percent blood alcohol.
A Long Island Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant moves to dismiss the charge based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the roadblock and also moves to suppress the breathalyzer test results as well as expected testimony relating to coordination tests administered to him as being obtained in violation of his rights under the State and Federal Constitution. A hearing on this motion was held on March 8, 1984 and continued on March 12, 1984. The defendant now stands charged with violating VTL 1192(2) and 1192(3). He thus makes the instant motion.
Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on January 18, 1982. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department. A Bronx DWI Lawyer said that, in December 2001, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Committee) served respondent with a notice and statement of charges alleging 28 counts of professional misconduct against him involving seven separate legal matters. The charges alleged that respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct including the repeated disregard of court orders and directives; misrepresentations to clients, adversaries and courts; and the repeated neglect of client matters, often resulting in default judgments. By order entered November 28, 2001, this Court appointed a Referee to hear and report on the charges. Respondent filed an answer with affirmative defenses in January 2002.
A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, prior to the hearing, the Committee made a motion before the Referee requesting that the doctrine of collateral estoppel be applied to find respondent guilty of 11 of the 28 counts charged, based upon the findings and decisions issued by four courts. Respondent opposed the motion, and by decision dated November 1, 2002, the Referee granted the collateral estoppel motion on six of the 11 counts requested. Following 23 days of liability hearings on the remaining counts, the Referee issued a February 18, 2003 report sustaining 12 other counts and dismissing 13 counts. Three days of sanction hearings were held, with the Committee recommending disbarment and respondent, citing various mitigating factors, arguing for a public censure. In a final report dated May 5, 2003, the Referee recommended a five-year suspension. A Hearing Panel was convened, and it heard oral argument and accepted written submissions from both parties. In a written determination dated March 2, 2004, the Hearing Panel affirmed the Referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, except as to count 3, which it disaffirmed, and it further affirmed the Referee’s recommended sanction of a five-year suspension.
A Brooklyn Criminal Lawyer said that, the Committee now moves for an order pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.4 (d), confirming the Referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, as modified by the Hearing Panel’s recommendation, and imposing a sanction suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period not less than five years. A review of the five matters in which charges were sustained follows.
On September 25, 2003, the Associate Village Justice of this Court signed a search warrant directed to “any police officer of the County of Nassau.” A New York Criminal Lawyer said the search warrant provided: “Proof, by affidavit, having been this day made before me by Senior Building Inspector, Village of Westbury, Public Works, Village of Westbury and Department of Public Works, Village of Westbury that there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, as set forth in the affidavit and Exhibits attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein; you are therefore, commanded to make a search with Senior Building Inspector and his agents, between 09/25/03 and 10/02/03 in the hours between 6:00 A.M. and 9:00 P.M. of the entire premises designated and described as 335 Princeton Street, Westbury, New York. “The seizure of the foregoing evidence shall be limited to the taking of still photographs and videotape pictures of the inside and outside of the premises. This warrant must be executed within 10 days of the date of signing and a return to court 10 days thereafter. “If you find the same or any part thereof you are hereby directed to return and deliver said evidence to the undersigned Justice of the Village Court without unnecessary delay.”
A Bronx Criminal Lawyer said that, the Senior Building Inspector submitted what may be described as an exhaustive affidavit in support of the application. This Court wonders why, in view of the thoroughness of this affidavit and the apparent pre-warrant investigation, that a search and search warrant were needed at all unless the Village is simply trying to test the legal waters in this case to determine whether they may have another tool at their disposal, namely search warrants, that they may use to enforce the Village’s zoning and building code laws. The application for and the execution of a search warrant may in themselves deter the proliferation of illegal housing. The execution of a search warrant is an extremely frightening event for those subject to it. The court questions the need for this warrant because there is no legal requirement that a warrant be obtained in order to take photos of the outside of the premises from a public thoroughfare in front of the home. However, this Court finds that the Village has acted in good faith attempting; for example, to obtain the homeowner’s consent for the search prior to seeking the warrant and no doubt believing that similar actions have been approved and utilized in other villages without challenge.
A Bronx Criminal Lawyer said that, the subject property, 335 Princeton Street, is a two story house within the Incorporated Village of Westbury, New York. As shown on the records of the Department of Buildings of the Village of Westbury it is located on a quiet residential block consisting of one (1) family homes neatly maintained on a tree lined block.
On May 6, 1995 at approximately 1:30 AM, a police officer was assigned to a so called DWI checkpoint in Queens County. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that pursuant to the procedures established for this checkpoint, every vehicle was stopped and every driver was asked if he or she had been drinking. If the driver answered affirmatively, he or she was asked to submit to an alcohol-sensor field sobriety test. At about 1:30 AM, the accused man entered the checkpoint area and in response to the officer’s question indicated that he had been drinking. At this time, the accused exhibited the classic signs of intoxication, slurred speech, bloodshot watery eyes, an odor of alcohol and unsteadiness on his feet. The accused agreed to submit to an alcohol-sensor test and the results indicated a blood alcohol content of 0.15 of one percent. This test was re-administered to the accused approximately nine minutes later with identical results and he was then arrested and taken to the 114th Precinct where pedigree information in connection with the arrest was taken. While en route to the precinct, the accused asked the officer what was going to happen. The officer told the accused man that he would be given a breathalyzer test and that if his blood alcohol content registered 0.06 of one percent or less, that he would be released; that if he refused to submit to the breathalyzer test that his license would be revoked; that if he took the breathalyzer test and his blood alcohol content registered 0.10 of one percent or greater, that his license would be suspended. A similar exchange of information between the officer and the accused man took place at approximately 4:15 AM, immediately before the accused man took the breathalyzer test. Thereafter, the accused was transported to the Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit at the precinct. It was here that the officer advised the accused of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him from the IDTU questionnaire. Each and every Miranda warning was given and acknowledged by the accused who voluntarily agreed to answer questions.
A Manhattan Criminal Lawyer said that at some point after the IDTU questionnaire was completed by the officer, the accused was asked if he would submit to a breathalyzer test. Once again, the three alternatives described above were stated to the accused by the officer. The accused, without any apparent hesitation or protest, took the breathalyzer test at 4:15 AM. The results showed 0.09 of 1% of alcohol in the blood. The complainant concedes that the breathalyzer examination was administered more than two hours from the accused man’s arrest. The complainant concedes that notice of this statement was never provided to the defense counsel pursuant to CPL (Criminal Procedure Law).
Accordingly, the stop of the accused was proper. The officer request that the accused submit to an alcohol-sensor test was proper in view of the accused man’s response to the officer’s preliminary inquiry. The alcohol-sensor results provided probable cause to arrest the accused man of DWI.
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