Sex Crimes

Published on: October 11, 2012

Court Discusses Crime of Petit Larceny in Conjunction with Robbery Charges

by Stephen Bilkis

Appellant was charged by an indictment of committing the crime of robbery. The trial court instructed the jury on robbery and on the lesser offense of attempted robbery and, in so instructing advised the jury that it could bring in one of three verdicts: 1) not guilty, 2) guilty of robbery, or 3) guilty of attempted robbery. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the appellant’s trial counsel specifically requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit robbery, aggravated assault, and petit larceny, upon the theory that such offenses are within the dictates of the Supreme Court’s previous decision.

In rejecting the foregoing request, a New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the trial court observed: I find it difficult to believe that a jury could logically and legitimately determine that assault with intent to commit the crime, aggravated assault or petit larceny could in this instance, In view of the proof shown, be considered lesser offenses. Now it is the interpretation of this Court of the Brown Decisions and the Decisions that the Court, of the Supreme Court of Florida, in the Gilford Case expressly overruled those portions of those decisions wherein the Court has mandated to charge on all lesser included offenses, and left it to the point wherein Only when there was proof submitted that would enable the jury to determine guilt of a lesser offense should the Court charge on it.’

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in its decision.

Published on: October 10, 2012

Court Discusses Concept of Settled Jurisprudence

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an appealed case from the US District Court for Georgia. The district court dismissed the appellant’s complaint on the basis of the application of a settled jurisprudence in his case, which “held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” A New York Criminal Lawyer said the issue raised in the appeal is whether or not a claim for damages and declaratory relief filed by the state prisoner is barred by the rule on the settled jurisprudence. The state prisoner in filing his claim challenged the validity of the procedures of his extradition from Georgia to New York. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the district court.

The accused was serving a twenty-five year sentence at the federal prison located in Kansas. The appellant was later on extradited to Suffolk County, New York and was indicted of another criminal suit for which he served another twenty-five years to life. In the year of 2000, upon the lapse of time of his release, the convicted appellant was arrested with protest on his part because he was not given the signed extradition warrant to waive his extradition rights or habeas hearing and then he was extradited to New York to serve sentence for another criminal conviction.

As a consequence, he filed a verified complaint at New York District stating defendants’ violations of his constitutional right and seeking injunctive relief and claim for compensatory damages. The action was referred back to Georgia District Court, which dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim wherein relief could be granted pursuant to a statute. The major contention of the district court is finding the action as premature since the appellant failed to allege that his sentence or conviction for the crime charge was declared invalid. Thus, this appeal is filed.

Published on: October 10, 2012

Court Decides Whether to Issue Writ of Heabeas Corpus

by Stephen Bilkis

Appellant, who was petitioner below in a habeas corpus proceeding, seeks reversal of an order of the trial judge denying the writ and remanding him to the custody of the appellee, Custodian of the Florida State Prison. The point for determination on this appeal is the legality of the sentence of the appellant in view of the apparent inconsistencies between Section 811.301, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. and Section 817.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

A Franklin Criminal Lawyer said that, appellant was informed against in the Circuit Court for Franklin County by an information in two counts, reading in part as follows: Appellant, did then and there designedly by false pretense, and with intent to defraud, obtain from another person property, to-wit: $10.00, $10.00, and $5.00 from a certain individuals by promising to heal their illness and infirmities and then absconding with their money, knowing that his promises to heal were false. Second Count: A New York Criminal Lawyer said the appellant did then and there practice the healing art without first having obtained a certificate or proficiency in the basic sciences, by professing to heal a certain individuals for the sum of $10.00, $10.00 and $5.00.

Upon arraignment, a Franklin Criminal Lawyer said that, appellant pleaded guilty to the offense condemned by the first count and the second count was nolle prosequied. On September 26, 1955, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment in the State Prison under the first count of the information. When he began serving the sentence does not appear from the record. On March 26, 1956, appellant, without benefit of counsel, filed in the Circuit Court for Union County his petition for writ of habeas corpus contending that the information pursuant to which he was convicted was defective and that he had been denied counsel as well as a trial by jury. After hearing the matter, the Circuit Judge on April 14, 1956, found that the questions raised by the petition were not sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. A New York Drug Possession Lawyer said that, the Judge thereupon denied the writ and granted to the appellant the right of appeal. Reversal of this order denying the writ is sought by this appeal.

Published on: October 9, 2012

Defendant Submits a Nolo Contendre Plea

by Stephen Bilkis

In this sex crime case, by an Information, the State of Florida charged that, on October 1, 1997, petitioner, who was 18 at the time, violated former Florida Statutes § 800.04(3) by committing an act of Sexual Battery as defined in Florida Statutes § 794.011(1)(h) upon a child under the age of 16. A New York Sex Crimes Lawyer said that, petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge for which the court withheld adjudication, and the court entered an “order of supervision” placing petitioner on “sexual offender probation” for four years. In March 2001, the Florida court granted a defense motion to terminate petitioner’s probation and petitioner was thereafter required to register as a sex offender under Florida Statutes § 943.0435, Florida’s version of SORA.

Prior to moving to New York, petitioner sent a letter to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) informing it that he was required to register as a sex crime offender in Florida and the he intended to move to New York by February 8, 2006. DCJS thereafter sent petitioner sex crime offender registration form, which petitioner executed and returned. After receiving this form, the Board, in a letter determined that petitioner was a sex crime offender required to register under SORA, and upon the recommendation of the Board, the court determined that petitioner’s Final Risk Level Determination was level 1.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding to vacate the Board’s determination that he was required to register as a sex crime offender under SORA. In a decision the court determined that petitioner was entitled to a hearing to determine whether petitioner was properly served with the Board’s notification letter informing him that he was subject to the registration requirements of SORA. Rather than proceed with such a hearing, the Board, stipulated that it would recommence the registration process and “re-issue a final determination.” Thereafter, the Board issued a new determination informing petitioner that he was required to register under SORA because he had been convicted of sex offense as set forth in Correction Law § 168-a.

Published on: October 9, 2012

Defendant Charged with Drug Possession

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said in this drug offense case, defendant was found in his apartment with 6¼ grams of heroin about twenty to thirty minutes after a package containing 13 grams of heroin was delivered by mail to his apartment. Customs and postal inspectors had discovered the heroin in the package when it had arrived in the country at San Francisco. The package was mailed from Thailand and addressed to defendant’s residence in Daytona Beach, Florida. The postal authorities arranged a controlled delivery of the package to defendant’s residence.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, about twenty to thirty minutes after this controlled delivery had taken place, four officials, one a postal inspector, and another a customs agent, and the other two, Daytona Beach police detectives, entered defendant’s apartment under a valid search warrant. They found defendant in a bedroom with 6¼ grams of heroin on a coffee table in front of him. They conducted a search to find the remaining heroin. During this search, they found thirty packets of heroin, each wrapped in aluminum foil and containing a mixture which included approximately one milligram of heroin, in a drawer of a dresser in a bedroom across the hall from the room where defendant had been found. It was established at trial that these “dime bags” small packets wrapped in aluminum foil containing about one milligram of heroin are commonly used in passing heroin on the streets. The authorities also found some butts of marijuana cigarettes in the same bedroom drawer.

While the authorities were searching the apartment, defendant remarked to them, referring to the thirty “dime bags”, “I bet you didn’t think I could package it up that quick”.

Published on: October 9, 2012

Court Hears Conspiracy Case

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant appeals his conviction after trial to a jury for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846, and to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (drug possession). This court recently affirmed an earlier conviction of defendant for conspiracy to possess and to distribute heroin. On the present appeal a Georgia Heroin Lawyer said that defendant contends that the government arbitrarily has carved a single conspiracy to deal in narcotics into separate heroin and cocaine conspiracies in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.

A Georgia Heroin Lawyer said that, the government’s proof in the heroin conspiracy trial established that defendants arranged sales of heroin for their cocaine customer a Detective, who unknown to them was an undercover DEA Agent. Co-defendant, who pled guilty, and the Detective testified against defendant in both trials. The government presented to the jury portions of defendant’s own testimony from the heroin conspiracy trial in the trial on the cocaine conspiracy charge. During July 1976, conspiratorial negotiations involving cocaine and heroin went on simultaneously. The major events proven in defendant’s trial on the heroin conspiracy charge which we discussed in our earlier opinion affirming that conviction, were also central to the government’s proof against defendant’s in the trial on the cocaine conspiracy charge.

The issue in this case is whether defendant’s claim for double jeopardy should be granted.

Published on: October 8, 2012

Man Receives Life Sentence for Distributing Heroin

by Stephen Bilkis

In this drug offense, petitioner was a 21 year old heroin addict. On September 18th, two agents of the Sheriff’s Department of Louisiana, accompanied by a paid informant, and encountered petitioner. Aware of petitioner’s addiction, they asked him whether he had any heroin. He answered that he did not but agreed to “score a bundle” for them. This jargon describes the purchase of 25 packets of individual doses of heroin, a retail transaction. Petitioner telephoned his “connection” (i.e. his supplier), the agents provided the funds to enable him to make the purchase and he left to accomplish the transaction. He returned with 22 packets. The agents took 19 and allowed him to retain three.

Some months later, a New York Criminal Lawyer said that petitioner was arrested, tried and convicted of distributing heroin. Petitioner testified at trial. He did not deny the facts set forth above, but contended that he was entrapped. He admitted that his addiction required five to six packets of heroin each day, but he was not able to afford that much. He paid $10 to $12 per packet. He was employed as a carpenter earning $3 per hour, but he did not work steadily. He admitted that he had previously been convicted of two felonies, burglary and theft by fraud. His wife testified that, while she also worked, her husband was a good provider for her and their one child. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that petitioner was sentence to life imprisonment without parole for distributing heroin.

The issue in this case is whether petitioner’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime as to contravene the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.

Published on: October 8, 2012

Defendant Contends Confession was Coerced

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, a New York Lawyer said the defendant was arrested by a Police Officer at 144th Street in Manhattan and charged with possession of a 9mm firearm. While en route to the 32nd Precinct, he initiated a conversation with the Police Officer in which he asked him to let him go and stated that he would help him by bringing in additional guns. They arrived at the precinct at approximately 7:50 p.m. and while the Police Officer elicited pedigree information, the defendant continued to talk about bringing in additional guns. The defendant, who was “kind of fidgety”, talked continuously and was “over-excited”, told the Police officer that he “used” heroin. At 9:05 p.m. A detective read Miranda warnings to the defendant. The defendant indicated that he understood his rights and wished to answer questions. Thereafter, the Police Officer and the Detective spoke with the defendant intermittently. During this period the defendant also was questioned by homicide detectives from the 32nd Precinct. Thereafter, the defendant gave a detailed oral statement to the detective in whom he explained where and from whom he had purchased the 9mm weapon and said that he had purchased cocaine from the same location. At approximately midnight, the defendant made two telephone calls: one to his wife and the other to an unidentified male. He told the man that he had been arrested, that he was “working with some good police officers” and that the man should gather the guns and gave them to the defendant’s wife. The Police Officer told the defendant that he would tell the District Attorney’s Office that the defendant was cooperating. At approximately 2:00 a.m. the defendant’s wife arrived at the precinct and the defendant, in the Police Officer’s presence, instructed her to get the guns. At about 4:00 a.m. she returned to the precinct with a Cobray Mac 11 gun, a .380 caliber pistol and matching ammunition.

The defendant was then transported from the 32nd Precinct to Manhattan Central Booking for arraignment. He complained of being ill and asked to see a doctor. Central Booking, therefore, would not accept him and he was returned to the 32nd Precinct. The Police Officer filed a felony complaint on the arrest with the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office. The Warrant Officer again transported the defendant to Manhattan Central Booking. At 10:15 a.m. the Warrant Officer received a call from the Police Officer asking that he return the defendant to the 32nd Precinct and the former did so.

At 11:45 a.m. another Detective in the Brooklyn South Homicide Task Force learned from the Police Officer that the defendant, a suspect in the December 20th shooting was being returned to the 32nd Precinct. Defendant was questioned by narcotics detectives from Manhattan South. The detective questioned the defendant, asking him about a gun trafficker in Brooklyn. Twenty minutes into their conversation, he told the defendant that he and a Sergeant were from Brooklyn and “that they knew that he had done a shooting in the apartment on Parkside Avenue.” The defendant shook his head “No” and the detective repeated that they knew he had done it and wanted to hear his version of what had happened. The defendant stated: “He tried to f* * * my wife. My wife called me and I went over there.” The detective then showed the defendant the Miranda waiver, signed the previous evening, and “reminded him that he had waived his rights, signed the Miranda form and agreed to make a statement.” The detective then re-administered Miranda warnings and the defendant once again indicated that he understood. During the next hour the defendant made statements concerning the shooting. The defendant, also, told the detective that he was a heroin user.

Published on: October 7, 2012

Defendant Brings an Action for Unjust Conviction

by Stephen Bilkis

The State of New York appeals from an order, inter alia, denying its motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim against it on the ground that claimant fails to meet the statutory criteria to maintain an action for wrongful conviction.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the issue in this case is whether claimant is entitled to his action for wrongful conviction.

The Court said that, to maintain an action for unjust conviction against the State within the ambit of Court of Claims Act 8-b(3)(b)(ii), “claimant must establish by documentary evidence that his judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the accusatory instrument dismissed” on one of the grounds stated in CPL 440.10(1)(a), (b), (c), (e), or (g). As pertinent to the facts of this case, claimant must show that: “(b) the judgment was procured by duress, misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the court or a prosecutor or a person acting for or in behalf of a court or a prosecutor”. As he alleges no prosecutorial misconduct, in order to proceed, claimant must demonstrate that the court employed “duress, misrepresentation or fraud” in obtaining his plea of guilty to the reduced charge. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the statutory pleading requirements are explicit: The claim shall state facts in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that claimant is likely to succeed at trial in proving that (a) he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument or his acts or omissions charged in the accusatory instrument did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the state, and (b) he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction. The claim shall be verified by the claimant. If the court finds after reading the claim that claimant is not likely to succeed at trial, it shall dismiss the claim, either on its own motion or on the motion of the state.

Published on: October 7, 2012

Plaintiff Alleges Bank Fraud Scheme

by Stephen Bilkis

The savings bank filed a motion for summary judgment in its action against the mortgage corporation and the guarantors for breaches of loan agreement and guaranty agreement, respectively, by the latter and for their charges against another defendant for the commission of bank fraud.

The plaintiff entered into a contract of loan at New Jersey with the mortgage banker wherein the savings bank extended a line of credit to the defendant for the purpose of closing the latter’s existing mortgage loans. In connection with the loan agreement, the officers, who are the owners of the mortgage corporation, executed individual guaranty contract which established their solidary liability of the mortgage banker’s obligation upon its failure to settle the obligations on time. A New York Criminal Lawyer said another guaranty was executed by the owner’s wife in relation with the loan agreement.

The stipulations of the loan agreement pertain to the grant of mortgage loans of the defendants’ borrowers where the line of credit shall be used to finance the mortgage contracts. Upon settlement of the mortgage loans by the borrowers, the proceeds of the loan would then be remitted to the savings bank and mortgage notes would be used as security in favor of the savings bank as part of their agreement. A Staten Island Criminal Lawyer said such mortgages would then be sold to potential investors and the plaintiff, as bailee, shall give the investors the mortgage notes where they shall pay the purchase price directly to the savings bank’s mortgage warehouse lenders who in turn would give the proceeds back to the savings bank as payment to the advances made by the defendants in their line of credit with the plaintiff. The defendants were responsible to the keeping of all the records pertaining to the loan agreement.