Sex Crimes

Published on: September 7, 2012

Defendant Contends Evidence Should be Supressed

by Stephen Bilkis

On March 22, 1996, the police obtained a search warrant for 2130 East Tremont Avenue, Apartment 7E, in Bronx County. The warrant authorized seizure of cocaine possession and crack-cocaine possession and evidence tending to demonstrate that the premises are utilized for the unlawful possession, packaging and sale of crack-cocaine and cocaine, to wit: scales, plastic bags and other paraphernalia. The warrant was issued in conjunction with a long-term narcotics investigation, during which undercover officers had purchased large amounts of cocaine from occupants of the subject apartment on several prior occasions.

A Bronx Drug Crime Lawyer said that, on the same evening, a detective and several other officers executed the search warrant. Upon entering the apartment the detective saw four individuals, two of whom he recognized as subjects of the investigation. The police searched the apartment and recovered a large amount of currency, narcotics, a gun and several forms of drug paraphernalia from inside the apartment. Police officers stationed outside the building recovered drugs wrapped in a paper towel, which had been thrown out of a window by one of the occupants of the apartment.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said about 20 to 30 minutes after the initial police entry, the apartment “buzzer” rang while the police were completing their search. The officers stationed outside the building informed the detective by radio that a Hispanic male was ringing the downstairs buzzer. The detective instructed them to allow the man to enter the building, and further instructed the officers in the hallway to stay out of sight.

Published on: September 6, 2012

Court Looks at Whether Key Evidence Should be Excluded

by Stephen Bilkis

This involves a criminal case where the court excluded the evidence sought to be introduced in a prior, uncharged incident stating it was largely irrelevant from the alleged crime from which defendant is being indicted.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said on September 20, 1985, police officers chased herein defendants who are driving a livery or gypsy cab for suspecting to have stolen the vehicle. The officers then chased the defendants from the footbridge toward a ramp of the Henry Hudson Parkway. Reaching the bottom of the bridge, and proceeding along the exit ramp, defendant allegedly turned around and once again fired at the officers; neither officer was struck by a bullet. This time police officers returned fire, but did not strike his target. The absconders then proceeded north, away from the footbridge, and disappeared. After sometime, they were apprehended and charged with attempted murder and gun possession.

The prosecution’s star witness testified that on September 11, 1985 while driving his gypsy livery cab, defendants put a gun on the back of his head. He claimed that defendants stole his car and his money with a gun.

Published on: September 5, 2012

Court Orders New Trial

by Stephen Bilkis

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, based upon his arrest for assault which later became a murder charge for acts allegedly committed. Plaintiff was incarcerated for 333 days. The charges remained pending for nearly 8 more months after plaintiff was released from custody. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, all charges were dismissed on the motion of the Bronx County District Attorney. After trial in this action, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding damages to plaintiff in the sum of 2.7 million dollars for false arrest and 7.1 million dollars for malicious prosecution.

A Bronx Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant, the City of New York (City) now moves pursuant to CPLR 2221 and 4404 (a) for an order (1) setting aside the jury’s verdict on liability as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, (2) setting aside the jury’s verdict and ordering a new trial as the jury’s liability verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or, in the alternative, (3) dismissing the malicious prosecution claim for failure to prove proximate cause, or, in the alternative, (4) setting aside the damages verdict and ordering a new trial on damages as the jury award was excessive and contrary to the weight of the evidence, and for other related relief.

Plaintiff opposes the motion. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the City’s renewal of its trial motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to establish a prima facie case or for a directed verdict is denied as the court adheres to its original decision on the record.

Published on: September 4, 2012

Special Narcotics Court Reviews Case

by Stephen Bilkis

In New York City, there is a special Grand Jury that handles cases from the Special Narcotics Courts of the city. When they are called to review a case, it generally means that the persons who are in line to be indicted are the result of many months of undercover police work designed to apprehend the most dangerous drug dealers. This group is not interested in apprehending the lower level drug dealers. A New York Criminal Lawyer said they are interested in making sure that the drug suppliers that provide narcotics to the street level dealers are put behind bars for good. To ensure that this happens, the narcotics officers are specially trained to be aware of all of the different search and seizure laws that apply to drug cases so that they do not make careless errors that will wind up costing them a conviction in court. Unfortunately, they occasionally do make mistakes.

It is commonly understood that people who are engaged in drug trafficking are often involved in other felony crimes. However, a New York Sex Crimes Lawyer said when an undercover officer is made aware of criminal wrongdoing through his position with the narcotics task force, they cannot simply ignore the fact that they are entrusted to enforce all of the laws of New York. In 2004, one narcotics officer was advised by an informant that there was a group of individuals who were forming a narcotics robbery gang. Their goal was to rob drug traffickers of their money and drugs and then sell the drugs themselves. They assumed that robbing drug dealers would be easy because the drug dealers are not likely to go to the police and tell them that they had robbed. The narcotics officer began working with another undercover officer to arrest this gang of thugs. They let it be known that they would be interested in joining the gang so that they could get close to the people involved and formulate a case.

One of the undercover officers was invited to join the robbery gang. He let the other one know about the intentions of the group so that they could maintain proper surveillance. Ultimately, on the evening that the robbery was planned, the group intended to rob some drug dealers of 60 kilos of cocaine (drug possession) and an unknown amount of cash. The undercover officer was picked up by his contact person and three other males. They loaded the cars with multiple guns and drove to the address that they intended to rob. The police were already there. The robbers were taken into custody and charged with multiple felony offenses. Once they were all indicted, their attorneys filed motions to dismiss the charges because they believed that the Special Grand Jury for the Narcotics Court did not have jurisdiction to handle the robbery and firearms charges. Their logic hinged on the fact that the subjects were not charged with even one narcotics charge.

Published on: September 3, 2012

Defendant Moves to be Resentenced Pursuant to Drug Law Reform Act of 2009

by Stephen Bilkis

Defendant was convicted of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and on November 19, 2002 given an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment with a term of 2-6 years.

The People assert that the Defendant engaged in the sale of $350 of cocaine to an undercover police officer on two occasions and that on later date cocaine and drug paraphernalia were recovered from the apartment where the sales took place. In addition to the instant offense, Defendant was convicted of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (drug possession) and sentenced to time served in 2002, convicted of Invalid Use of a Credit Card with Intent to Defraud and sentenced to time served in 1999 and convicted of Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree and sentenced to four days in jail in 1998.

The Defendant was initially released to parole supervision on the instant offense on July 17, 2003. Parole violation warrants were issued for the Defendant. In these warrants, it was alleged that the Defendant had used cocaine and marijuana, failed to report to his parole officer on multiple occasions, left his approved residence and failed to attend two programs required by the Division of Parole. A Bronx Drug Crime Lawyer said that, the Defendant was re-incarcerated for a parole violation and continued to be in prison at the time the instant motion was filed. Defendant has been punished for one disciplinary infraction while in prison. That was a Tier 3 infraction on December 26, 2008 for violent conduct; fighting and disorderly conduct for which he received 30 days of keep lock time.

Published on: September 2, 2012

Defendant Refuses to Give DNA Sample

by Stephen Bilkis

Seven men were grouped together outside a house. They were talking loudly together and drinking. One of the neighbors called the police and so two uniformed police officers were dispatched to the scene. The police officers had their police badges and did not have their guns drawn.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said as they were speaking with the group of seven men, one of the men stood up and pulled up his pants by his waistband and walked away in the direction of the house. When the man adjusted his pants, a small plastic bag fell from his pant leg. The police officer saw the plastic bag and it was a re=sealable bag contained dried herbs. The police officers seized the plastic bag from the ground and smelled it and they thought it was marijuana. Subsequent testing revealed it to be marijuana as suspected by the police officers.

They followed the man who had gone into the house. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the police officers knocked on the door and the residents of the house opened the door to the police officers and let the police officers in to the house. When the police officers went into the house, they noticed that a group of men were also drinking. Their bottled alcoholic beverages were contained in a cooler which lay open on the floor.

Published on: September 2, 2012

Court Decides Defendant Should be Offered the Judicial Diversion Program

by Stephen Bilkis

A hearing was held on the accused man’s request to enter the Judicial Diversion Program. The man has been charged in a 23 count indictment with 21 counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument, one count of grand larceny and one count of scheme to defraud. Both the State and the defense counsel have submitted post-hearing memoranda of law on the issue of the man’s eligibility for judicial diversion.

The State argue that the man may not be considered an eligible accused as that term is defined in the criminal law, since only one of the counts contained in the 23 count indictment would render him eligible for Judicial Diversion. The State oppose the man’s participation in Judicial Diversion, asserting that since he has been charged with numerous offenses in the indictment which are not listed in the Judicial Diversion statute, it renders him ineligible for the program.

The man contends that he is eligible for the Judicial Diversion Program because he is charged with grand larceny, which is an included offense under the statute. A New York Criminal Lawyer said he argues that the statutory language of the Criminal Procedure Law does not exclude his participation simply because he is also charged with offenses which fall outside the statute. None of the other offenses he is charged with in the indictment are specifically listed in the Criminal Procedure Law as offenses which would exclude him from the program.

Published on: September 1, 2012

Issue Involved Whether Defendants Guilt was Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, defendant appealed from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Jonas, J.), rendered November 18, 1991, convicting him of attempted murder in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), reckless endangerment in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

The issue in this case is whether defendant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the Court held that, the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite intent for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The defendant was in possession of 12.312 grams, or .434 ounces, of cocaine. There was legally sufficient evidence of the element of intent to sell a controlled substance based upon the defendant’s possession of this quantity of cocaine.

Published on: September 1, 2012

Court Rules on Discusses Exclusionary Rule

by Stephen Bilkis

The laws of arrest in the United States are well defined. The laws that provide a police officer with the ability to stop a car or a person to determine if they are involved in a crime are also well defined. However, in both cases, case law continues to define the limitations that exist when a police officer has contact with a citizen. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that as the laws stand right now, the landmark case of Terry v Ohio, 1968 still remain the predicate for a stop of a person by a police officer. This case also defines the limitations placed on the officer for patting down the outer garments of the stopped person to determine if that person is carrying a concealed weapon on their person.

One case, involved a detective who saw three men casing a drug store. The officer observed that the men were wearing bulky overcoats even though it was a hot day. The fact that the men were dressed in a manner that was incongruous of the weather conditions, made the officer pause to observe them further. While he watched, he saw that one at a time, the men would each walk up to the window in front of the store and look inside. That person would then return to the group and a discussion would take place. The officer determined that the men were probably concealing weapons under the large coats and that they were casing the store in an effort to determine the optimum opportunity to rob it. He approached the group and began to ask them questions. He was concerned that they were armed, so he ordered them to place their hands on the wall, and he patted down their outer garments. During the course of patting down the outer garments, the officer located a handgun in the pocket of the defendant’s coat (possession of a weapon). He and the others were placed under arrest. The defendant’s attorney claimed that the men were not breaking any laws at the time that the police officer approached them. He maintained that the officer had no right to stop the defendant or to search him. He appealed the conviction of the defendant to the Supreme Court on Constitutional grounds that the police officer had violated the defendant’s Constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment protections against illegal search and seizure.

The court disagreed. The Supreme Court ruled that it would not be reasonable to prevent an officer from patting down the outer garments of a person who he believed was concealing a firearm and could create a substantial risk to the officer or surrounding people. They determined that the officer had not violated the defendant’s rights because the search was not intrusive until the officer felt an object inside the defendant’s coat that the officer recognized to be the same size, weight, and shape of a handgun. The limitations on a stop under defendant, is that the officer must have articulable reasonable suspicion to stop the subject.

Published on: August 31, 2012

Defendant Contends He Should Have Received Concurrent Sentences

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, the proof established that in the five-year period from 1984 to 1989, the defendant represented himself as a spiritual healer, generally charging people $20 per consultation. During the consultations, the defendant purported to transform himself into various spirits who would offer advice and claim that they could cure illnesses. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the defendant, acting through these spirits, induced victims to lend him sums of money, sometimes in the thousands of dollars, which “loans” he never repaid. The defendant also told some of his victims that he was an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, using this false claim as a further means of obtaining money from them.

A Queens Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, defendant was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree (four counts), scheme to defraud in the first degree, criminal impersonation in the second degree (four counts) and fortune telling (five counts), upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of 3 to 9 years imprisonment for grand larceny in the second degree, four indeterminate terms of 1 1/2 to 4 1/2 years imprisonment for grand larceny in the third degree, an indeterminate term of 1 to 3 years imprisonment for scheme to defraud in the first degree, four definite terms of one year imprisonment for criminal impersonation in the second degree, and five definite terms of 60 days imprisonment for fortune telling, with all terms of imprisonment to run consecutive to each other.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant claims that he was not given fair notice of the grand larceny charges against him to enable him to prepare an adequate defense to those charges. He contends, in essence, that proper notification of the charges should not be reduced to a matter of guess work, and that a conviction on any count for which the defendant has not been given proper notification of the nature of the charge should not be countenanced. Specifically, neither the indictment, the bill of particulars, the Jury minutes supplied to the defendant which were redacted as to the victims’ names, the People’s opening statement, nor much of the trial, served to fully inform the defendant as to which individual complainants corresponded to the various counts of larceny.