Sex Crimes

Published on: August 31, 2012

Court Rules on Juror Misconduct

by Stephen Bilkis

When jurors are chosen to sit on a trial jury, they are required to take the position seriously. The responsibility that is inherent to the position of a juror in a trial is heady to say the least. That is especially true when the person is called to put their lives on hold while they sit for weeks on a highly publicized trial jury. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that it can be almost impossible for anyone to shut themselves off from any information that relates to a trial that is in the news and on the television and radio every time that they turn one on. It is incumbent upon the court to ensure that the juror is aware of their responsibility and to take action against those jurors who violate the standards that are set.

Because the court realizes that it is sometimes impossible to prevent a juror from being exposed to some type of information about a case that is highly publicized, it is often at the discretion of the court to determine if that juror can put aside the information that they have been exposed to outside of the courtroom in order to make a decision on the case based solely on the information that is presented in the court. In most cases, a court simply asks the juror and accepts the juror’s response. However, there are times when that is not possible, for instance it may not be possible if the juror has been discovered to have discussed the case outside of the jury room with an uninvolved acquaintance. In most cases, when a juror is found to have participated in that type of misconduct, they will be dismissed from the jury and an alternate will take their place.

In one case that was a highly publicized rape and robbery case from 1973, the juror went to dinner with some friends while she was sitting on the jury. While at dinner, they were joined by some acquaintances of another one of her friends. In this group was a defense attorney. Over dinner, the woman told her tablemates that she was on the jury and that she had been instructed not to discuss the case. She stated that she had made up her mind about the man’s guilt, but that she would listen to the viewpoints of the other jurors before putting in her vote. Later in the day, she found out that the woman was a defense attorney and pointed asked her if she was familiar with the accuracy of DNA evidence as well as a few other questions. She also stated that she had looked on the computer to find out what the defense attorney’s credentials were. All of these statements are violations of the code of conduct for jurors. The defense attorney whom the woman had spoken to worked for the legal aid society.

Published on: August 30, 2012

Court Determines if Defendant was Unlawfully Adjudicated a Persistent VFO.

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, the Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree, a class B violent felony under Penal Law § 70.02 (1) (a). At his sentence, the People filed information alleging that defendant was a persistent VFO having been convicted of two previous violent felonies. The People alleged that on January 7, 1985, defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree in Nassau County and sentenced to a term of incarceration of 2Â½ years. The People also alleged that on July 18, 1986, defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree in Nassau County and sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration with a minimum of 4 years and a maximum of 8 years. The People further asserted that the following time periods during which defendant was incarcerated were tolled from the 10-year limitation: January 18, 1985 to April 5, 1990, and December 14, 1991 to June 9, 1994.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the court adjudicated defendant a persistent VFO and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 24 years to life, in accordance with the statutory guidelines set forth in Penal Law § 70.08.

Defendant now moves to set aside his sentence pursuant to CPL 440.20 on the grounds that he was unlawfully adjudicated a persistent VFO. In his motion, defendant claims that he was unlawfully adjudicated a persistent VFO. Defendant argues that his 1985 conviction cannot serve as a predicate in conjunction with his 1986 conviction because the sentence on his earlier case was not imposed until after the commission of the felony on the latter case. A New York Criminal Lawyer said to support his claim, defendant attached to his motion the commitment orders submitted by the Clerk of Nassau County to the State Department of Correctional Services on both the 1985 and 1986 convictions. Indeed, the orders confirm that defendant had been sentenced on his 1985 gun crime conviction on January 7, 1985-15 months after September 8, 1983, the date he committed the gun crime which led to his subsequent burglary conviction in 1986. Furthermore, the second violent felony offender statement submitted by the Nassau County District Attorney’s office upon defendant’s sentencing in 1986 establishes that the People did not rely upon defendant’s 1985 conviction to enhance his punishment. Instead, in 1986, the People relied upon defendant’s 1981 conviction of robbery in the first degree in Bronx County to establish that defendant was a second VFO.

Published on: August 30, 2012

Defendant Charged with Offering a False Instrument

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, in 1986 although the installation of individual water meters was required in commercial and industrial buildings, 630,000 one and two family homes were unmetered and billed for water on an arcane basis unrelated to usage and predicated on property frontage. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the City decided to meter these homes and to do so through a municipal installation project rather than by requiring the individual homeowners to install them. The City would use a competitive bidding process, and award contracts according to the boundaries of the City’s community boards. As is common in such contract bidding processes, the City prepared bid packages for prospective bidders. In addition to technical information and cost estimates, the bid package informed prospective bidders that they would be required to calculate labor costs in accordance with Labor Law Section 220, which requires contractors performing public works projects to pay the workers the prevailing wage. The bid packages let out in 1989 and 1990 also required that the contracting party would have to perform certain work known as pre-plumbing work. In essence, the contracts with the City would require that pre-plumbing work be supervised by a licensed master plumber.

After conducting pre-bid conferences, the City circulated an addendum to the bid specifications which set forth the specific wages that the bidders would be required to pay their employees. The defendants received this addendum. After the bids were publicly opened, the lowest bid was determined and the contracts were awarded to the defendants. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the defendants executed formal contracts, to which were annexed the bid information and the wage schedules, which were also incorporated by reference. Each contract provided: The wages to be paid and the supplements to be provided, for a legal day’s work, to laborers, workmen or mechanics employed by the Contractor shall not be less than the prevailing wages and supplement required to be paid to such employees, as ascertained and prescribed by the Comptroller in the Specifications attached hereto.

A New York Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the indictment charges larceny by false promise, larceny by false pretenses, scheme to defraud, and filing of a false instrument, conspiracy, and perjury. The thrust of the indictment is that the defendants never intended to comply with the prevailing wage and pre-plumbing master plumber requirements. Among other evidence which was presented to the Jury was that the defendants calculated their bids based on piecework rather than hourly costs, that they promised workers the higher of piecework or hourly rate, but only paid a piecework rate that resulted in a lower wage than an hourly rate at the prevailing wages, that the defendants arranged with a licensed plumber to falsely make it appear that a licensed plumber was supervising pre-plumbing work, and that the defendants submitted false and perjurious forms to the City certifying they had complied with the contracts.

Published on: August 30, 2012

Court Discusses Larceny Charges

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, Defendant has been charged with grand larceny, grand larceny by extortion, money laundering, and intimidating a witness.

Complainants are the principal officers of the general contractor engaged in the rehabilitation of a hotel. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the defendant demanded periodic cash payments from Complainants in exchange for a guarantee of labor peace. He has influence over union business agents monitoring the rehabilitation project. A portion of the collection was given to his organized crime associates to make sure the rehabilitation ran smoothly. Complainants believed these representations and that they were thereby initially induced to pay the defendant out of fear of economic harm. Jurisprudence dictates that fear of future economic harm is sufficient to establish extortion under the statute. Larceny by extortion does not require evidence of an actual ability to cause the threatened harm in the threatened manner, only that the person threatened believed the defendant possessed such ability. In this connection, the court noted that the evidence of the defendant’s assaults, reputation for violence and of his self-proclaimed ties to organized crime was properly admitted as contributing to the credibility of his threats and of the victims’ fear that they would be realized.

With respect to defendant’s indictment for grand larceny in the first degree, the bill of particulars clearly indicates with respect to this count that the Prosecution’s sole theory of larceny was extortion. The count, however, fails to specifically allege that the larceny was committed by extortion. Hence, the count is dismissed for failure to allege larceny by extortion.

Published on: August 29, 2012

Court Decides if Trial Court Erred in Vacating Sentence

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a proceeding brought pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR to prohibit respondent a Justice of the Supreme Court, Bronx County from vacating petitioners’ convictions and the sentences imposed thereon in violation of Article 440 of the Criminal Procedure Law, and to prohibit respondents and District Attorney, Bronx County, from further prosecution of the petitioners on felony charges.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said on July 7, 1987 petitioners pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny in the third degree. All parties apparently thought that defendants were pleading guilty to an “E” felony, since grand larceny in the third degree is a “D” felony. Accordingly, the defendant was sentenced as a predicate felon to 1 1/2 to 3 years in prison.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, attempted grand larceny in the third degree became a “D” felony on November 1, 1986. At the time of the commission of the acts alleged in the indictment, May 14, 1986, grand larceny in the third degree was an “E” felony and attempted grand larceny in the third degree an “A” misdemeanor. Thus, defendant Wilson was improperly sentenced to felony time that is 1 1/2 to 3 years in prison. A Bronx Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, petitioner Wilson commenced his sentence. Following the discovery of the error, the trial court vacated the sentence and conviction and reinstated the original felony charges. On February 23, 1988 this court granted a stay of the prosecution pending determination of this Article 78 proceeding.

Published on: August 29, 2012

Defendant Arraigned on a Fugitive from Justice Complaint

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts:

On 20 May 2009, defendant was arraigned on a fugitive from justice complaint based on an arrest warrant issued on 11 May 2009, Delaware County of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The arrest warrant charged the defendant with the following felonies: one count of Criminal Solicitation, two counts of Criminal Solicitation and one count of Criminal Use of a Communication Facility, all of which were allegedly committed on 2 October 2008.

On 27 October 2009, defendant sought to withdraw the Waiver of Governor’s Warrant of Extradition and Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Waiver of Extradition”) executed by him on his arraignment as a fugitive of justice from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on 20 May 2009.

Published on: August 29, 2012

Defendants Contend Court Lacks Jurisdiction

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts:

Stemming from a grand larceny case where defendants were convicted, at an Extraordinary Special and Trial Term of the Supreme Court, of conspiracy in the fourth degree, hindering prosecution in the third degree and official misconduct, the Appellate Division, on appeal, found that the evidence was legally insufficient, unanimously reversed, expressly stating it did so on the law and the facts, and dismissed the indictment.

The people now appeal from the said judgment.

Published on: August 29, 2012

Defendant Contends Double Jeopardy

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts:

On 18 April 1975, in the County of Queens, a person was assaulted and robbed. Among the items taken were a 1970 Cadillac, a wallet and four blank checks. Thereafter, that person’s signature was forged on two of the checks which bore the date 18 April 1975 and which were presented for payment. On 3 May 1975, defendant was apprehended in the County of Nassau while operating the said stolen vehicle. A New York Criminal Lawyer said as a result, defendant was indicted in Queens County for Robbery in the First Degree and Assault in the Second Degree. Defendant was thereafter convicted on both charges. In Nassau County, defendant was charged with Criminal Possession of the Forged Checks (Second Degree, 2 counts) and Criminal Possession of the Cadillac (First Degree) together with certain traffic offenses not hereto relevant.

Consequently, defendant, by his attorney, applies to the Court for an Order dismissing the indictment which accuses him of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Second Degree (2 counts) and dismissing the first count of indictment which accuses him of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the First Degree. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the defendant contends that the prosecution of these charges would constitute a second prosecution in violation of CPL 40.20 and Penal Law 165.60.

Published on: August 28, 2012

Evidence Inadvertently Destroyed Prior to Trial

by Stephen Bilkis

The charges in this case arise from five separate incidents, beginning in July 1986. On July 3, 1986, a man representing himself as an executive of a foreign branch of a major company, asked that $5,000 in travelers’ checks be prepared and delivered to an associate. Thereafter, defendant appeared at the offices of the company, identifying himself as the associate, and as signed five Citicorp travelers’ checks purchase agreements, one for each of five $1,000 packets of checks, then signed many of the checks in the upper left hand corner, as required of purchasers. When it was discovered a week or two later that there had been no authorization for the checks, most, if not all, of the checks had been negotiated at various metropolitan locations.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant was convicted of one count of grand larceny in the second degree for stealing property having an aggregate value in excess of $1,500, three counts of forgery in the second degree and three counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree with respect to the travelers’ checks and of forgery in the second degree with respect to the purchase agreement.

Thereafter, defendant stayed at the Days Inn in Manhattan registering as the associate, and advancing $140 as a deposit. During his stay, he presented the cashier with a purchase order from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, providing that Met Life was to be billed for the room, taxes and incidental expenses. Days Inn refunded defendant his initial deposit and the bill for his four day stay ($819.67) was never paid since defendant was neither employed by Metropolitan nor authorized to present such a purchase order. A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree.

Published on: August 28, 2012

Defendant Seeks to Withdraw his Plea

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts:

On 6 July 2006, defendant was arrested and charged with Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Second Degree, Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree. On 13 September 2006, defendant was arrested and charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree. In both instances, defendant was represented by lawyer-one. On 31 October 2006, defendant met with an ADA (the person herein complained of) outside the courthouse, and in November 2006, defendant fired lawyer-one and hired lawyer-two to represent him. On 8 December 2006, defendant and lawyer-two met with the ADA assigned to the case to negotiate and execute a plea and cooperation agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, defendant was required to perform various duties, including but not limited to: testifying against co-defendants, making controlled buys of controlled substances, engaging in taped telephone conversations, and providing information to support the issuance of search warrants.

On 27 December 2006, pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the charges of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree and to a violation of probation for a previous offense and received time served. In exchange for his guilty plea, defendant was promised a sentence of no more than seven years imprisonment and two years post-release supervision. A New York Criminal Lawyer said under the agreement, based upon the extent and nature of defendant’s cooperation, defendant may be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and re-plead to a lesser charge. If that occurred, the Queens County District Attorney’s Office may recommend any sentence permissible by law based upon the nature and extent of defendant’s cooperation. Conversely, the Queens County District Attorney’s Office also had discretion to terminate the cooperation agreement and ask the Court to sentence defendant to seven years imprisonment, the maximum term permissible under the plea agreement.