New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

In this Criminal case, the defendant moves to dismiss the superior court information in this matter pursuant to section 210.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law on the ground that the information charges an offense other than the one for which he was held by the Long Beach City Court for action of the grand jury.

This matter was previously the subject of consideration by this Court in relation to a motion to amend the superior court information. In its decision on the former motion this Court expressed the view that under the provisions of the recent amendment to the New York State Constitution a person may only waive indictment and consent to be prosecuted by superior court information in relation to the charge in the local criminal court for which that person was held for grand jury action.

This precise issue, however, could not be decided on the previous motion and it required this motion to dismiss to place the question squarely before the Court.

Continue reading

In this Criminal action, the defendant here pleaded guilty only after the court told him that, if he did not, he would be remanded until his next scheduled court appearance. The issue presented on this appeal is whether the plea was voluntary.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that in November 2005, the People filed a felony complaint charging the defendant with two counts of falsifying business records in the first degree. He was arraigned on the complaint and released on $1,000 bail. Seven months later, a grand jury returned a 40-count indictment charging the defendant with two counts of grand larceny in the third degree, scheme to defraud in the first degree, granc larceny in the fourth degree, petit larceny, attempted granc larceny in the fourth degree, attempted petit larceny, twenty-four counts of falsifying business records in the first degree, seven counts of insurance fraud in the fourth degree, and two counts of insurance fraud in the fifth degree.

The charges were based on allegations that, between December 21, 1999 and October 13, 2005, the defendant, a licensed dentist with a practice in Hempstead, New York, repeatedly submitted falsified claim forms to a number of insurance carriers and attempted to alter his own business records to avoid detection.

Continue reading

Appeals by the defendant, as limited by his motion, (1) from a sentence of the Supreme Court, Queens County, imposed January 27, 1988, the sentence being an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years imprisonment, upon his conviction of grand larceny in the third degree, after a plea of guilty, and (2) by permission, from an order of the same court dated June 13, 1990, which denied his motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 to vacate his sentence.

A Nassau County Criminal attorney said that on May 14, 1987, at the corner of the Van Wyck Expressway and Atlantic Avenue in Queens, the defendant stole a 1986 Pontiac Firebird. Approximately one hour later, the defendant used the stolen vehicle as a getaway car after an accomplice forcibly stole a woman’s purse in Nassau County. After a high speed chase with police, the criminal defendant crashed the car into a telephone pole and was arrested.

In Queens, the defendant was charged, inter alia, with grand larceny in the third degree under Queens County Indictment Number 3518/87. In Nassau County, he was charged, inter alia, with robbery in the second degree.

Continue reading

The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that Citizens shall be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, of individual liberty and privacy, and the right to be left alone. The landmark Court of Appeals decision in a case, firmly established that “Before the police may stop a person pursuant to the common-law right to inquire there must exist at that moment a founded suspicion that criminal activity is present,” and “the police may not justify a stop by a subsequently acquired suspicion resulting from the stop.” It has been long held that the stop of an automobile constitutes a limited seizure of its occupants for federal and state constitutional purposes. The Court of Appeals has specifically held that in order for a Police Officer to legally stop a vehicle, the Officer needs to have either observed a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, or reasonably suspects that the occupants had been, were then, or were about to be engaged in criminal conduct.

In this case, the Officer testified that she observed defendants entering a bank, in a high crime area, with clothing that was suspicious given the weather conditions. Specifically, the defendants were wearing heavy hooded sweat shirts on a warm day when Officer was wearing a T-shirt. The Officer observed defendants put up their hoods before entering the bank and then she observed them race out of the bank and into a moving Toyota Camry.

The Officer testified that she believed that a bank robbery had occurred. This Court finds that the observations of the Officer correctly supported her belief. It is clear that a Police Officer may not stop a vehicle merely based on a hunch.

In February 7, 2011, a one hundred seven (107) count indictment was filed with the Nassau County Court Clerk charging fourteen (14) defendants, each with a count of Enterprise Corruption, Conspiracy in the Fourth Degree and Scheme to Defraud in the First Degree. Each criminal defendant was charged with additional differing counts, including Money Laundering in various degrees, Falsifying Business Records in various degrees, Identity Theft in the First Degree and Grand Larceny in various degrees.

A Nassau County Criminal Lawyer said that all defendants were arraigned and on April 6, 2011, specific dates were scheduled by the Court regarding time limitations for plea negotiation and discovery. On that date, in light of the large number of defendants, attorneys, witnesses, and the complexity of the case, a firm date of October 17, 2011 was set for the commencement of trial.

The Court inspected the twelve hundred (1,200+) plus pages of grand jury minutes and issued orders on omnibus motions. Various discovery issues were resolved.

Continue reading

Defendant and co-defendants were charged with three counts of violating Penal Law § 160.15(4), Robbery in the First Degree as a class B felony; three counts of violating Penal Law § 160.15(2), Robbery in the First Degree as a class B felony; three counts of violating Penal Law § 160.10(1), Robbery in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 265.03(1)(b), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 265.03(3), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 155.40(1), Grand larceny in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 145.10, Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree as a class D felony and one count of violating Penal Law § 140.35, Possession of Burglar’s Tool as a class A misdemeanor.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that on March 1, 5, 6, 8, and 12, 2012, after motion practice by the attorneys, this Court conducted a Huntley, Mapp, and Dunaway hearing. The Huntley hearing pertained to various oral and written statements allegedly made by defendants. The Mapp hearing pertained to items allegedly seized from 2 defendants. The Dunaway hearing pertained to probable cause for the arrest of the 2 defendants.

This Court finds the testimony of 4 Police Officers, and 4 Detectives. An Officer testified that on October 14, 2011, he was working a 7 am to 7 pm tour of duty for the Nassau County Police Department. He was in uniform, working alone, in a marked Nassau County Police vehicle. At approximately 1:52 pm, he was on Northern Boulevard in Manhasset, Nassau County, taking an accident report. While taking the accident report, he received a radio assignment for a robbery at the a jewelry store in Manhasset. The radio assignment indicated that the suspects were male blacks, that they were armed with multiple handguns, and that they fled in a black Cadillac Escalade (hereinafter referred to as the “Escalade”).He pursued the Escalade onto the Long Island Expressway Service Road and then onto the Long Island Expressway. As the traffic on the Long Island Expressway slowed down, he observed four (4) to five (5) male black individuals jump out of the Escalade while it was still moving, run across the traffic lanes of the Long Island Expressway, jump over the center barrier, and exit the Long Island Expressway.

Continue reading

Defendant is charged with two counts of violating Penal Law § 160.10(1), Robbery in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 160.05, Robbery in the Third Degree as a class D felony; and three counts of violating Penal Law § 155.30(1), Grand larceny in the Fourth Degree as a class E felony. Codefendant Dwight Washington is charged with two counts of violating Penal Law § 160.10(1), Robbery in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 160.05, Robbery in the Third Degree as a class D felony; two counts of violating Penal Law § 155.30(1), Grand larceny in the Fourth Degree as a class E felony; and one count of violating Penal Law § 155.25, Petit Larceny as a class A misdemeanor.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that on January 13, 17, 18, 19, and 23, 2012, upon stipulation by the attorneys, this Court conducted a Huntley, Mapp, and Wade hearing.. The Huntley hearing pertained to various oral and written statements allegedly made by defendants. The Mapp hearing pertained to money allegedly seized from defendants, and various other items allegedly seized from the car owned.

The People called four (4) witnesses at the hearing. The Court finds the testimony of these witnesses to be credible.

Continue reading

A Nassau Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, on July 22, 1977 two robbers entered the Ridgewood Savings Bank. One of them stood guard with a gun while the other jumped over a counter, ordered the tellers to open their cash drawers which contained bank funds, and then took money from each drawer. A total of more than $27,000 was taken. Based on these acts, the Nassau County Grand Jury, in an indictment dated August 10, 1977, charged the defendant with the crimes of robbery in the first degree (three counts), robbery in the second degree (two counts), grand larceny in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree (two counts). After trial the jury returned a verdict finding the criminal defendant guilty on the second and third counts of the indictment, each of which charged him with robbery in the first degree.

The defendant raises three issues on this appeal: (1) that he was denied his right to counsel at a lineup; (2) that the second count of the indictment was void for duplicity; and (3) that the sentences imposed were unduly harsh.

The second count of the indictment charged the defendant with the crime of robbery in the first degree in that he “forcibly stole certain property from the employees of the Ridgewood Savings Bank and in the course of the commission of the crime displayed what appeared to be revolvers”. The three named individuals are tellers of the said bank.

Continue reading

Sources show that one evening, the accused approached a motor vehicle which was idling outside a convenience store and falsely told the woman in the front passenger seat (hereinafter the passenger) that the vehicle’s rear tire was low. When the passenger got out to investigate, the accused jumped into the driver’s seat and shut the door. The passenger jumped back into the car and, as the accused tried to push her out of the moving vehicle, the passenger continued to struggle with the accused as he drove away. After driving approximately one half of a mile, the passenger succeeded in stopping the car, and the accused jumped out. The accused was arrested later that night after taking money and merchandise from a Dairy Barn drive-through store, and after leading the police on a high-speed chase through a residential area. Items found in his possession upon his arrest included cocaine, marijuana, a camcorder, DVD player, video game console, and stolen credit card.

After conviction, accused appeal from a judgment of the County Court, convicting him of reckless endangerment in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree (two counts), petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (five counts), criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, criminal mischief in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, unlawful possession of marijuana, and resisting arrest, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

The court ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the convictions of grand larceny in the fourth degree under count 6 of the indictment, petit larceny under count 8 of the indictment, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree under count 18 of the indictment, vacating the sentences imposed thereon, and dismissing those counts of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The ruling is discussed in the following manner:

Continue reading

Records reflect that the accused, a lawyer 30 years of age, was indicated on four counts of Grand Larceny, Second Degree, by reason of obtaining money by false pretenses in connection with certain settlements of lawsuits. He pleaded guilty to the one criminal count involved herein.

He now applies for a certificate of reasonable doubt pending his appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court from a judgment of conviction of the crime of Grand Larceny, Second Degree, more specifically from the sentence imposed, that he ‘be imprisoned in Sing Sing Prison under an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of such imprisonment to be two years and the minimum one year’.

The first question to be disposed of is whether the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court has the power to change, lower, or suspend the criminal sentence in this case. However, at the very outset it is clear, without unnecessary argumentation, that the Appellate Division does have the power to reduce the maximum sentence; in fact, the District Attorney’s brief with commendable candor states that ‘there is no question but that the Appellate Division has the power to reduce the maximum term imposed upon the accused by the County Court’.

Continue reading