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A man has been charged with grand larceny in the second degree and attempted assault in the second degree. The man is accused of attempting to cause physical injury to a peace officer with intent to prevent the said officer from performing his lawful duty.

The man was then arraigned on those charges at which time he was served with a notice of impending grand jury proceeding. The man thereafter advised the district attorney of his desire to testify.

Subsequently, the man and his attorneys appeared at the place and time specified in the notice of presentment. But, a dispute arose between the district attorney and the man’s attorney as to whether the man would be permitted to testify. The entire discussion was recorded outside the presence of the grand jury.

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A Suffolk Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, both rendered July 20, 1988, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), under Indictment No. 54/88, and forgery in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (two counts), grand larceny in the second degree, attempted grand larceny in the second degree, and offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, under Indictment No. 86/88, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentences of (a) concurrent indeterminate terms of three to nine years imprisonment on each count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, with these terms to run consecutively to (b) concurrent indeterminate terms of two to six years imprisonment on each count of forgery in the second degree and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, with these terms to run consecutively to (c) concurrent indeterminate terms of three to nine years imprisonment for grand larceny in the second degree and two to six years imprisonment for attempted grand larceny in the second degree, with these terms to run consecutively to (d) a term of one to three years imprisonment for offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree.

A Suffolk Robbery Lawyer said that, the defendant was tried, inter alia, on charges of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree pursuant to Penal Law § 220.16(1). An element of this particular crime is that the defendant’s possession be accompanied by an intent to sell the controlled substance.

The issue in this case is whether the court erred in receiving the evidence of uncharged crimes.

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People v. Condarco

Court Discusses Whether Suspension of a Driver’s License is a Punitive or Remedial in Nature

The defendants were arrested and charged for driving while intoxicated DWI while having a blood alcohol level that is over the legal limit of .10. In each case, the defendant’s license was suspended at the arraignment pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) and (b). The defendants’ Queens County Criminal Attorney moved to dismiss the dockets on the ground of double jeopardy under section 170.30(1)(f) of the CPL as the suspension of the defendants license constituted as a penalty. The following issues were examined by the trial judge:

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The complainant and the defendant dated periodically for a period of time encompassing the past 13 years. The instant charge stems when the defendant is alleged to have picked up the complainant, thrown her over a couch, pushed her to the ground, and stomped on her groin, thereby causing her to allegedly suffer bruised ribs and a fractured coccyx.

In support of their application, the People detail the complainant’s allegations of physical and psychological abuse by the criminal defendant over a prolonged period of time. Included are a litany of alleged violent acts directed at her by the defendant, from 1991 to 2003. The alleged violence included threatening to kill the complainant on numerous occasions, repeatedly beating her, urinating on her, various acts of forcible sex, and constant berating of her. Although these acts occurred over a period of 13 years, except for brief sporadic periods of separateness, the complainant did not leave the defendant nor immediately seek protection from the police. All of the prior alleged violent acts were also the subject of the People’s Molineux application, which was separately decided.

The charges contained in the criminal complaint before the court allegedly occurred on August 25, 2003. The complainant did not report the alleged crime to the police on August 25, 2003. On October 19, 2003, after other alleged incidents, the complainant reported the charge to the police along with four additional charges. Thereafter, on November 6, 2003, the defendant was arrested for the above-listed crimes.

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This was an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered on 14 June 1972, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon, among others, as a felony, upon his guilty plea, and imposing sentence. The appeal brought for review an order of the same court, dated 25 May 1972, which denied defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence.

On 10 March 1972 at about 12:30 A.M., Patrolman RL and his partner, Patrolman B, were stationed in an unmarked car in the vicinity of 107th Avenue and New York Boulevard in Queens. Their vehicle was painted to look like a taxicab, but contained a police radio. He described the area as ‘a very heavy drug crime prone location’, where numerous arrests for stolen cars and other stolen property are made. The officers parked the vehicle about a half block from a bar on New York Boulevard which was ‘under observation’. They were facing toward the bar and were parked across the street from it.

At that time they observed a late model Cadillac, driven by herein defendant MF, pulled up and double parked outside the bar. The only one in the car was the driver as he did not get out of the car. The car remained double parked for ‘not even one minute’, and then drove off. The car just went around the block. Then the car appeared again a short time later, double parked in the same place and, within ‘less than a minute’, drove off a second time. At that point Patrol RL told his partner that he ‘intended to stop the car and check it out.’

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A man was sentenced to two years probation following his plea of guilty to attempted home invasion in the first degree in another state. He was subsequently sentenced to one hundred eighty days in jail.

Through a felony complaint, the man was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and seventh degrees. An indictment was filed and the man was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

Subsequently, the man plead guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree with the promise that upon the completion of a drug rehabilitation program, supervised by one institution, he would be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty. The court stated that the man would re-plead to a misdemeanor and receive a sentence of time served. If, however, he failed to complete the drug rehabilitation program, the court promised to sentence him to four and half to nine years in jail.

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McArdle v. New York City Housing Authority

Court Discusses Whether the Judge Acted Prudently in Exercising his Discussion

The plaintiff who was the parent of an infant brought an action to recover damages for false imprisonment and assault committed by the defendant. The infant, who was a 19 years old, was arrested by a security guard employed by the defendant on July 15, 1972 at 12:30 A.M. The security guard charged the infant with driving an automobile while intoxicated

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Defendants are each charged with the crimes of Grand larceny in the Second Degree and Falsifying Business Records in the First Degree. The indictment alleges that between September 1975 and December 1976, the defendants, acting in concert, stole monies in excess of $1500.00 from a Park Psychiatric Center, and that they also, acting in concert and with intent to defraud in order to commit the crime of larceny, made false entries upon the business records of the Park, to wit, monthly time and work attendance forms.

A Suffolk County Criminal attorney said that the Park is a mental hygiene hospital operated by the State of New York and defendants were employees during the relevant period.

The substance of the larceny charge is that Klein submitted time and attendance sheets showing that she worked certain hours for which she was paid, whereas, in fact, she was then attending nursing school at another location and that defendants by approving and submitting these inaccurate and false “business records”.

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A Suffolk Criminal Possession of Marijuana Lawyer said that, this action was commenced by plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law No. 23 of 1983 of the City of New York (“the ordinance”) is unconstitutional. Local Law 23 amended Chapter 22 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. Plaintiffs moved before this court on August 4, 1983 for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the ordinance pending determination of the action. The ordinance was to go into effect on August 5, 1983. A temporary restraining order was granted by this court pending the hearing of the motion for a preliminary injunction on August 9, 1983 which was adjourned at the defendant’s (“City”) request. The City then stipulated with the plaintiffs not to enforce the ordinance pending the adjourned date of the hearing. In the interim the City has moved, and the plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment.

A Suffolk Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, the ordinance at issue prohibits the sale of drug paraphernalia. It is criminal in nature and provides that anyone who knowingly sells, offers for sale or displays any cocaine spoon, marijuana pipe, hashish pipe or other drug related paraphernalia is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The ordinance is based upon the Model State Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted by the Department of Justice. Plaintiff is the owner of “Out of Our Drawers” and Plaintiff owns “The Village Smoke Shop” both located in Greenwich Village. Plaintiffs challenge the ordinance on a number of constitutional grounds. First, they allege that the ordinance is preempted by New York State Law, in particular Article 39 of the General Business Law, Penal Law Secs. 220.45 and 220.50 and Public Health Law Sec. 3387(3). Plaintiffs contends that these State statutes evidence an intent on the part of the State Legislature to occupy the entire field of drug paraphernalia regulation and thereby preempt local legislation in that area.

A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, plaintiffs also assert that the ordinance is void for vagueness and therefore violative of Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The ordinance is also challenged on the ground that it infringes upon protected speech in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the New York State Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also assert an equal protection argument and, finally, contend that the ordinance is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.

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People v. Vargulik

Court Discusses Whether Failure to Comply with Discovery Demand Should Result in Suppression of Chemical Results

The defendant was indicted for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, vehicular manslaughter and criminal negligent homicide. The defendant was the driver of a motor vehicle that killed a passenger in her car after she crashed into a tree. Three beer cans were recovered from the car, one unopened and two empty cans. The defendant went to the hospital to receive treatment and was later arrested. She consented to an Alco-Sensor” test where .15 percent blood alcohol content was recorded. The defendant requested an omnibus motion to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that there was insufficient evidence for probable cause in the absence of the chemical test. The People attempted to introduce evidence that indicated that the defendant had consumed alcohol which was probable cause for the arrest after the results of the blood test. The defendant’s Queens County Criminal Attorney objected to the introduction of the blood test into evidence because of the prosecution’s failure to provide the report of the breath test to the defendant in response to the discovery demand, pursuant to section 240.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law. This resulted in the court concluding that the DWI test result was prohibited from being introduced into evidence. The People appealed the decision.

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