People v Noreiga
Court Discusses Whether the Warrantless Search of the Defendant’s Motor Vehicle was Legal
The defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of driving while intoxicated, one count of failing to obey a traffic control device and one count of consumption or possession of alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle.
In November 2009, the Suffolk County District Attorney indicted the respondent on one count of grand larceny in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 155.40, one count of forgery, in violation of Penal Law § 170.10(2), one count of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 170.25, and one count of insurance fraud in the third degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 176.20.
A Suffolk County Criminal attorney said that in February 2011, in the County Court, Suffolk County, the respondent was convicted, after trial, of grand larceny in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 155.40, and insurance fraud in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law § 176.20.
The respondent’s conviction emanated from his theft of money paid by his insurance carrier, to be held in escrow, for the reconstruction of his Westhampton Beach home after it was destroyed by fire in 2008. Countrywide Home Loans, the lender holding the mortgage on the respondent’s home, never received or endorsed the check issued by the insurance company for reconstruction of the house.
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County rendered 5 May 2008 convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of suppression of identification testimony.
The court reverses the judgment, on the law, vacates the plea, suppresses the identification testimony, and remits the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
The defendant agreed to plead guilty to sex crimes of rape in the first degree in exchange for a promised determinate sentence of nine years of imprisonment on the day after the Supreme Court denied suppression of identification testimony. During the course of the ensuing plea allocution, the Supreme Court advised the criminal defendant of the terms of its sentencing commitment, and briefly explained that he would be waiving his right to appeal.
A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, rendered July 13, 1983, convicting him of grand larceny in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to a definite prison term of one year.
A Suffolk Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, in another case defendant appealed from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered June 3, 1985, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, assault in the first degree and grand larceny in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
The issue in this case is whether the court erred in convicting the defendant of grand larceny in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to a definite prison term of one year.
A Nassau Rape Lawyer, on this appeal we are called upon to consider the effect and interplay of CPL 160.50 (sealing of records upon termination of criminal action in favor of the accused) and General Municipal Law § 50-e (notice of claim). Since the Supreme Court did not give proper consideration to the impact of CPL 160.50 in this case, we have modified the order by imposing certain conditions. On the evening of August 2, 1991, the petitioner, was arrested by a member of the New York City Housing Authority Police Department, in front of 453 Beach 40th Street in Queens. Ragland was arrested for criminal contempt in the second degree (violation of an order of protection) and harassment. The officer acted on the basis of information supplied to him by the person who was to be protected by the order of protection.
A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, the petitioner was arraigned in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County, and remanded, apparently in default of bail, until August 13, 1991. The charges were dismissed on November 7, 1991, and all records sealed pursuant to CPL 160.50. While the certificate of disposition does not set forth the reason for the dismissal, the petitioner indicates that it was because he had never been served with the order of protection. The petitioner, acting pro se, served a notice of claim upon the City of New York in January 1992. Subsequently, according to the petitioner, the Comptroller’s Office advised him that the City was not the proper party to be given notice. In March 1992 the petitioner consulted with his attorney and promptly moved for permission to serve a late notice of claim against the New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter the Authority), alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution resulting in “mental anguish or suffering, shame and humiliation, ridicule and scorn, moral and mental degradation, loss of earnings, property loss and physical injury”. Public Housing Law § 157(2) provides that all notices of claim relating to personal injuries must be presented to the Authority within 90 days and that all of the provisions of General Municipal Law § 50-e shall apply to such notices.
The Supreme Court granted the application, and deemed the notice of claim to be timely served. This decision was predicated upon the finding that the Authority had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the petitioner’s cause of action. The court did not address the question of any possible prejudice to the Authority.
People v. Blajeski
Court Discusses Whether there was Probable Cause to Suspect the Defendant for Driving While Intoxicated DWI
The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated after parking in a drug prone area. The defendant was found drug prone area with in a vehicle with two other males while the engine was running at a curb. The police observed that the defendant had blood shot eyes, slurred speech and his breath smelled of alcohol after he was questioned by the police. The defendant was also found in possession of cocaine and diazepam, a prescription drug after being searched. The Supreme Court suppressed the findings of the search due to lack of probable cause to suspect that he was participating in criminal activity. The People appealed the decision.
A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, at about 6:50 P.M. on January 19, 1981, Detective of the Suffolk County Police Department Homicide Squad went to premises commonly known and referred to as 8 Nina Place in Farmingville where the homicide giving rise to the prosecution of this action occurred. Upon arriving he was informed by Patrolman of this department that a certain individual had called the precinct the previous evening and reported that he had been threatened by a person known to him as “Billy the Kid,” while the said individual had been at the above-mentioned premises. The patrolman stated that the only person he knew by that name was defendant who lived at 5 Roslyn Avenue in Selden.
A Suffolk Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the following day, the detective called “Central Records” and was told that defendant had been arrested several times, the last having occurred on January 6, 1981, for a burglary. Defendant’s arrest records, Exhibits D and E, show a number of arrests–approximately eleven–from December 19, 1979, to December 8, 1980, all with the notation “no disposition,” but do not mention the January 6 arrest. Continuing with his investigation, the detective spoke to the other Detectives of the Fourth Squad Detectives who advised him that all of defendant’s “troubles” stemmed from difficulties he was having as the result of his relationship with a married woman, who lived in a neighboring community and that his last arrest, the one on January 6, came about when either she or her husband charged defendant with assault, trespass, burglary, and harassment.
A Suffolk Robbery Lawyer said that, sometime during January 21, a call was received by a Patrolman of the Fourth Squad Detectives from defendant’s mother seeking help for him. Defendant had, at this point, been taken to Brookhaven Memorial Hospital along with the married woman after an automobile accident which occurred while they were enroute to a motel. It should be noted that defendant had become the patrolman’s informant after the latter had arrested defendant on December 8, 1980, as the result of a burglary complaint made by the girlfriend’s husband. After this earlier arrest, defendant had been advised by the patrolman to get a lawyer, but defendant insisted it was “all bullshit going to Family Court.”
This proceeding was originated from the appeal of a man. The man, who is an inmate at one correctional facility, is challenging the computation of his jail time credit associated with his current sentence of imprisonment. The court then issued an order to show cause, and has received and reviewed the answer of the commissioner and the chief officer.
The court received and reviewed the affirmation submitted on behalf of the department of correction. The court also received and reviewed the man’s reply to the answering papers.
On 2006, the man was sentenced to a determinate term of two years, with two years’ post-release supervision, upon his conviction of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. He was then received into the custody as entitled to one hundred eleven days of jail time credit. Running the two year determinate term from that date, less one hundred eleven days of jail time credit, the officials determined the initial maximum expiration date of the man’s 2006 sentence to be on 2008.
The line which marks the boundary between permissible police action and an unwarranted intrusion in violation of Fourth Amendment rights is frequently thin and not readily distinguishable. The need for on-the-spot decisions by law enforcement officials does not afford them the luxury of a contemporaneous in-depth analysis or consultation with counsel. It is reserved to the courts to make a retrospective judgment and to consider the multitude of variables in weighing the interests of society vis-a-vis the inherent rights of a citizen. Such an issue is presented on defendant’s motion to suppress physical property which forms the basis for charges of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, two counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Eighth Degree and Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fourth Degree. Defendant also moves to suppress “as fruits of the poisonous tree” post arrest statements attributed to him.
A Suffolk Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, at about 10:30 p. m. on the night of December 1, 1978, two police officers on routine patrol in the parking lot of a shopping center in Bay Shore observed the defendant walking erratically toward a car. Their interest was heightened by the fact that he was singing loudly and waving a walking stick. The defendant is a 250 pound male, aged 27, who on this winter night was wearing an earring, a suede hat with a wide brim, a vest, checkered shirt, blue jeans and carrying a large wooden eagle. The total impact of the defendant’s conduct and presumably his appearance, prompted the officers to intercept and stop him after he had entered the car, put it in motion, and started to back up.
A Suffolk Drug Possession Lawyer said that, upon request, the defendant exited his car and produced his license, registration, and insurance card. He was then asked whether he was intoxicated or sick. Defendant replied he was “only slightly high” and was on his way to Lala’s Bar on Sunrise Highway and was well enough to drive his vehicle. The defendant was concededly not belligerent. One of the experienced police officers concluded from his observations including those as to the defendant’s eyes, speech described as “somewhat slurred” and the odor of his breath, that defendant was inebriated and arrested him for Driving While Intoxicated. The other police officer made no observations as to defendant’s eyes, his breath or speech before the arrest, but nonetheless concluded from defendant’s conduct that he was intoxicated. The defendant was not given any of the usual field tests such as touching his nose, picking up a coin, or walking a straight line.
This is a proceeding wherein the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered 25 July 1980, convicting him of rape in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence and a judgment of the same court, rendered 12 December 1980, convicting him of endangering the welfare of a child, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence for sex crimes.
The court affirms the judgment.
The complainant left the home of her cousin on 1 January 1979 at approximately 9:15 P.M. While the complainant was walking on Rockaway Boulevard near 142 Street in Queens, she was approached by a man who asked her for directions. She stopped walking and looked at his face as she spoke to him. As she turned away and continued walking, the man put a gun to her neck and forced her to walk a few blocks and enter an abandoned house. Once inside, he led her down into the basement and then, still at gunpoint, into a second-floor bedroom. He ordered her to remove her clothes, put them back on and then remove them again. Eventually, he raped her. He refused to let her leave for about 10 more minutes while he simply stared at her. Finally, he ordered her to leave. The entire incident lasted about two hours.
