New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

Published on: May 9, 2014

The informer related criminal activity

by Stephen Bilkis

The county police found evidence involving a man in a number of burglaries. As a result, the said man was indicted for the crime of burglary in the third degree and two counts of grand larceny in the third degree. The man also faced a charge of petit larceny.

After an unsuccessful attempt of the man to controvert the search warrant, he pleaded guilty to two counts of petit larceny, in full satisfaction of all the criminal charges in the indictment. He also pleaded guilty to the petit larceny charge.

Subsequently, the single issue presented for the court’s consideration is whether there was probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant.

Published on: May 9, 2014

CPL 440.30 (4)

by Stephen Bilkis

A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, by motion submitted October 19, 2011, defendant moves to vacate his judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (h). On May 15, 1975, judgment was entered against the defendant in Supreme Court, Bronx County, convicting him upon his plea of guilty to robbery in the third degree (PL 216.05). On May 15, 1975, defendant was sentenced to a maximum term of four years imprisonment.

On June 2, 1987, the United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service issued defendant an “order to show cause, notice of hearing, and warrant for arrest of alien” that alleges he is subject to deportation from the United States pursuant to Section 1251 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), (8 USC 1251 [a] [4]), as a result of his 1975 robbery conviction.

A Suffolk Felony Lawyer said that, defendant now moves to vacate that judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (h) on the grounds it was obtained in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution. Defendant alleges that his defense counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea, and failed to file a notice of appeal on his behalf. Defendant further alleges that the trial court failed to: inform him of the elements of the crime to which he plead guilty, ascertain whether or not he understood them, determine whether or not he allocated to facts sufficient to support the elements of the crimes charged, conduct a hearing to determine whether or not he was competent to plead guilty, and inform him of his right to appeal. Alternatively, defendant requests that an evidentiary hearing be ordered to determine whether or not the judgment should be vacated.

Published on: May 7, 2014

CPL 440.10 (1)

by Stephen Bilkis

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered June 11, 1987, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree and criminally using drug crime paraphernalia in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

A Queens Drug Crime Lawyer said that, the police officer allegedly purchased a quantity of cocaine possession from the defendant during a planned “buy” operation. Although the drug sale was consummated in one apartment, the police surveillance of the defendant revealed that he entered a nearby apartment to obtain the needed amount of cocaine. Six days after the alleged drug purchase, the police simultaneously raided both apartments pursuant to a search warrant and arrested the occupants, including the defendant. Over defense counsel’s objections, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the undercover officer that when he was in the apartment, the defendant sold a gram of cocaine to another individual. After the charge to the jury was given, defense counsel requested that the Judge issue limiting instructions concerning the evidence of the uncharged drug crime. The application was denied.

Additionally, prior to the charge being given, defense counsel requested that the Judge instruct the jury that a police officer’s testimony is to be evaluated like any other witness. Although the Judge agreed to include such instruction in the charge, he failed to do so. After the charge was given, defense counsel once again asked that the Judge instruct the jury concerning the evaluation of a police officer’s testimony, but the Judge refused.

Published on: May 6, 2014

The court further agrees with the Family Court

by Stephen Bilkis

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, in a proceeding pursuant to the Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from (1) an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County, dated December 15, 1987, which, upon a fact-finding order dated November 18, 1987, made upon the appellant’s admission, finding that he had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the drug crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for one year, and (2) an order of the same court, dated June 13, 1988, which, upon a fact-finding order dated May 10, 1988, finding that the appellant had violated his probation, placed him with the Division of Youth, Title II, for a period of one year. The appeals bring up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

A Queens Drug Crime Lawyer said that, the testimony adduced at the Mapp hearing supports the Family Court’s denial of suppression of physical evidence. The Police Officer, the only witness at the hearing, testified that on February 13, 1987, he was assigned to a “special post” in Jamaica, Queens, designed “to show presence and to prevent anyone on the streets from making drug or gun sales”. At approximately 1:25 P.M., while standing at the corner of 108th Avenue and 160th Street, he heard two gunshots. He took cover behind a car and observed a cloud of smoke coming from the roof of a building at the corner of 108th Avenue and 159th Street. As he started toward the building to investigate, he was passed by people hurriedly leaving the area of the building, who stated that someone was shooting a gun. When he turned the corner and approached the entrance of the building on 159th Street, he observed the appellant and two other youths in the doorway. One of the other youths pointed at the officer, who was in uniform, and all three fled in different directions. The officer pursued the appellant and reported the direction of the chase over his portable radio. After only a few minutes, during which time the officer never lost sight of the appellant, two uniformed housing police officers apprehended the appellant and placed him against a wall, facing the wall, with his hands over his head. The Officer quickly caught up and patted the appellant’s outer clothing. He noticed a bulge in the appellant’s right front pants pocket which he believed to be bullets. Upon removal of the objects from the pocket, the officer discovered 10 vials of the drug known as “crack”.

The issue in this case is whether the court erred in suppressing the physical evidence obtained against the defendant.

Published on: May 5, 2014

Penal Law § 220.25

by Stephen Bilkis

A Suffolk Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered April 25, 2008, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, failure to signal, and failure to display a lit headlamp, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to concurrent determinate terms of imprisonment of 8½ years for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, seven years for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, three months for criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, one day for failure to signal, and one day for failure to display a lit headlamp.

A Suffolk Drug Possession Lawyer said that, in another case, petitioner was charged with the violation “Unlawful Possession of Marijuana” in violation of Penal Law §221.05 and was issued a desk appearance ticket. He appeared for arraignment on May 28, 2003 and was released on his own recognizance by respondent provided that he submit to a supervised drug test and that he report home by 10:00 p.m. each night. This petition seeks an order in the nature of prohibition claiming that the respondent Judge exceeded her authority by imposing conditions which were not relevant to the issue of bail and which violate petitioner’s due process rights.

The issue in this case is whether the defendant’s appeal should be granted.

Published on: May 5, 2014

People v Kanhai

by Stephen Bilkis

People v Kanhai

Court Discusses Whether Business Records are an Exception to the Hearsay Rule under the Principle of Crawford v Washington

The criminal defendant was arrested and charged for one count of of driving a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol DWI under section 1192(1) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. At the defendant’s bench trial, the defendant objected to the use of the exhibits which contained statements of individuals who were not called to testify. The defendant also objected to the use of the certified copies of field inspection reports, and the simulator solution lot analysis by police department technicians and scientists on the breath analysis instrument used in defendant’s breath alcohol test. The defendant relied on the Crawford v Washington 542 US 36 [2004], in his objections as the admission of the statements into evidence violated his Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The defendant argued that since he was not permitted to cross-examine the maker of the statements, who were the actual technicians, the documents were impermissible hearsay. According to defendant, the Crawford eliminated that the business records are an exception to the hearsay rule.

Published on: May 3, 2014

State and Federal Constitutions

by Stephen Bilkis

A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, on April 24, 1972, the Suffolk County police, executing a search warrant at the premises of defendant, found evidence implicating him in a number of burglaries. As a result, defendant was indicted for the crime of burglary in the third degree and for two counts of grand larceny in the third-degree. He also faced a charge of petit larceny lodged against him in the District Court of Suffolk County. After an unsuccessful attempt to controvert the search warrant, the defendant pleaded guilty in the County Court to two counts of petit larceny, in full satisfaction of all the charges in the indictment. He also pleaded guilty to the petit larceny charge filed in the District Court. The Appellate Term affirmed the judgments of conviction.

The issue in this case is whether there was probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant.

The police officer who applied for the warrant based his application entirely upon the sworn statement of one witness. The witness affidavit was annexed to the warrant application and was directly before the Magistrate who issued the warrant. The first paragraph of the affidavit consisted entirely of statements shedding light on witness personal background. The witness averred that he was 18 years old, single, unemployed, and that he resided with his parents at an address in Green lawn, New York. He also set forth his home telephone number. The remainder of the affidavit recited personal observations he had made and a report of statements he heard while at Hicks’ Huntington Beach residence two weeks earlier. While there, the witness, and defendant’s brother, went into the bedroom to drink beer and listen to stereo music. There was a safe in the bedroom. The brother told the witness that he and three others had ‘ripped off a house’ and had stolen the safe. He opened the safe, and a third individual, removed a shoebox ‘half full of grass (marijuana).’ The witness observed that there were also some fireworks inside the safe. The brother apparently quite proud of his criminal activity, told the witness that the stereo equipment in the bedroom had been stolen from a house. To top off the litany of crime, defendant for his that he also stole a new engine and two high-back bucket seats for his car. Based on this information, duly sworn to by Leone, a search warrant was issued.

Published on: May 3, 2014

The Supreme Court denied the motion for a mistrial

by Stephen Bilkis

In addition, the criminal defendant challenged the voluntariness of his statements to the police by testifying during the trial that they were the product of verbal threats and physical abuse by the police.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

“Upon a request by a defendant, the prosecutor shall notify the defendant of all specific instances of a defendant’s prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral conduct of which the prosecutor has knowledge and which the prosecutor intends to use at trial for purposes of impeaching the credibility of the defendant.”

Published on: May 3, 2014

Reilly v. Hults

by Stephen Bilkis

Reilly v. Hults

Court Discuses the Revocation of Driver’s License after Refusing to Submit to a Chemical Test

The Motor Vehicle Commissioner appealed the annulment of the revocation of the defendant’s license by the Commissioner after he refused to submit to a chemical blood test to determine the alcohol content of his blood for driving while intoxication DWI. The commissioner appealed to review and annul the findings of the Supreme Court dated October 20, 1961, under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act.

Published on: May 2, 2014

Grievance Committee’s motion

by Stephen Bilkis

A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, by letter dated August 3, 2007, the respondent informed the Court of his conviction of serious offenses automatically resulting in the revocation of his license to practice law in New York State. Effective July 27, 2007, he ceased the practice of law. The Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District (hereinafter Grievance Committee) has now filed a motion to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4), upon the ground that he has been disbarred upon his conviction of grand larceny in the second degree, pursuant to Penal Law § 155.40, a class C felony, and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, pursuant to Penal Law § 170.25, a class D felony.

A Suffolk Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, on December 22, 2006, the respondent entered a plea of guilty in the County Court, Suffolk County, to one count of grand larceny in the second degree, pursuant to Penal Law § 155.40, a class C felony, and one count of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, pursuant to Penal Law § 170.25, a class D felony, in lieu of 50 counts, before the Honorable Judge.

A Suffolk Felony Lawyer said that, during the plea allocution, the respondent admitted that, in or about May 2002, he obtained ownership of a house and real property located at 96 Jefferson Avenue, Wyandanch, in Suffolk County, without the permission or authority of its true owner and by false pretenses. The respondent specifically admitted that he obtained ownership of that property by filing false deeds and other instruments with certain public offices, including the Suffolk County Clerk’s office. He filed those documents knowing that they were forged. The respondent was sentenced on July 27, 2007, to a term of probation of five years, restitution in the sum of $534,462, and a mandatory DNA fee in the sum of $50.