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A Queens Criminal Possession of a Weapon Lawyer said that, appellant, and his codefendant, were indicted for robbery in the first degree for forcibly stealing a sum of money from a cashier in a restaurant in Queens on August 10, 1976, while displaying what appeared to be a pistol, rifle or other firearm. Both men pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree after a motion to suppress evidence of the gun and confessions which each had made to the police were denied. Codefendant has taken no appeal from the judgment of criminal conviction against him.

On August 10, 1976, at about 10:30 or 11 P.M., appellant and codefendant walked into a Kansas Fried Chicken establishment on Northern Boulevard in Queens and robbed the cashier, of a sum of money. The appellant held a gun on the cashier while he took money from the cash register. An accomplice was waiting for them in an automobile parked outside the store. The accomplice’s mother owned the car. After the robbery appellant and the codefendant went into the accomplice vehicle and rode away. Several hours later, at about 1:45 A.M. on August 11, 1976, Police Officers both in uniform and patrolling in a marked police vehicle, observed codefendant, accomplice and appellant walking along Manhattan Avenue near 117 Street, in what was conceded to be a “high-crime drug area”.

At the suppression hearing the officer testified that among the things which aroused his suspicion was the fact that appellant, when the officers pulled up, “abruptly turned back like he wasn’t a member of the group”. He then saw appellant and his companions enter the Atkins’ automobile at 116 Street. The car proceeded south on Manhattan Avenue. The police vehicle followed it and caused it to stop at 113 Street. The Officer’s explanation was that from a point about a car-length away the officers saw “a lot of action inside the car which aroused their suspicions” and they “saw, I believe, appellant trying to put something under the seat. It appeared at our vantage point like he was trying to hide something.” He also noted that there was “a lot of jostling in the car, a lot of moving.” The driver of the police vehicle flashed the lights of the car at which point the Officer saw what he assumed to be “narcotics being thrown from the window”. These were two envelopes which “appeared to be white in nature, a glassine envelope, containing a white substance.” However, when asked by the criminal court whether he “could see the white substance in the envelope”, the officer answered, “They looked like two white pieces of paper. I took it for granted it was glassine envelopes with alleged heroin.” This ejection took place near 114 Street, but the Atkins’ vehicle did not respond to the flashing police lights until a block later. After it came to a halt, with the police car parked behind it, went up to the occupants “to cover them”, while Officer Quinn went back to the area in which the papers had been tossed. He recovered a glassine envelope filled with a white substance and waved it at, who understood that to mean that it was an envelope containing drugs.

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In this Criminal action, the Judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County convicting defendant after trial by jury of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree and Criminal Use of Drug Paraphernalia in the Second Degree and sentencing defendant to various terms of imprisonment was affirmed.

The Magistrates only differs from a dissenting member on the question of sentence. The Court held that the then mandatory sentence of 15 to life imposed for the conviction of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree was required by law. The proof, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish defendant’s accessorial liability with respect to the drug selling operation conducted by defendant’s co-defendant. A Queens County Criminal lawyer said that like the dissenting opinion, the Court was troubled by the draconian sentence. Yet, they cannot, in good conscience, say that this is the rare case which on its particular facts may lead to the opinion that the sentencing statute has been unconstitutionally applied.

While the proof lends itself to the conclusion that defendant, who controlled entrance into the apartment, was greeter, receptionist, general factotum and bodyguard, there is no reasonable doubt that his function was to “protect” the operation by excluding those who might seek to disrupt it. Thus, while he was, in the eyes of the law, an accessory to the crimes and is equally guilty, his participation in the criminal activity was markedly less than that of the principal actor.

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In this Criminal case, herein Appellant has been convicted of murder, effected while engaged in the commission of a felony. Appellant was indicted together with another individual, and it is alleged that the defendants, each aiding and assisting the other, committed the crime.

A Queens County Criminal lawyer said that the gun crime was committed in June 1935. At about 1 o’clock in the morning six persons were in a Tavern in Winfield, Queens County. The owner was standing behind the bar at the end farthest from the entrance. Sitting on a stool at the bar was a patron. At a table at the right of the bar as one entered, the deceased sat with three other persons. The deceased faced the door of the tavern, had his back to the door and was facing the owner faced the bar, and another had his back to the door.

Three men entered the tavern, drew guns, and said, ‘Stick them up.’ The victim turned in his chair, saw a gun in the hand of one and made a lunge for it. He seized the hand of the gunman. The gun was discharged and a bullet passed through his buttocks. Two other shots were fired, although it does not appear which one of the gunmen fired these shots. The victim fell to the floor. He was struck by a bullet, and died as a result of it. The three men escaped. They were on the premises only a little over a minute.

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People v. Lopez

Court Discusses Whether a Sentence was Excessive for a Second time Offender

The defendant was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. He was arrested after possessing over twenty four thousand dollars of heroin for the purposes of selling the controlled substance. The defendant was 27 years of age at the time he was arrested and had one other conviction of possession of a weapon for which he received a conditional discharge and paid a two hundred dollars fine. The defendant was convicted of both a controlled substance in the first degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and sentenced to a concurrent term of twenty years to life imprisonment on each count. The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence.

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Defendant moves pursuant to § 440.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law for an order vacating his judgment of conviction. His conviction followed a negotiated guilty plea to one count of the Class D felony of Insurance Fraud in the Third Degree and one count of the Class E felony of Grand larceny in the Fourth Degree.

The thrust of the instant motion is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by Defendant’s two former attorneys.

A Queens County Criminal attorney said that defendant entered a plea of guilty to a Superior Court Information charging a single count of Insurance Fraud 3° and a single count of Grand larceny 4°, with a promise of indeterminate concurrent sentences of one to three years, and a restitution judgment in the amount of $77,199.00. Defendant was originally charged with three counts each of Insurance Fraud 3° and Grand larceny 3° relating to the submission of allegedly false automobile damage claims to certain insurers. Defendant contends that the lawyer was obligated to advise him that his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation. Defendant maintains that the lawyer’s failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because the federal law pertaining to the immigration consequences of a plea to such crimes is, Defendant asserts, “simple and straightforward” since both crimes are allegedly deemed “aggravated felonies” within the meaning of the immigration statute, the conviction for which mandates deportation.

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People v McFadden

Court Discusses Conviction Against the Weight of the Evidence.

The defendant was charged for a criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree in connection with a single transaction. The first trial resulted in a deadlock by the jury on two of the most serious charges. The defendant was found guilty on a partial verdict of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and the trial judge declared a mistrial on the other counts. A second trial was conducted on the charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

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By petition filed, a juvenile is alleged to have committed acts which, were he an adult, would constitute the crimes on criminal possession of a weapon in the third and fourth degrees and possession of pistol or revolver ammunition.

The matter arose from incident where a police officer was on patrol with his partner in an unmarked police vehicle. At approximately 8:30 p.m., the police vehicle was situated at the corner one street, an area of mixed residential and commercial structures, which was well-lit by street lights and the light coming from homes.

From the police officer’s seat on the front passenger side of the car, he observed an individual walking alone. He observed that the said individual, who apparently had not noticed their vehicle because there had been no eye contact with them. The individual, as observed by the officer, looked like going to cross the street and when he got a quarter of the way he stopped and looked down, reached for his waist to adjust something. The criminal individual then turned and returned to the corner.

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The Grand Jury of the Special Narcotics Courts of the City of New York voted an indictment against the defendants charging them with four counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 (2); four counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree in violation of Penal Law § 265.02 (4); and two counts of conspiracy in the fourth degree, in violation of Penal Law § 105.10 (1). In summary, the People allege that a confidential informant contacted defendant, offering him an opportunity to rob drug dealers of a valuable supply of narcotics and/or cash. Defendant allegedly accepted the informant’s offer, and engaged the three codefendants to be part of the robbery gang.

A Queens County Drug Crime lawyer said that the defendants filed omnibus discovery motions, to which the People responded. The People also supplied the grand jury minutes to the court for in camera examination pursuant to. After examining the grand jury minutes, the court ordered the parties to submit additional memoranda of law on two jurisdictional questions. First, in light of the fact that the indictment does not contain a single narcotics-related charge, does the Grand Jury of the Special Narcotics Courts of the City of New York have subject matter jurisdiction. Second, assuming, arguendo, the Special Narcotics Grand Jury has subject matter jurisdiction, does it also have geographic jurisdiction

The CI testified in the grand jury. In summary, the informant testified that he had continuous conversations with defendant; however, his testimony is devoid of any references to where he or defendant was located when they had those telephone conversations. Furthermore, it is apparent from the grand jury minutes that none of the face-to-face meetings between the informant and the defendants occurred in Manhattan. The sole reference to Manhattan in the informant’s testimony is contained in the informant’s recitation of why he was at a certain place at a certain time, to which the witness responded: “[I]t was an operation that had been assigned to me with those four people [the defendants] that the foreman of the jury mentioned which consisted of going to an apartment in Manhattan or in the Bronx with firearms, with guns, and it was to rob sixty kilos of cocaine.”

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A Queens Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the indictment in this case charges the defendant with the crime of grand larceny in the first degree in that he stole an automobile with the intent to deprive the lawful custodian and owner thereof. Upon appropriate waiver by the defendant of the right to trial by jury the cause was tried before me without a jury. The contention of the District Attorney is that the automobile was stolen by the defendant in Queens County, and was thereafter transported by him to the State of Indiana where, on an alarm issued by the New York City police, the defendant was taken into custody.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that it appears that on March 23, 1964, the owner of the automobile, as complainant, swore to a complaint charging the defendant with its theft, and that on the same day, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant was issued by a Criminal Court judge. Ten days later, in the State of Indiana, and thereafter in New York, the arresting officer interrogated the defendant with reference to the complainant’s automobile and obtained the defendant’s confessions to the stealing thereof.

A Queens Robbery Lawyer said that, the proffer of the testimony with respect to the alleged confessions made by the defendant was objected to upon the ground that they were obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights in that he was not represented by counsel.

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A man pleads guilty to the crime of grand larceny in the second degree and was sentenced to the state vocational institute.

After two years, the man again pleads guilty to the crime of attempted grand larceny in the second degree and was sentenced for a term of two and half to five years.

After seven years, he again pleads guilty to the crime of forgery in the second degree.

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