New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

Published on: February 5, 2014

A man was convicted of the crime of issuing a fraudulent check

by Stephen Bilkis

A man was convicted of the crime of issuing a fraudulent check and of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree, and from the decision of the Supreme Court that unanimously affirming the decision of conviction, the man appeals by permission.

In connection with the man’s purchase of a quantity of lumber, the man gave to the seller a check upon a bank where payment thereof was refused because of insufficient funds to the man’s credit. As a result of the transaction the man stands convicted of a violation of the penal law.

Based on records, grand larceny in the second degree is the appropriating, taking, stealing the property of another the value of which is over $100 and less than $500 in any manner whatsoever. Further, larceny is just another name for stealing and it is the taking of another man’s property with a view of depriving him of it and appropriating it to your own use and benefit, stealing. Forgery was an element.

Published on: February 5, 2014

DCJS’ regulation

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York DWI Lawyer said that, this matter is before the Court for sentencing under The Defendant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3).

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the State enacted Leandra’s Law November 18, 2009, roughly one month after the DWI death of 11-year-old girl in New York City. It demands, inter alia, that all first-time, misdemeanor DWI offenders install ignition interlock devices in every automobile they own or operate for at least 6 months. It further requires, barring indigency, that offenders pay for installation and maintenance of the interlocks. However, like so many products rushed to market prematurely, Leandra’s Law exhibits numerous defects imperiling its constitutionality.

The issue in this case is whether the Leandra’s Law is constitutional.

Published on: February 4, 2014

The evidence was legally insufficient

by Stephen Bilkis

In two related juvenile delinquency proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeals are from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Queens County, which, after a fact-finding hearing, found that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree , (2) an order of disposition of the same court, which, upon the fact-finding order, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation with the “Probation Department of the County of Queens” for a period of 18 months, (3) a fact-finding order of the same court, which, after a fact-finding hearing, found that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and (4) an order of disposition of the same court which, upon the fact-finding order, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation with the “Probation Department of the County of Queens” for a period of 18 months,

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, the Court found that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and attempted criminal robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree.

Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented is primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses. Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record. Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight of the evidence.

Published on: February 2, 2014

People v. Reyes

by Stephen Bilkis

People v. Reyes

Court Discusses the Credibility of Detective testimony versus the Defendant

The defendant was charged with sale, possession with intent to sell and possession of heroin on two separate occasions. The charges stemmed from the allegation that the defendant sold heroin in a glassine envelope on two separate occasions to an undercover detective. The detective also used the assistance of a patrolman to indicate that the sale had been completed. The defendant, however, stated that he was leaving work to pick up his son at the time the sale was alleged to have transpired on the first occasion but provided no further evidence to support his alibi. The defendant’s nephew also testified that he was him an hour prior to the defendant’s arrest on the second occasion it was alleged that he sold heroin to the undercover defective. The defendant’s nephew further stated that at no time the defendant possessed any illegal substance. The defendant was convicted by a non-jury trial of one count of criminal selling a dangerous drug in the third degree and sentenced to an intermediate term of imprisonment not exceeding four year. The trial court however, dismissed the remaining charges because the prosecution failed to prove their case against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant appealed the conviction on the ground that he should not have been convicted since the other charges were dismissed.

Published on: February 1, 2014

The Supreme Court of the United States

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant moves to suppress physical evidence and his statements. He was charged of crimes of burglary in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree.

A Queens County Criminal lawyer said that in October 2011 a Detective of the 104th Precinct Detective Squad, was assigned to investigate a burglary that took place in Middle Village, Queens. Police Officer, an eight (8) year veteran of the NYPD and also working with the 104th Precinct Detective Squad, was assigned to investigate a burglary that took place a day earlier. They worked together on these criminal cases.

Thereafter, the Detective placed a telephone call to the defendant and speaking in English, asked him to come to the precinct and speak with him. The defendant spoke to him in English. They scheduled an appointment two (2) days later. The detective did not recall telling the defendant why he needed to speak to him. The detective did not tell the defendant that he would be coming in to surrender. The detective had been given the defendant’s name, address and telephone number by the co-defendant, who had been arrested earlier that day.

Published on: February 1, 2014

The issue is whether the court erred

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Drug Possession Lawyer said that, defendant, a graduate student and teacher at Penn State University, was convicted by the court, without a jury, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, a class A felony, and was sentenced to a minimum period of imprisonment of 15 years to life. It is not disputed that on January 4, 1975 the defendant, while under police surveillance, sold a substantial quantity of cocaine to a police informant.

A New York Cocaine Possession Lawyer said that, the informant who made the purchase of cocaine upon which defendant’s conviction is based testified that he had known defendant for about two years before the transaction of January 4, 1975; that he had visited defendant’s Pennsylvania apartment on several occasions; and that he had made prior drug purchases from defendant. He also testified that on December 4, 1974, the day before he was arrested in Steuben County for possession of amphetamines, he purchased 1,000 pills which he believed to be amphetamines, a gram of cocaine and one or two grams of PCP from defendant in Pennsylvania. While it later developed that these pills were not a controlled substance, he asserted that defendant told him that they were ‘black beauties’ and he paid defendant between $220 and $240 for the pills.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the informant admitted that over a period of time he had used amphetamines, sedatives, hallucinogens, marijuana and heroin, and that he had sold drugs to others. He had a prior Chemung County conviction for felony possession of marijuana which was pending on appeal. On December 5, 1974 he was arrested for felony possession of amphetamines and shortly thereafter he expressed a desire to work with the state police as an informant. On December 20, 1974 he discussed with his attorney his possible informant’s role and its effect not only upon the charge with which he was then confronted but also upon the prior Chemung County conviction.

Published on: January 31, 2014

1972 Interim Report of the Temporary State Commission

by Stephen Bilkis

By order to show cause, the defendants move for renewal and re-argument of so much of the Court’s prior decision and order, entered December 2, 1993 as denied, after an inspection of the Grand Jury minutes, that branch of their respective omnibus motions to dismiss or reduce the first count of the indictment, predicated upon the argument that it was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Relying upon the Court of Appeals’ recent decision, the defendants request the Court to re-inspect the Grand Jury minutes and to reduce the first count of the indictment, charging the defendants with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree upon the ground the People failed to adduce legally sufficient evidence establishing that each had knowledge of the weight of the cocaine. The People oppose the application.

The motion, properly designated as one to reargue based upon a subsequent authoritative decision clarifying the mensrea element for drug possession offenses which require a minimum quantity of the drug, is granted and, upon re-argument, the motion to dismiss or reduce the first count of the indictment is denied.

Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, as defined in Penal Law requires proof that the defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed substances of an aggregate weight of four ounces or more containing a narcotic drug such as cocaine. As was acknowledged, there is a distinction between inferences that may reasonably be drawn regarding a person’s knowledge of the pure weight of a controlled substance, when it is mixed with other materials in amounts not ascertainable except by the person who created the mixture or by chemical analysis, and inferences that may reasonably be drawn by direct sensory perception. The charged offense in this case is one of aggregate weight and the amount of cocaine discovered in the trunk of the vehicle, which was occupied solely by the defendants, was almost 18 times the requisite statutory weight.

Published on: January 29, 2014

The new pimp was very violent

by Stephen Bilkis

A woman moves to vacate her plea of guilty to disorderly conduct, the judgment of conviction and sentence rendered on her. She asserts that her prior convictions are directly related to her arrests for prostitution offenses, and that because she is a victim of human trafficking.

At trial, the woman testified that she was forced into prostitution when she was only twelve years old. She stated that she lived with her grandmother until she was eight years old. While living with her grandmother, she further stated that she was sexually abused by her uncle, but she never received any medical attention even though an institution for children was involved and informed about the abuse.

Following her grandmother’s death, she avers that she was placed into foster care and over the next few years, she was bounced around different foster homes until she was twelve years old.

Published on: January 29, 2014

ADJUDGED and ORDERED

by Stephen Bilkis

Respondent, a Housing Authority was created by the Legislature to, inter alia, build and operate low-income apartments in New York City. Respondent is required by federal and state law to provide safe, decent, and sanitary housing to public housing tenants. Pursuant to 42 USC § 1437d(l)(6), leases must include the following provision: Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.

A New York Criminal lawyer said that, by lease, petitioner agreed that in exchange for residing in apartment located at Bronx, New York, neither she nor any member or guest would engage in “any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the development by other residents or by the landlord’s employees” or “any violent or drug-related criminal activity on or off the leased premises or the development,” and that respondent may terminate the lease for “violation of its material terms.”

Thereafter, New York City Police Department Detective searched petitioner’s apartment pursuant to a warrant issued upon proof of secured drug buys from petitioner and her brother, a member of her household. The search yielded two ounces of marijuana split among 37 small plastic bags and two larger bags, $419.00 in cash, all of which were found in a safe in petitioner’s bedroom, and codeine pills, which were found on petitioner’s night stand. He arrested petitioner, who pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and was sentenced to two days of community service.

Published on: January 29, 2014

CPLR Rule 4518

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant, during his alcohol related driving trial, opposed introduction of the foundational documents customarily offered to validate the admission of the results of a breath test and subsequently objected to the results being admitted due to lack of foundation. The defendant’s basis for the objections was his inability to exercise his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him as outlined by the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. As this was a bench trial, the court reserved decision and in the interests of judicial economy allowed the evidence to be introduced subject to submission of papers and rendering of this opinion. Following the trial, the court reached a partial verdict on all charges except the per se DWI or Driving While Intoxicated charge.

The court overrules the defendant’s objections to the admission of the breath test documents, allows their introduction into evidence and permits the breath test results to be considered by the court as fact finder.

Criminal defendants in New York enjoy co-existing state and federal constitutional rights to confront their accusers. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him in accordance with the US Constitution, 6th Amendment, NYS Constitution Article 1, § 6. Since 1939, the state’s similar constitutional provision has provided that in any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him. This limited right of “confrontation” gave the defendant the opportunity to “reproach” or object to the testimony of a potentially biased witness.