Published on:

by

This is a proceeding wherein the defendant, MW, moves, pursuant to CPL § 410.90(1), for an order granting early termination of his ten-year sentence of probation, on the ground that he is rehabilitated.

On 10 May 2012, the court held a hearing wherein Rabbi EZ testified on defendant’s behalf, as did defendant. The court finds Rabbi EZ to be a credible witness but rejects his conclusion that defendant’s practice of Orthodox Judaism nearly eliminates the risk that defendant will commit future sexual assault and obviates the need for ongoing monitoring of defendant by the Department of Probation.

The court is faced with the task of determining whether defendant is rehabilitated and whether continued supervision is warranted. In order to make that assessment, the defendant’s current “conduct and condition” (CPL § 410.90[3][a] ) as compared to his status in 2004 shall be considered. Accordingly, I have examined the information available to the sentencing court eight years ago (gleaned from transcripts and other court records), along with the evidence presented at the hearing of this motion. Following are my findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Continue reading

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

The Court conducted a SORA risk assessment hearing in this criminal case. Defendant was convicted by plea of guilty in July of 2009 of one count of possession of child pornography under federal law for which he received a sentence of two years imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Defendant was apprehended in a “sting” operation in which he responded to a solicitation to buy child pornographic videos by postal inspectors. He was subsequently arrested and a search of his home computer uncovered 300–600 images primarily of pre-pubescent girls clothed, naked or being sexual abuse. He was released from prison to federal supervised release in December of 2011.

A New York Child pornography attorney said that defendant is 33 years old and has had no other contacts with the criminal justice system. He has suffered from severe problems with depression and social anxiety arising from prior physical abuse by his father. Psychiatric evaluations indicated that he posed little risk of committing a contact sex offense. His prospects for committing another child molestation crime, however, were less certain. Defendant’s counsel argued that the Defendant did not view the child pornographic images on his computer for sexual pleasure but rather because he identified with the pain and abuse the children in the videos had suffered. In the Court’s view, however, the evidence indicated that the Defendant also may well have been motivated at least in part by sexual desire.

The evidence indicated that although defendant could not be diagnosed with pedophilia, such a diagnosis could also not be ruled out. Defendant has expressed remorse for his crime. He currently lives and cares for his ailing mother in public housing but would apparently have to move out of his mother’s apartment if he were designated as anything other than a level 1 offender. He has been complying with the requirements of his supervision.

Continue reading

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

In this Criminal case, the Defense Counsel moved for the dismissal of the Indictment upon the grounds of: Multiplicity, Duplicity, Double Counting; Vagueness and Resulting Insufficiency, and Sufficiency.

A Queens County Criminal attorney said that the Assistant District Attorney opposed such motion and this Court then calendared oral argument. On the same hearing, Defense Counsel served upon the Court a request to adjourn oral argument in order to afford Counsel an opportunity to submit a written reply to the District Attorney’s Memorandum of Law. The Court denied in part and granted in part such request and thereafter, entertained oral argument on the issues hereunder. The Court was in receipt of Defense Counsel’s supplemental reply affirmation in support of the motion to dismiss the indictment.

Defense Counsel alleges that when death is a possible outcome of a criminal prosecution, state and federal law demand a heightened standard of due process at every phase of a capital case, from indictment to appeal. Specifically, Defense alleges that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, requires a more stringent standard of due process in capital cases. Defense further contends that the New York State Constitution expands that requirement and includes several provisions which specifically augment protection for a capital-eligible defendant.

Continue reading

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

This is a proceeding wherein the State of New York moves to establish probable cause to believe that K.A. is a “sex offender requiring civil management” pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) Article 10, §10.06(k). K.A. opposes the motion.

Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 provides that after a case review team, consisting of at least two mental-health professionals, finds that an individual is “a sex offender requiring civil management,” the Attorney General may file a sex offender civil management petition in Supreme Court. The petition must “contain a statement or statements alleging facts of an evidentiary character tending to support the allegation that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.

After a burglary petition is filed, the act directs that Supreme Court “shall conduct a hearing without a jury to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.”

Continue reading

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

A New York Sex Crimes Lawyer said that, by indictment filed on February 6, 2007, first defendant was charged with rape in the second degree, endangering the welfare of a child, and unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree (two counts) for providing alcohol to underage children and having sex with a 14-year-old boy. First defendant was a 34-year-old mother of six in September 2006, when the events underlying the indictment took place. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress a statement in which she made an admission, defendant pleaded guilty on August 16, 2007 to one count of third-degree rape in exchange for a sentence of 1½ to 3 years in prison. During the plea colloquy, defendant told County Court that she was satisfied with her attorney. The judge did not inform her that she would have to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) as a consequence of her conviction.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the County Court denied her application. He advised her, however, that she could later move for post conviction relief, for which he would assign her new counsel. Next, the judge sentenced her as promised. The clerk then brought up the sex offender registration fee of $50 and the supplemental sex offender fee of $1,000, which the judge imposed; and the prosecutor asked the judge to certify her as a sex crime offender, which he did. On appeal to the Appellate Division, defendant argued that County Court should have conducted an inquiry after she moved to withdraw her guilty plea on conflict-of-interest grounds; and that her guilty plea was involuntary because the judge did not tell her that she would have to register as a sex offender.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, by indictment filed on October 5, 2006, second defendant who was then 39 years old, was charged with one count of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and one count of first-degree rape , based on allegations that he sexually abused a young girl from the age of seven until she reported the abuse at the age of 10. On April 10, 2007, second defendant pleaded guilty to one count of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree in exchange for a split sentence of six months in jail and 10 years of probation. At the time, he resided with his girlfriend and several children (although not the alleged victim) younger than 18 years old. The judge did not mention any particular potential conditions of probation during the plea colloquy.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

Defendant, in February of 1995, in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, entered pleas of guilty to sodomy in the second degree and sexual abuse in the first degree. The initial charges arose when defendant, during the summer of 1992, lured two young boys into his home for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations. The defendant took photographs of the victims.

A New York Criminal lawyer said that in January 1996, while defendant remained on probation, the Sex Offender Registration Act (hereafter referred to as SORA), became effective. The act requires convicted sex offenders, including those on probation at the time of its enactment, to register with the Department of Criminal Justice Services. Sodomy in the second is designated a “sex offense” while sexual abuse in the first degree is designated a “sexually violent offense”. A “sexually violent predator” is defined as any person convicted of a “sexually violent offense” or a sex crimes offender who suffers from a mental abnormality that makes such person likely to engage in predatory sexual conduct.

The law establishes three levels of community notification. A level one designation is the lowest level and provides for information to be given only to the enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over the individual. A level two, or moderate, designation provides notification similar to level one along with authorization to said agencies to disseminate relevant information including approximate address based on zip code, a photograph, background of the crime, type of victim and any special conditions imposed on the offender to any entity with vulnerable populations related to the nature of the offense committed by such sex offender. Level three, the high risk category, provides for the dissemination of the same information as for level two offenders, as well as the dissemination of the offender’s exact address. In addition, the information is required to be recorded in a subdirectory which, upon request, will be made available to the public.

Continue reading

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

This is a proceeding wherein on appeal, the court holds that the reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b). Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence.

On 20 September 2004 at 3:57 p.m., the defendant, JD, a road patrol deputy in the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, was on routine patrol for DWI in a marked police vehicle when he received a radio dispatch from the Office of Emergency Communications dispatch or “911 center” directing him to respond to a stolen vehicle report at an address in Henrietta, New York. When he received the call, he was heading south on West Henrietta Road, nearing a traffic light at the intersection of West Henrietta Road and Brighton Henrietta Town Line Road, which marks the border between the Towns of Brighton (on the north side) and Henrietta (on the south side). No Drunk Driving.

Thereafter, JD received a second radio dispatch which requested backup for another officer who was responding to a burglary alarm at a location in Henrietta. Because the 911 center categorized the burglary alarm as “classification one”, meaning, “a serious call that needs immediate attention”, JD acknowledged the request, telling the dispatcher that he would assist with the burglary alarm before addressing the stolen vehicle report which was assigned a higher classification and therefore a lower priority. At 4:02 p.m., the dispatcher transmitted information about the burglary call, including the address and the names of cross streets, to the mobile data terminal inside the deputy’s vehicle. DUI was not an issue.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

This proceeding is an appeal from a judgment of the Yates County Court rendered 8 December 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of driving while ability impaired and driving while intoxicated.

The court affirms the judgment appealed from.

On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of, inter alia, felony driving while intoxicated DWI Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2]; § 1193 [1] [c] [ii], defendant contends that County Court erred in admitting in evidence breath test calibration and simulator solution certificates used in verifying the accuracy of the breathalyzer test. According to defendant, the admission of those records in evidence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution under Crawford v Washington.

Continue reading

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered March 5, 1984, convicting him of murder in the second degree, and robbery in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by him to law enforcement authorities.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, on January 28, 1983, the defendant, his brother traveled from their neighborhood in Brooklyn to Liberty Avenue in Queens looking for a store to rob. The defendant was armed with a can of mace and one of his companions was carrying a gun. After checking out several stores, the defendant and his accomplices decided to rob a Clothing Store because the proprietor was an elderly gentleman who they believed would be “easy to take off”.

A Queens Criminal Felony Lawyer said that, after the trio entered the store, the defendant immediately assaulted the victim by spraying him in the face with mace. One of his accomplices then pulled out the gun and announced a stickup. The victim came out from behind a counter and a struggle ensued; defendant’s brother grabbed the man and started choking him. The defendant proceeded to the cash register and emptied its contents while his accomplices continued the fatal struggle with the victim. As he was taking the money out of the cash register, the defendant saw his brother hit the victim in the head with a hammer. The victim’s death was due to asphyxiation by strangulation, and multiple wounds to the head and face inflicted during the course of the robbery. In a videotaped statement the defendant admitted knowing that one of his criminal accomplices was armed with a gun prior to entering the store, and he acknowledged spraying the victim in the face with mace. He also admitted removing money from the cash register as his accomplices continued the fatal assault.

Continue reading

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, while the delay has been extensive, the other factors favor the prosecution. Two bar owners were shot point blank after defendant’s cohort allegedly became enraged over a spilled drink, resulting in second degree murder charges. There was virtually no pretrial incarceration. The defense has not been impaired; to the contrary, defendant has enjoyed significant freedom with no public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation of crime, and the record does not demonstrate undue prejudice to the defense. Far from giving the People an unfair tactical advantage, the delay here has made the case against defendant more difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process even though there may be some prejudice to defendant.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, the Homicide Bureau of the Queens County District Attorney’s Office applied in a written memorandum dated March 25, 1982, for authority to present “the case for Grand Jury consideration of two counts of murder in the second degree. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the evidence against defendant at that time was indistinguishable from that against him and only differed from the proof inculpating him in the respect that he was the only one of the three suspects arrested and, following the arrest, put in a lineup and identified as a participant in the shootings by the victim.

The issue in this case is whether the constitutional rights of the defendant have been impaired due to denial of speedy trial.

Continue reading

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Contact Information