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A man was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years for assault in the second degree and one year for promoting prostitution in the fourth degree. At the time of sentencing, the court did not impose the mandatory period of post-release supervision as required by the law. In spite of a five-year period of post-release supervision was administratively imposed the man was released to post-release supervision. He was then be supervised by the division of parole. Lewd conduct was involved.

Subsequently, the man was charged with violating four conditions of his release to parole supervision and was declared delinquent with respect to his parole obligation. Later, a parole warrant was issued and lodged, and the man was served with a notice of violation and violation of release report on the same date. At his preliminary parole hearing, the hearing officer made a finding of probable reason. The man’s final parole revocation hearing was scheduled and prior to it, the man brought an instant writ alleging that his period of post-release supervision was improper.

The man’s primary argument was based upon the recent decision of previous related case which held in part that post-release supervision is not merely a direct consequence of a determinate sentence but is in fact part of the sentence itself and as such it may only be imposed by the sentencing judge and a nullity if imposed administratively after sentencing. Hence, the man argues that the five-year post-release supervision imposed upon him by the department of correctional was unlawful and therefore the parole violation warrant must be vacated.

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In this criminal case, defendant was arrested and charged with the violation of Penal Law Section 230.00, a class B misdemeanor. A bench trial was held. The People presented the testimony of Police Officer assigned to the Brooklyn South Public Morals Division (BSPMD). He testified that in January 1994, he placed a telephone call to a specific number to set up a “rendezvous” with someone he believed to be engaged in prostitution. That belief was based on a complaint the officer’s unit had received several months before.

A Kings County Criminal attorney said that the Officer testified that after several telephone calls, he was instructed to go to an Avenue. He did so and was met at the door by a female, white, who weighed about 300 pounds and had blond hair. He identified this woman as the defendant. He followed the defendant into the building to apartment. When he got into the apartment, he testified that the defendant told him that it would cost him $100 and that he should get undressed and go to the bedroom. He then asked the woman what he would get for $100 and the woman said a brand. He said that he told the defendant he was not interested in said brand and was told by the defendant that straight sex was $80 and oral sex was $20.

The officer then testified that he refused to undress, and the defendant directed him to go into the bedroom and put on a video while she slipped into something comfortable. The officer testified that in the bedroom were tapes of sex crimes videos and a dildo. The officer put on a tape and then transmitted a code to the arrest team to set into place the apprehension of the defendant. The officer subsequently opened the front door and admitted the arrest team. Defendant then was advised to get dressed and a Detective placed her under arrest for prostitution.

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In this Criminal action, Defendant-appellant was charged with multiple petty offenses. None carries a maximum term of incarceration greater than six months upon conviction when prosecuted individually.

A New York Criminal attorney said that Defendant was originally charged, under two separate informations, with multiple misdemeanors and lesser offenses relating to two altercations with his wife. By the time of the trial, the charges remaining on the first information were attempted criminal mischief in the fourth degree and menacing.

These are classified as class B misdemeanor carrying maximum authorized jail sentences of three months. The charges in the second information were reduced to three class B misdemeanors, attempted third degree assault, attempted fourth degree criminal mischief, and attempted second degree criminal contempt, in addition to a single count of harassment. The latter is a violation punishable by a maximum sentence of 15 days and the others, as class B misdemeanors, are punishable by a maximum sentence of up to three months. Upon motion by the People, the informations were consolidated for trial.

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This is a proceeding wherein the petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination that he is a sex offender subject to registration pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.

Supreme Court granted the petition and annulled the determination, concluding that petitioner was not subject to SORA’s registration requirements.

The court agrees with respondent that petitioner, who was on probation in Wyoming for sex offenses within the meaning of Correction Law § 168–a(2)(d)(i) on the effective date of SORA, is required to register as a sex offender in New York. Therefore, the court concludes that the judgment should be reversed and the petition dismissed.

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Property Clerk of the Police Dept. of the City of N.Y. v Burnett

Court Discusses the Krimstock v. Kelly Principle after the Seizure of Motor Vehicle

On February 16, 2004, the defendant was arrested on three drug charges: felony possession of a controlled substance, Viagra, with intent to sell; felony possession of more than 16 ounces of marijuana; and misdemeanor possession of marijuana in a public place. At the time of the defendant’s arrest, his 2000 Lexus was seized by the Police Department under voucher number B161371, because the drugs were found in the vehicle. At the time of the arrest the defendant provided paperwork that the vehicle belonged to the defendant. At the time of the arrest, the vehicle had a retail value of $24,550.00.

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This is a proceeding wherein the defendant, JC, was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of sexual abuse in the first degree. In evaluating the defendant for registration as a sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6–C, the Sex Offender Registration Act, the New York State Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders assessed the defendant as a presumptive level two sex offender based, in part, upon his juvenile delinquency adjudication when he was 13 years old. After a hearing, the Supreme Court granted the People’s application for an upward departure to risk level three.

Herein, the court addresses the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s consideration of the defendant’s juvenile delinquency adjudication was permissible as evidence of the defendant’s age at the time of his first sex offense. For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that the consideration of the defendant’s juvenile delinquency adjudication was improper.

On 12 January 2009, the Board prepared a Risk Assessment Instrument containing the Board’s recommendation to the Supreme Court regarding the defendant’s appropriate risk level designation under SORA. In the RAI, the Board assessed a total of 80 points, which placed the defendant at risk level two. The points were assessed under five risk factors, as follows: 10 points under risk factor 1 (“Used forcible compulsion”); 10 points under risk factor 2 (“Contact under clothing”); 20 points under risk factor 5 (“Age of victim 11 through 16”); 10 points under risk factor 8 (“Age at first act of sexual misconduct 20 or less”); and 30 points under risk factor 9 (“Prior violent felony, or misdemeanor sex crimes or endangering welfare of a child”).

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A New York Prostitution Lawyer said that, petitioner is the lessee of the premises at 6693 Broadway, Bronx, New York, which was ordered closed for one year by Police Commissioner Ward, pursuant to the Padlock Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The Padlock Law, effective August 6, 1984, authorizes the Police Commissioner to impose sanctions for public nuisances by barring the use of property in violation of penal laws, such as those relating to prostitution, gambling and drugs.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, specifically, the Padlock Law defines, as a public nuisance, any building where violations of certain provisions of the Penal Law (such as PL Article 225, relating to gambling) are occurring, and where at least two such criminal convictions have occurred within one year of commencement of proceedings pursuant to section 436-8.1. The law creates a statutory presumption of continuing criminal activity, where an arrest for violation of the relevant provisions was made within thirty days of issuance of notice pursuant to § 436-8.1. The police commissioner’s regulations provide for notice of arrests to the owner of property, informing him that if two or more convictions are obtained within 12 months for such public nuisances, proceedings may be commenced resulting in possible closure of the premises. The proceedings are commenced by service of notice of hearing on the owner, lessor, lessee and mortgagee, pursuant to CPLR Article 3. A public hearing presided over by a hearing officer, employed by the police department, is held to determine whether a public nuisance exists, and to report to the police commissioner with recommendations, either for abatement of any nuisance, or for vacatur of a closing order.

A New York Patronizing Prostitution Lawyer said that, in this case, a hearing was held on March 19, 1985 before Hearing Officer Edward Jordan, who recommended closure of the premises for numerous violations of PL Article 225 relating to gambling (specifically, 11 gambling arrests were made at the premises between March 15, 1984 and January 3, 1985, 10 of which resulted in convictions). The police commissioner later accepted the recommendation and ordered closure for one year. Petitioner admitted running a numbers operation out of the premises, but contended that gambling should not be illegal and in any event does not constitute a public nuisance. Neither of these contentions bears scrutiny. The legislation has resolved the issues, and it is not for the court to substitute its judgment. Nor is there substance to the argument that the premises do not constitute a nuisance because they are located in a relatively unpopulated area. Finally, petitioner’s claim that the closure is invalid because some of the cited convictions were obtained prior to the effective date of the padlock law, is also without merit, inter alia because evidence was submitted relating to five convictions, resulting from arrest at the premises, which took place after the effective date of the statute.

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Respondent was found to suffer from a Mental Abnormality under Article 10 at a jury trial. The evidence from that trial was made a part of the record of the instant proceeding. At the trial, the State presented the testimony of two psychologists who opined that the Respondent suffered from a Mental Abnormality. The State also presented the testimony of two parole officers and introduced documentary evidence. The Respondent presented the testimony of a psychologist, who opined that the Respondent did not suffer from a Mental Abnormality.

A New York Criminal attorney said that during the trial, a psychologist witness provided a summary of the Respondent’s child, adolescent and adult history including his criminal history and history of disciplinary violations while incarcerated. Respondent’s childhood and adolescent history were also extensively outlined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1978 in one case. The Second Circuit noted that its recounting of the early life of the Respondent was based on “sketchy records based on secondhand information, or facts furnished by the Respondent, whose reliability for accurately conveying information is questionable”.

In the Court’s view, however, even assuming that not every fact in the Second Circuit’s decision is completely accurate, the general outlines of Respondent’s life prior to age 17 are useful in understanding the origins of his anti-social behavior. The Court therefore has taken judicial notice of the Second Circuit’s decision and has used it in recounting what appear to have been some of the relevant events in Respondent’s life prior to age 17.

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A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, in an action, inter alia, to enjoin a public nuisance, the defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated August 15, 1989, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, directed them to pay a civil penalty in the sum of $68,700, compensatory damages in the sum of one dollar, and punitive damages in the sum of $100,000.

A Kings Prostitution Lawyer said that, this case arises out of allegations that the appellants used the subject premises for purposes of prostitution. As a result of a prior action commenced by the City of New York, a consent judgment was entered on May 22, 1985, permanently enjoining the defendant from using, maintaining or permitting the use of the subject premises for the purposes of prostitution or for any other nuisance and directing that the premises be sold within six months to a new owner who would not use the premises for prostitution.

A Kings Patronizing Prostitution Lawyer said that, thereafter, the City of New York commenced the instant action, alleging, inter alia, causes of action based upon the Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-701, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the Nuisance Abatement Law), and common-law nuisance. After a hearing where evidence was produced indicating that the subject premises continued to be used for prostitution, the court found that defendant had sold the property to the other defendant, but continued to manage the premises. Testimony indicated that defendant encouraged promoting prostitution from a vehicle parked nearby the premises.

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In this Criminal case, defendant, a 78 year old man, was convicted by plea of guilty of one count of Assault in the Second Degree and one count of Attempted Sexual Abuse in the First Degree. Thereafter, he was sentenced to a determinate sentence of imprisonment of 5 years with 5 years post-release supervision on the assault count and an indeterminate sentence of 2–4 years incarceration on the sexual abuse count, with those sentences to run concurrently. The Court’s review of the court file for this crime indicates that the Defendant repeatedly struck an 86 year old woman with a blunt object causing lacerations and a loss of consciousness. As the victim lost consciousness, she felt her attacker pull her pants down. When she awoke her pants and shoes had been removed. She had significant bruising on her hands and back and required surgery for an eye injury which occurred during the attack. She identified her attacker as a person she knew from the building she lived in and said he had lived there for about five years.

A New York Sex crimes attorney said that Defendant allegedly told the arresting police officer that he came out to the garden of the senior citizens housing complex where the assault occurred to get drunk and pass out. He also admitted that he knew the victim. When interviewed in preparation for his pre-sentence report, he denied his guilt but said he wanted his guilty plea to stand. He asserted that he had “blacked out” and that someone else had tried to rob the victim. During argument on the Original SORA Decision, the Defendant’s counsel asserted that the evidence against defendant was highly suspect and that despite his guilty plea and the complainant’s grand jury testimony, there was not reliable evidence that Defendant was guilty of a sex crime.

In order for a Defendant to obtain a modification of his risk level under SORA he must demonstrate that such a modification is justified by clear and convincing evidence. The Defendant’s previous RAI score and presumptive override are not any different now than they were at the time of the Original SORA Decision. To lower the Defendant’s risk level then, the Court would have to find that a departure from the presumptive risk level was warranted. Generally, a court may not depart from the presumptive risk level unless it concludes that there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the RAI.

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