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A Queens Sex Crimes Lawyer said that, the People move to have this Court reconsider its April 24, 1998 classification of the defendant for purposes of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art. 6-C, Section 168 et seq., hereinafter “SORA”). After reviewing the People’s motion, the applicable case law and the Court files, the Court rules as follows.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant pled guilty before this Court on March 25, 1998 to violating Penal Law Section 130.60, Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, a class “A” misdemeanor, with a promised sentence of one-year incarceration. The case was adjourned to April 24, 1998 for a sex crime offender risk determination pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (commonly known as “Megan’s Law”, hereinafter “SORA”). On April 24, 1998, the District Attorney advised this Court that a stipulation had been entered into with the defendant’s attorney providing for the offender to be classified as a “level two” sex offender, despite the defendant’s prior record, which included a previous felony conviction for a sex crime offense. Albeit erroneously, the Court agreed to honor the stipulation of the parties, and thereby made a risk-level determination that the defendant be classified a level two (moderate risk). The defendant was released from custody on April 1, 1998. The Court was not provided with a recommendation from the Board of Examiners until August 16, 1998, just prior to the People’s application herein. The Court was not therefore given the opportunity, prior to the defendant’s discharge into the community, to review the Board’s recommendations that the defendant be deemed a level three sexually violent predator. The People made the instant application to revisit this Court’s classification on September 8, 1998, more than four months after the Court’s determination. The Court adjourned the matter to October 1, 1998 for responsive papers from the defendant’s attorney and for oral argument. On that date, the matter was deemed submitted and set down for Court decision.

The issue in this case is whether the Court that adopted a Sex Offender Risk Level determination stipulated to by the People and the defendant’s counsel for purposes of the SORA vacate the stipulation to correct an error in the risk-level classification.

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This matter is before the court for a judicial determination of defendant’s duration of registration and level of notification pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), based on his June 9, 1999 plea of guilty to one count of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and one count of sodomy in the first degree. On October 4, 2005, this court received a risk assessment recommendation from the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders pursuant to Correction Law § 168-l (6), recommending that defendant be designated a level three sex crimes offender.

On November 3, 2005, this court held a hearing pursuant to Correction Law § 168-n (3). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court was required to designate defendant a “sexually violent offender”, as the crimes of which the defendant stands convicted are both designated as “sexually violent offenses” requiring lifetime registration. This court also rendered a determination designating defendant a level one sex crime offender. This written opinion further explains this court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in its oral ruling, in conformity with Correction Law § 168-n (3).

A New York Rape Lawyer said that, the instant charges arose from incidents commencing in February 1995, when defendant was 13 years old and the victim was 4 years old, and continuing through March 31, 1998, when defendant was 17 years old and the victim was 7 years old. During those years, the victim’s mother regularly brought the younger child to defendant’s home for babysitting by defendant’s mother. The conduct at issue occurred when defendant’s mother left the victim in defendant’s sole care while she left the home to run errands. No gun was involved.

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People v. Aguayo

Court Discusses Waiver of a Defendant’s Right to Appeal

The criminal defendant appealed his conviction related to two respective judgments for driving while intoxicated as a felony on one indictment and enterprise corruption and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree on another indictment after pleading guilty and waiving his right to appeal. Later, the defendant wished to change his plea from guilty but was denied by the trial court. The defendant appealed the decision and whether his sentence was excessive.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant in this case is charged with a violation of Correction Law Section 168-t, in that he is alleged to have failed to personally register with the local law enforcement agency as a sexually violent predator, within ninety (90) days after his “initial release or commencement of” probation, as mandated by Corr.L. §§ 168-f(3) and 168-h 1. On January 22, 1992, defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of Penal Law, Sex Abuse (by forcible compulsion) in the First Degree, and was sentenced to six (6) months in jail and five (5) years probation. On July 25, 1995, the New York legislature approved passage of the Sex Offender Registration Act (“the Act”), Section 2 of Chapter 192 of the Laws of 1995, Correction Law Art. The Act became effective on January 21, 1996, almost four years to the day that the defendant completed four of the five years of his probationary term.

A New York Sex Crime Lawyer said that, intended to provide “law enforcement with additional information critical to preventing sexual victimization and to resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and exploitation promptly”, the Act imposed registration requirements on sex offenders and established procedures for the release or notification 2 to the law enforcement community and the public of information pertinent to the identity and location of convicted sex crimes offenders.

The issue in this case is whether defendant covered by the SORA.

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A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an emotionally charged CPLR article 78 proceeding which has its genesis in a tragic incident in which two young pedestrians, were killed when a motor vehicle operated by the defendant struck them. Defendant was DWAI. The accident occurred in Nassau County. Flaherty, in response to the filing against him of a superior court information, entered a guilty plea in Nassau County Court to two counts of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree and one count of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. On May 2, 1988, he was sentenced to two concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment with a minimum sentence of two and one-third years and a maximum sentence of seven years on the vehicular manslaughter convictions and a concurrent definite term of one year in prison for driving while under the influence of alcohol. He was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Correctional Services (DCS) to serve his sentence.

A Nassau Rape Lawyer said that, in 1987, the New York Legislature added Article 26-A to the Correction Law which created a shock incarceration program. The program’s stated purpose is to deter young, non-violent offenders from future crime. Correction Law § 865(1) specifies the eligibility requirements for the program. On June 27, 1988, respondent Flaherty was received into the custody of the Corrections Department at the Downstate Correctional Facility Reception Center. While at the reception center, his eligibility was reviewed and the selection process commenced. The Shock Incarceration Selection Committee, established by Correction Law Section 866(2), approved respondent Flaherty’s application on July 29, 1988 for permission to participate in the shock incarceration program and forwarded his application to DCS’s central office for final review.

On August 2, 1988 defendant was selected and approved by the central office for the program. He satisfied the then-existing eligibility criteria. He was under the age of 26, his sentence was indeterminate, he would be eligible for parole within three years, this was his first felony conviction, he was between the ages of 16 and 26 when the crime was committed and he was not convicted of any specifically enumerated disqualifying crimes. On August 22, 1988, he commenced his actual participation in the program. It was not until August 22, 1988 that enough inmates had been selected to form a “platoon” to commence the program. After he entered the program, a form letter was sent on August 29, 1988 by the New York State Division of Parole to the sentencing judge, the Nassau County District Attorney’s office and defendant’s attorney advising that he would be eligible for parole release consideration, was scheduled to appear before the New York State Board of Parole during the month of January, 1989 and that a determination whether to release him to parole supervision would be made at that time. The letter sought any statements or recommendations the recipients might care to present with regard to his or her knowledge of the case. The letter contained the following sentence:

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This is a proceeding wherein the defendant moves pursuant to CPL 330.30 and 370.10 for an order setting aside the verdict upon the grounds that (1) the court committed reversible error by improperly allowing the People’s challenge “for cause” of a prospective juror and the People’s peremptory challenges were ultimately exhausted before jury selection was complete; (2) the defendant was deprived of a fair trial because of the People’s prosecutorial misconduct during summation; and (3) improper conduct by a juror during deliberations, out of the presence of the court, may have affected a substantial right of the defendant.

The People oppose the defendant’s motion.

The defendant was charged by way of a simplified traffic information, with a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) – operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated per se; that is a blood alcohol content of .08% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood, and Vehicle and Traffic Law § 319 (1)-operating a motor vehicle without insurance in January 2004.

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Claimant, as limited administratrix of her late husband’s estate, seeks damages for his wrongful death which allegedly occurred when, as he drove his automobile along a New York State highway, he left the lane of travel colliding with a guide rail, causing his automobile to flip over and land on its roof, resulting in claimant’s decedent’s instant death. The claim alleges negligence on behalf of the State of New York in the construction and/or maintenance of the guide rail system situated alongside of a state owned roadway. Defendant argues the accident occurred due to driver-alcohol impairment. Furthermore, defendant contends that the subject guide rail was not designed to withstand the force of the collision involved in this accident, and that any maintenance failure did not contribute to the cause of this accident.

A New York Criminal attorney said that the subject accident occurred in December 1997 in the Town of Lloyd, Ulster County, New York. Shortly before that time, claimant’s decedent had driven to claimant’s residence. Upon arriving at the apartment complex’s parking lot, he remained in his vehicle. Soon after his arrival, claimant appeared on her stoop with two of their three children. Decedent remained momentarily then drove from the lot in his automobile. No conversation occurred between claimant and decedent and no explanation was offered regarding why he left so abruptly. Shortly after decedent drove away, claimant heard two loud successive “bangs.” She immediately called 911 reporting that there had been an accident in which she believed her husband was involved. She then left her apartment and ran to the scene of the accident which was a short distance.

A New York DWI lawyer said that claimant observed, much to her horror, that it indeed was her husband who had been involved in the accident as she saw his auto lying on its roof off the side of the road. As she remained roadside, a number of motorists stopped to look. One such person went to the decedent’s auto and opened the driver’s door, at which time, claimant saw her husband in the vehicle “bent over.” Immediately thereafter, claimant left the scene with one of her daughters who had become distraught at the sight. She later went to the Hospital in Poughkeepsie where her husband was taken by ambulance. There he was pronounced dead on arrival. No evidence was submitted to suggest he endured any pain and suffering.

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Pursuant to a written directive of the County Sheriff, a roadblock was established for the purpose of detecting and deterring driving while intoxicated or while impaired and as to which operating personnel are prohibited from administering sobriety tests unless they observe listed criteria, indicative of intoxication, which give substantial cause to believe that the operator is intoxicated, is constitutionally permissible, notwithstanding that the location of the roadblock is moved several times during the three- to four-hour period of operation, and notwithstanding that legislative initiatives have also played a part in reducing the incidence of driving while intoxicated in recent years.

The criminal defendant pleaded guilty to driving while impaired after denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the roadblock. The court affirms the order of the County Court, Genesee County, affirming his conviction.

The relevant facts are as follows:

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In November 2002, the complaining witness, then 14 years old and pregnant, first told medical providers and then the police that she had been raped by a 14-year-old classmate in her school. Once inconsistencies in her story were revealed, she stated that she had engaged in consensual sex with this classmate.

A New York Criminal lawyer said that, five years later, the complainant, now age 19, reported to the police that the defendant, her stepgrandfather, had engaged in sexual intercourse with her several years before. The complainant testified before a grand jury that, over three time periods in 2002, the defendant raped her.

The People filed an indictment, alleging that the defendant committed several felonies, misdemeanors, and violations during those three periods in 2002. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that because the complainant had first “reported” the incident to the police in 2002, the indictment should be dismissed as time-barred. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the indictment in its entirety.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, section B32-127.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York makes it unlawful for any person to act as a dealer in second-hand articles without a license therefor. The Commissioner of Licenses of the city has charge and control of issuing, transferring, renewing, revoking, suspending and canceling such licenses (New York City Charter, § 773). Applications therefor must be made to him in such form and detail as he shall prescribe. No person shall be licensed unless a citizen of the United States or has regularly declared his intention of becoming a citizen. Petitioner, a citizen of the United States, applied for such a license, the Commissioner denied her application, and she brings this proceeding to compel him to grant it. Neither robbery or burglary were involved.

A New York Prostitution Lawyer said that, in the form of application prescribed by the Commissioner there was a question: ‘If applicant has ever been arrested or summoned for any offense, such facts must be stated in full, giving number of times and final disposition.’ In her sworn answer to that question petitioner stated that in 1947 she had been arrested for maintaining a house of prostitution and sentenced to 15 days in the workhouse.

A New York Patronizing Prostitution Lawyer said that, by co-operation with the Police Department the Commissioner ascertained that in addition to what petitioner thus disclosed, she had been arrested on the same charge in 1936 and again in 1939 and in each of those instances she had received a suspended sentence; also that in each instance her record was under a different name, no one of which names was the name in which she institutes this proceeding and which she presumably used upon her application for the license.

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