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A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant has applied for an order granting him ‘permission to inspect the minutes of the Grand Jury, or, in the alternative dismissing’ a three-count indictment accusing him, and a co-defendant, of (1) Assault, 2d Degree, committed July 17, 1965, ‘by willfully and wrongfully using a knife against’ the throat of a named female, ‘that being an instrument or thing likely to produce grievous bodily harm’; (2) Assault, 2d Degree, committed July 17, 1965 ‘by use of their clenched fists’ upon said female ‘thereby willfully and wrongfully wounding and inflicting upon her grievous bodily harm, to wit: Multiple bruises of the face and body’; and (3) Felonious Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, i. e., a dangerous knife, on July 17, 1965, with intent to use it unlawfully against another.

A Queens Sex Crime Lawyer said that, the basis of the motion is that ‘there was no testimony before the grand jury, or evidence, sufficient as a matter of law, to warrant a finding of the indictment’. The predicate for this conclusion is that since the criminal acts here charged were committed prior, but as direct steps leading, to the rape testified to by the prosecutor the indictment lacks a sufficient evidentiary foundation in view of the fact that no corroboratory proof of the rape was submitted to the grand jury.

A Queens Sex Crime Lawyer said that, the facts disclosed by the grand jury minutes are that the victim of the assaults was forcibly abducted in an automobile by two male persons–later identified by her as these defendants–and, while being carried away in the car, was given a choice of either participating in sodomy or submitting to rape, but refused either alternative. After having been ‘slapped around’ and frustrated in an attempt to escape, she was raped by each defendant, in turn, while the other held a knife-point to her throat and threatened to cut her if she didn’t stop screaming. Nevertheless, she resisted, but in vain. She was not examined by a doctor until August 10, 1965, and the police were not notified until August 12, 1965. She made no immediate disclosure to her parents although, within a day or two after the event, she told a neighbor about it. Other than her own testimony there is no evidence that she was abducted by anyone, or that she was in the company of these defendants on the occasion in question or that at or about the time of the occurrences narrated by her, she bore visible marks of recent physical violence or ravishment. When apprehended and questioned, the defendants denied having been in the girl’s company on the evening in question and specifically denied the charges made. There was no evidence that any knife was found or that either of the defendants had been known to possess one.

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Because of a presumably unintentional omission by our legislature it now appears possible for a person with a less than 5 years old class B misdemeanor conviction who is convicted by a jury of certain class A misdemeanors in the New York City Criminal Court to receive a maximum sentence of one year, while another person with a less than 5 year old armed violent felony conviction convicted by a jury of the same class A misdemeanor in the Supreme Court could only receive a maximum sentence of six months.

This strange result seems to be an unintended consequence of the recently enacted experimental package of laws designed to reduce the backlog of misdemeanor cases in the State’s largest cities, particularly New York, by eliminating jury trials for less serious misdemeanors committed by first offenders.

The so-called “Misdemeanor Reclassification Act” amended Penal Law, § 70.15 and Criminal Procedure Law, § 340.40 and added a new section 400.14 to the Criminal Procedure Law. Briefly stated, the package created two sentencing categories for Class A misdemeanors, with provision for enhanced punishment for those convicted of the less serious misdemeanors who are “second crime offenders” and for defendants pleading to misdemeanors entered in full satisfaction of all felony charges contained in a felony complaint, indictment or Superior Court information.

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On 22 September 1978, the fifteen year old defendant was arrested and charged with Robbery, Second Degree, P. L. Sec. 160.10, an act for which a fifteen year old may be held criminally responsible. P.L. Secs. 10, 30, as amended Ch. 481, L.1978 pursuant to P.L. Secs. 10, 30, as amended Ch. 481, L.1978.

On 28 September 1978 a preliminary hearing was held. At the conclusion thereof, the court found that there was reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime of Robbery, Second Degree, while displaying an imitation gun, an armed felony.

Immediately thereafter, the defense renewed its motion for removal of the case in the interests of justice to the Family Court. The prosecutor stated that the District Attorney would not consent to removal of the armed felony and that, therefore, under CPL § 180.75(4)(b), the court had no authority to remove the case and no discretion to make an inquiry respecting removal.

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A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant, charged with Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (PL §110/120.00[1]), moves to dismiss the superseding information pursuant to CPL 170.35(1)(a) for facial insufficiency. The People oppose. The accusatory portion of the superseding information alleges that, the Police Officer says that on or about April 2, 2007 at approximately 6:18 p.m. the defendant committed the offense(s) of PL 110/120.00(1) Attempted Assault in the Third Degree.”

A Kings Order of Protection Lawyer said that, the deponent states that at the above time and place, deponent observed a woman in an excited state in that she was flagging down deponent for help, screaming, and had watery eyes at that time, and that she stated to deponent that the defendant did strangle around the neck and did punch her about the face. The deponent further states that deponent observed her with a swollen neck, red marks to the neck, and a laceration and swelling to her lip. To date, no supporting deposition from the complainant has been filed.

A Kings Domestic Violence Lawyer said that, the defendant contends that the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient because the statements made by the complainant to the Police Officer do not fit within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Specifically, he contends that the accusatory instrument fails to allege when the assault occurred or what the complainant was doing in the interim between the assaults and when she flagged down the officer. Thus, he concludes, there are no facts presented for the court to determine whether the complainant had an opportunity to reflect or if she was excited due to the alleged assault itself.

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A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, during the summer of 1984 a young woman, 19 years of age, was subjected to an evening of sodomy and attempted rape by an individual whom she knew from the neighborhood, and whom she later, although not immediately, identified as the defendant. At trial, the court permitted the prosecution to present expert testimony on the psychological phenomenon known as “rape trauma syndrome” as an explanation for the victim’s failure to immediately identify her assailant. The defendant contends that this was error.

A Nassau Sex Crimes Lawyer said at approximately 9:00 P.M. on the evening of July 29, 1984, the victim, a 19-year-old resident of Southold, New York, received two telephone calls from a man claiming to be a friend of hers by the name of Paul. The caller told her that he was very upset and that he needed to talk to her, but that he couldn’t speak to her over the telephone. The victim borrowed her mother’s car and proceeded to meet him at a nearby location. A few minutes after arriving at the agreed-upon spot, a young man approached her parked vehicle. Believing that this man was her friend, she released the locks and allowed him to enter the car. She immediately realized that the man was not her friend, but rather the defendant, a young man she had known from the neighborhood for years and whom she had seen the previous night. She told him that she knew that he was her friend, whereupon the defendant ordered her at gun point to drive to Clark’s Beach, a secluded location, where, at gun point, he sodomized her twice and attempted to rape her. This sexual assault continued for about 45 minutes, after which the defendant forced her to drive him back to the spot where he had entered her vehicle.

A Nassau Sex Crime Lawyer said that, the victim immediately returned home between 11:00 and 11:30 P.M., woke her mother up and told her that she had been sexually attacked and that she was scared she was going to be killed. The victim’s mother telephoned the police who arrived 10 minutes later. While waiting for the police to arrive, the victim, who was hysterical and sobbing, washed her face and drank some soda. Her hair was matted, her sweater on inside out, and she appeared to be very upset. Nevertheless, she gave a description of her assailant to the two police officers, speaking rapidly and jumping up and down as she did so. The Officer drove the victim and her mother to the Southold Police Station, tape recording their conversation as they proceeded. The victim advised him of the two telephone calls she had received earlier that evening while they drove around and attempted to retrace the route taken to Clark’s Beach with the defendant, the officer jotting down license plate numbers as he drove along.

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This is a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3 wherein the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County dated 6 October 1999, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated 8 September 1999, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal nuisance in the second degree, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent and placed her with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated 8 September 1999.

The court reverses the order of disposition, on the law, without costs or disbursements, vacates the fact-finding order, and dismisses the proceeding.

On 24 June 1999 at about 11:30 P.M., the 14-year-old appellant was observed at an intersection in Queens known to police as a prostitution location. The appellant flagged down four cars within a period of approximately 10 minutes. Each time a car stopped, the appellant walked to the driver’s side and had a conversation with the driver lasting 30 seconds to a minute.

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A Bronx Criminal Lawyer said that, in a motion dated July 30, 1980, which was subsequently joined by defendants’ moves for various reliefs including dismissal of the indictment and suppression of various evidences. The only applications contained in this motion which survive defendants’ recent pleas of guilty are the motions to suppress eavesdropping evidence on the grounds: (1) that the eavesdropping order exceeded the limits of permissible state regulation under U.S.Code, tit. 18, § 2516, subd. (2), and, (2) that no amendment to the eavesdropping order was sought by the prosecution prior to using eavesdropping evidence to substantiate the charge of Grand Larceny, an offense not specified in the eavesdropping order.

Bronx Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, defendants contend that the eavesdropping order signed by the honorable judge on June 26, 1979, effective June 29, 1979 exceeded the limits of permissible State regulation under U.S.Code, tit. 18, § 2516, subd. (2) in that it authorized eavesdropping in connection with an investigation into criminal usury (PL Art. 190).

The issue in this case is whether the court erred in decreeing the eavesdropping order.

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This is an action for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and civil rights violations which stems from plaintiff’s arrest in the Village of Lake Placid, Essex County, on 2 November 1995 for rape and sodomy in the first degree.

The criminal complainant was a woman that plaintiff had met at a party the previous evening. At approximately 3:30 A.M. on 2 November 1995, plaintiff arrived at the cottage where the complainant was staying—an encounter which he claims was prearranged—and was led to the complainant’s bedroom by her cousin, CS. After some small talk, according to plaintiff, they engaged in consensual oral sex and sexual intercourse which did not last for long because the complainant became sick. When she did not respond to his inquiries about “what was going on”, plaintiff got mad and left to drive JC, a friend who had accompanied him to the cottage, home. When plaintiff returned to the cottage shortly thereafter to check on the complainant, she was crying and had told CS that plaintiff raped her. After contacting the police, the complainant was taken to a local hospital by two Village of Lake Placid patrolmen for a rape kit examination.

Thereafter, she was taken to the police station and interviewed by Village of Lake Placid Police Detective D. She gave him an oral statement accusing plaintiff of having nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her, which was later reduced to writing, albeit after plaintiff’s arrest.

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This is a proceeding wherein the defendant, AS, seeks to vacate the second felony offender adjudication and the accompanying sentence, both from 12 October 2005 pursuant to C.P.L. 440.20 of this court dated 19 May 2010. The court denied defendant’s motion. The defense has filed a motion to re-argue and to set aside the sentence under C.P.L. § 440.20 and a petition for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 via an affirmation filed on about 28 May 2010. The People filed a response on 15 June 2010. In addition, extensive oral argument was heard on 30 June 2010. The defense also submitted a letter brief on 1 July 2010.

For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion to set aside the sentence and vacates its original decision.

On 21 March 2002, in the Third Circuit Court of Detroit, Michigan, the defendant, AS, was sentenced to two years probation following his plea of guilty to attempted home invasion in the first degree in accordance with Michigan Criminal Law 750.110(a)(2). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 180 days in jail on 23 February 2004 by the Third Circuit Court of Wayne, Michigan, for violation of probation.

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In Supreme Court, Bronx County, the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree. Such plea covered the entire indictments. In support, defendant submits that the allocution was factually insufficient because it did not contain a statement of affirmation by the defendant that “force”, an essential element of the crime of robbery in the second degree, was used or threatened during the crimes. Additionally, Davis contends the allocution was factually insufficient as to the lesser included offense of grand larceny in the third degree in that there was no statement or affirmation by the defendant that any property was taken from the complainant’s person.

A Bronx County criminal lawyer said that the People submit that, according to applicable case law, the allocution was sufficient absent a statement by the defendant on the use of force. The People further contend that the context of the allocution establishes that defendant knowingly pleaded guilty to robbery with the use of force, in that, during the pre-allocution colloquoy, the Prosecutor described for the Court the crime where the defendant and his accomplice “used knives and they took money from [the victim]”.

The issue to be resolved is whether omission of an essential element (“force”) of a felony, robbery in the second degree by defendant, represented by counsel, and the court during the factual allocution of a guilty plea to a prior felony conviction is legally sufficient as the constitutional basis for a predicate felony sentence.

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