New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

Published on: September 3, 2013

Multiple crimes are charged

by Stephen Bilkis

A Bronx Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, defendant was arrested on December 31, 1986 and charged with grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, and resisting arrest. He has moved for an order dismissing the action pursuant to CPL 170.30(1)(e) on the ground that he has been denied his statutory speedy trial right under CPL 30.30. The action was commenced on January 1, 1987 when the defendant was arraigned on felony and misdemeanor charges. On January 5, 1987, the People reduced the felony charges to misdemeanors and requested a further adjournment. The People were required to be ready for trial within 90 days of the date of this reduction.

A Bronx Criminal Lawyer said that, on February 3, 1987 the defendant did not appear in court and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The People did not then announce their readiness for trial. On March 11, 1987 the defendant was returned on the warrant and the case was adjourned. On March 16, 1987 the People sought a further adjournment for purposes of obtaining a corroborating affidavit. On March 23, 1987 the prosecution did not have the affidavit and again requested an adjournment in order to secure it. On April 9, 1987 the People again were not ready and sought additional time to procure the corroborating affidavit. The presiding judge adjourned the case until April 22, 1987, indicating on the record of court action: “Adjournment period to be charged under 30.30 CPL.” On April 22, 1987 the People filed a corroborating affidavit and the complaint was converted to information. This motion followed.

A Bronx Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, at no time did the defendant ever waive prosecution by information, and the record is devoid of any indication that he requested or consented to any of the adjournments. Notably, at no point during the period from the reduction of the charges to the filing of the corroborating affidavit–a period of 107 days–did the People ever announce their readiness for trial.

Published on: September 1, 2013

The said victim is deaf and illiterate, but able to read lips

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered March 16, 1967, convicting him of attempted grand larceny in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, defendant, along with two others, was indicted for robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree and assault in the second degree. The charges stem from a robbery allegedly committed in a hallway against a certain victim. The said victim is deaf and illiterate, but able to read lips. He does not know ‘sign language’ and communicates by making verbal sounds which can be understood only by those with special training. When he was called to testify, the People introduced his sister to the court and offered to have her sworn for the purpose of assisting the court and jury in understanding his testimony. A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, defense counsel objected to the use of a relative for such a purpose and insisted upon using a disinterested person. The objection was sustained and a speech therapist was used instead of the victim’s sister.

A Kings Robbery Lawyer said that, with considerable difficulty, the victim ‘testified’ that he was kicked by one of the defendants and that a sum of money was taken from his person. The Detectives testified that their unmarked patrol car was stopped for a red traffic light when they observed a group of people in the hallway in question. The first detective testified further that he got out of the car and approached the hallway to investigate. When he was within approximately six feet of the group in the hallway, he ‘observed 4 men going through the pockets of the complainant, who was on the ground.’ As the first detective approached the hallway door, defendant ran out of the building, but was apprehended by the second Detective. A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the jury acquitted defendant of the robbery and assault counts of the indictment, but convicted him of attempted grand larceny in the first degree, under the count of the indictment charging him with grand larceny in the first degree.

The issue in this case is whether the court properly convicted defendant of grand larceny in the first degree.

Published on: September 1, 2013

The grade of the offense would have been that of petit larceny; with the amendment allowed,

by Stephen Bilkis

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, the People move for an order amending the indictment pursuant to the provisions of Section 200.70 of the Criminal Procedure Law. The indictment contains three counts. The first count accuses the defendant of the crime of attempted murder, a Class B felony. The People seek to amend this count by adding the words ‘a police officer in the course of performing his official duties’ after the name of the victim. This would in effect convert the crime to a Class A felony. No amendment is sought for the other counts in the indictment.

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the People seek to amend the overt act numbered 1 to state that ‘the defendant on or about October 19, 1971, in the County of Kings, with intent to cause the death of a police officer in the course of performing his official duties’, instead of that ‘the defendant on or about October 19, 1971, in the County of Kings, with intent to cause the death of a police officer. The crimes charged as recited in the present indictment is a Class B felony (Penal Law 110.05(2)). The addition of the words ‘a police officer in the course of performing his official duties’ is an essential element of the crime to bring it within Penal Law 110.05(1), a Class A arson felony.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, the People assert that such amendment does not change the theory or theories of the prosecution or otherwise tend to prejudice the defendant on the merits. However the defendant strenuously opposes the application claiming that to permit the proposed amendment would be highly prejudicial to him, by charging him with a crime much greater than that charged by the grand jury.

Published on: August 31, 2013

juvenile Delinquent is on probation

by Stephen Bilkis

In the first case, a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, petit larceny, unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months.

A Kings County Grand Larceny attorney said that the appellant contends that the evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing, which established that he was a passenger in the back seat of a stolen automobile, was legally insufficient to establish that he committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, petit larceny, and criminal mischief in the fourth degree.

The Court agrees. As defined by the Penal Law, the term “possess” means “to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property”. The record is devoid of any evidence that the appellant exercised “dominion or control” over the stolen automobile, and his mere presence as a passenger in the vehicle “cannot be equated with his possession thereof”. Further, in the absence of evidence that the appellant “possessed” the subject automobile, the inference of guilt arising from the unexplained or falsely-explained possession of recently stolen property is not applicable, and the finding that the appellant committed the offenses of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and petit larceny cannot be sustained. Moreover, while the stolen automobile was extensively damaged, the circumstantial evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing was insufficient to establish that the appellant was the individual who damaged the vehicle, or that he acted in concert with the individual who damaged the vehicle. Accordingly, we vacate the Family Court’s finding that the appellant committed the offense of criminal mischief in the fourth degree.

Published on: August 31, 2013

The issue in this case is whether the judgment of conviction was obtained in violation of the constitutional right of the defendant on the ground of ineffectiveness of counsel.

by Stephen Bilkis

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, The defendant has made a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(b), (f) and (h) for an order vacating the judgment of conviction on the grounds that the judgment was obtained in violation of his “constitutional rights, ineffective counsel, and the judgment was procured by trickery, deceit and prejudical conduct on the part of my assigned attorney.” On June 14, 1994 this defendant was found guilty after trial of one count of robbery in the first degree; one count of grand larceny in the fourth degree; one count of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree; and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. On July 6, 1994, defendant was sentenced as second felony offender, to an aggregate term of imprisonment of twelve and one-half to twenty-five years.

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, at trial it was sufficiently and credibly proven that on January 30, 1994, the defendant threatened the victim with a razor and forcibly stole property from him. In his motion the defendant specifically alleges the following: 1. He was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because his assigned attorney did not “secure” his right to testify before the grand jury. 2. He was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not call a witness who would have allegedly provided exculpatory testimony. 3. He was also denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not call him (the defendant) to testify at trial. 4. “The judgment was procured by trickery, deceit, and prejudical conduct on the part of my court assigned attorney not appearing in the trial record.”

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that in support of the defendant’s first allegation that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the defendant did not testify before the grand jury, the defendant, in his affidavit in support of his motion, dated March 25, 1995, stated the factual issues exist in my case as to whether my attorney received notice of the scheduled grand jury presentment, informed the people of my desire to testify, and/or signed a waiver without my knowledge. The record is completely barren with respect to why no motion was made to dismiss the indictment by my attorney when he learned I did not testify before the grand jury.

Published on: August 30, 2013

This is a motion to vacate a judgment dated February 4, 1959 convicting…

by Stephen Bilkis

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, this is a motion to vacate a judgment dated February 4, 1959 convicting the defendant on his own plea of guilty to Attempted Grand Larceny in the Second Degree, upon an indictment charging Grand Larceny in the First Degree, and sentencing him as a third felony offender to two to three years.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, as set forth by the Assistant District Attorney in his affidavit in opposition the motion may be summarized as follows: On November 20, 1958, the defendant offered to plead guilty to Attempted Grand Larceny in the Second Degree. It was upon an agreement that if it should ultimately appear that the plea would make him a fourth felony offender, the plea would be permitted to be withdrawn and he be permitted to plead to a misdemeanor. When he appeared for sentence on February 4, 1959, the District Attorney filed against him an information showing two former convictions: one in New Jersey in 1951 for armed robbery and one in this Court in 1955 for attempted grand larceny in the second degree.

A Kings Robbery Lawyer said that, the defendant, although admitting his identity and the fact of these convictions, claimed through his attorney that he had also been convicted in Federal Court with the result that he should be deemed and adjudicated a fourth felony offender. Nevertheless, he was adjudicated as a third offender and sentenced as aforementioned.

Published on: August 30, 2013

Court must consider the nature of the prior forum

by Stephen Bilkis

Intervenor moves pursuant to CPLR § 3212 for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint seeking foreclosure of a mortgage against her home which was fraudulently given by movant’s son, Defendant, and declaring that such fraudulently obtained mortgage and the fraudulent deed upon which it was based are null and void and that the prior deed of Intervenor is valid and in full force and effect together with all real property tax exemptions appurtenant thereto. The property at issue was purchased on February 5, 1975 by Intervenor and her husband, who took title as tenants by the entirety. On February 23, 1994, the husband died, leaving Intervenor as the sole owner.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, plaintiff’s company obtained the rights to a mortgage upon Intervenor’s premises at 2246 East 12th Street, Brooklyn, New York, executed by defendant on November 22, 1999, to a mortgage corporation of Woodland Hills, California, by assignment to Plaintiff on November 29, 1999. The deed upon which defendant premised his mortgage was also executed on November 22, 1999, purportedly by his mother, conveying title to said premises to her son. Intervenor first became aware of the fraudulent mortgage sometime in 2000 when mail from Plaintiff to her son defendant herein began accumulating at her home unopened by defendant. Upon further investigation, Intervenor learned that title to her home had been transferred to her eldest son, defendant, without her knowledge or consent, whereupon she took her complaint to the Kings County District Attorney. The instant mortgage foreclosure action was commenced by complaint dated June 24, 2002.

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, defendant was indicted on July 30, 2002 on charges of Grand Larceny in the Second Degree, Forgery in the Second Degree and Offering a False Instrument for Filing in the First Degree, all related to Defendant’s forging of a false deed and mortgage upon his mother’s home and the resultant theft of that home and the mortgage proceeds. Complainants named in the indictment were Intervenor and the Mortgage Corporation, Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest. Prior to indictment, by letter dated July 12, 2002, Assistant District Attorney counsel to Plaintiff herein, advising of the “ongoing criminal action affecting defendant and the subject real property” and relating the entire substance of confession to the crime, including that someone posing as Intervenor had actually appeared at the closing on the mortgage to said corporation. The Assistant District Attorney enclosed a copy of the criminal complaint dated May 13, 2002, and closed by soliciting cooperation in “a resolution of the entire situation.” In addition to the District Attorney’s efforts to engage Plaintiff, and even prior to his letter, Intervenor’s counsel asserts that he left a telephone message for Plaintiff’s counsel alerting him to Defendant’s arrest.

Published on: August 30, 2013

Multiple charges are made against this defendant

by Stephen Bilkis

On April 27, 1942, the defendant appearing with counsel pleaded not guilty to the following indictments: First count, robbery 1st degree; Second count, grant larceny 2nd degree; Third count, assault 2nd degree; Fourth count, robbery 1st degree; Fifth county, grand larceny 1st degree; Sixth count, assault 2nd degree; Seventh count, attempted rape 1st degree; Eighth count, assault 2nd degree. 2) Indictment No. 28704b–First count, attempted rape 1st degree; Second count, attempted rape 2nd degree; Third count, abduction; Fourth count, assault 2nd degree. 3) Indictment No. 28704c–First count, robbery 1st degree; Second count, assault 2nd degree; Third count, grand larceny 1st degree.4) Indictment No. 28704d–First count, robbery 1st degree; Second count, grand larceny 1st degree; Third count, assault 2nd degree; Fourth count, sodomy; Fifth count, assault 2nd degree.5) Indictment No. 28704e–First count, sodomy; Second count, assault 2nd degree.

A Kings Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, on May 2, 1942, a motion to have the criminal defendant committed to Kings County Hospital for psychiatric examination was denied. A similar motion was made and denied on May 4, 1942, by the Judge who at the same time granted over the objection of the defendant the District Attorney’s motion to consolidate the five indictments pursuant to section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On May 11, 1942, the defendant pleaded guilty before the same judge to each count of indictment numbers 28704a, 28704b, 28704c, 28704d and 28704e, and was then committed to Kings County Hospital for psychiatric examination. On May 25, 1942, the psychiatric report, finding the defendant not insane, not mentally defective, and capable of understanding the charge and proceedings against him and of making his defense, was confirmed and the Judge sentenced the defendant to Prison as follows:

1) On Indictment No. 28704a, for a term of not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years on counts 1, 2 and 3; for a term of not less than 15 and not more than 30 years on counts 4, 5 and 6; and for a term of not less than 5 years and not more than 10 years on counts 7 and 8.; 2) On Indictment No. 28704b, for a term of not less than 5 years and not more than 10 years on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4. This sentence to run consecutively with the expiration of the sentence imposed on indictment No. 28704a.; 3) On Indictment No. 28704c, for a term of not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years on counts 1, 2 and 3. This sentence to run consecutively at the expiration of the sentence imposed on indictment No. 28704b (and indictment No. 28704a); 4) On Indictment No. 28704d, for a term of not less than 7 1/2 years and not more than 15 years on counts 1, 2 and 3, and for a term of not less than 10 years and not more than 20 years on counts 4 and 5. This sentence to run consecutively at the expiration of the sentence imposed on indictment 28704c (and indictment numbers 28704a and 28704b); 5) On Indictment No. 28704e, for a term of not less than 10 years and not more than 20 years on counts 1 and 2. This sentence to run consecutively at the expiration of the sentence imposed on indictment No. 28704d (and indictment numbers 28704a, 28704b and 28704c).

Published on: August 30, 2013

The issue in this case is whether defendant’s motion to dismiss

by Stephen Bilkis

A Kings Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant, charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (Penal Law (PL) § 220.03), Criminally Using Drug Paraphernalia in the Second Degree (PL § 220.50[2]) and Unlawful Possession of Marijuana (PL § 221.05) moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds alleging that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the applicable ninety day statutory period mandated by CPL 30.30(1)(b).

A Kings Drug Possession Lawyer said that, the People concede, in their Affirmation in Opposition, that their announcement of readiness for trial was not made until the ninety-first day after the filing of the accusatory instrument. They assert, nonetheless, that their announcement of readiness was timely for two reasons, namely: (1) that the defendant’s pre-conversion oral request for a copy of the search warrant underlying the defendant’s arrest, is an excludable pre-trial delay as provided in CPL 30.30[4][a] ; and (2), even if the Court would disallow the request for a copy of the search warrant as an excludable pre-trial delay, as the day on which the People would have been required to announce their readiness for trial fell on a Sunday, the General Construction Law permits a timely announcement of readiness on the following business day in the instant case, the ninety-first day which fell on a Monday.

A Kings Drug Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant was arrest on the aforementioned charges on November 8, 1996. The misdemeanor complaint, in relevant part, reads as follows: Deponent is informed by P.O. Brooks that deponent entered the above premises pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Judge on 11/97/96 and observed the defendant standing in a bedroom with a quantity of crack/cocaine possession and a quantity of marijuana possession on top of a dresser in open view.

Published on: August 29, 2013

People v. Crosby

by Stephen Bilkis

The outset of a criminal case can be the difference between an acquittal and conviction if a person does not have an attorney present after being arrest or being interrogated. An attorney can save an accused from self-incrimination during the period where an individual is most vulnerable. In the People v Crosby the defendant with an attorney gave a confession which tarnished his chances of an acquittal.

Crosby, the defendant was convicted in the County Court, Nassau County, of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of weapon in the second degree, and he appealed. The grounds of appeal were that there was no probable cause for the arrest and the confession which he gave should have been inadmissible. The defendant was arrested after the commission of a robbery and shooting where witnesses described the defendant as a black male with purplish pants and jacket with plaid lapel. The Defendant was found lurking in desolate part of railway station sought to evade identification by discarding his coat in the cold of winter, and tried to flee the scene. He was then subjected to full scale arrest when he was handcuffed at gunpoint so that he could be transported to scene of murder. After which he was then taken to the police station read his Miranda Rights and then interrogated about the criminal allegations against him. He later gave a confession which incriminated him in the matter after being read his Miranda rights.

The issue of probable cause for the arrest was examined by assessing the circumstances of his arrest. Probable cause requires, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or evidence sufficient to support conviction, but merely information which would lead reasonable person who possesses same expertise as officer to conclude, under the circumstances, that crime is being or was committed. The police officers did not act arbitrarily in arresting the defendant for the criminal acts but instead acted on the descriptions of eye witness in describing how the three men were dressed and by making a calculated decision in deciding where the defendant and his other accomplice could have gone. The defendant also acted very suspiciously when the officers were observing him in the train station. Additionally, he was identified by the eye witnesses who were there at the scene of the crime. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant.