New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

Published on: August 25, 2013

The police officer’s conduct was not only different from previous case in a legally significant way, but had a far more threatening purpose.

by Stephen Bilkis

At some point in September, a police officer had an argument with a man with regards to the servicing of the officer’s beeper. The two had a verbal argument inside the man’s store and the man told the officer to leave. According to the man, he did not strike or threaten the officer. Nevertheless, the police officer calls for other authority to come to the store. When uniformed officers arrived at the scene, the police officer told them that she was also a police and she wanted the officers to arrest the man. The uniformed officers therefore complied. At the time of the incident, the police officer was not in uniform and was not working a tour of duty.

After the man was released from jail, he received an electronic page requesting him to call the police officer’s cousin. During the telephone conversation, the police officer’s cousin told the man that the police officer would be willing to drop the assault charge if the man will paid her $5000. After some negotiation, the police officer’s cousin and the man agreed upon $3000 as the price for dropping the charge. Later that day, the man contacted some detectives and enlisted their assistance in the matter.

Subsequently, the man meet-up with the offenders after they discussed the payment and the agreement about the charge. At the scene, the police officer placed a telephone call in which she allegedly spoke with an unidentified person about dropping the charges. The man then gave $3000 to another individual while the police officer was standing nearby during the exchange. The aforementioned transaction was then monitored by the agents. Consequently, the police officer and her colleague were arrested at the scene, immediately following the exchange.

Published on: August 24, 2013

The Court of Appeals has established that common and routine police inquiry remain simple requests for information

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a proceeding wherein the defendant is charged with Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 140.10(e)) and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (Penal Law § 220.03). Defendant moves to suppress drugs found during the arrest and to suppress statements made to the police.

On 18 April 1996, a hearing was held. Police Officer J testified for the People. The defense called no witnesses.

The court finds the officer’s testimony credible.

Published on: August 24, 2013

The Court ruled that deportation is not a direct consequence of conviction,4

by Stephen Bilkis

In November 2004, the defendant was arrested for stealing a 2004 Lexus automobile, valued at more than $50,000, and was subsequently charged with grand larceny in the second degree, a class C felony, and eleven other offenses. Thereafter, the defendant plead guilty to criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, a class D felony, in satisfaction of the indictment, and in exchange for a promised “split sentence” of five months in jail1 and five years probation. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant also waived his right to appeal. Later, the court rendered judgment and sentenced the defendant as promised.

A Kings County Criminal Attorney said that the court issued a “Declaration of Delinquency” against the defendant, based on the “Specifications of Alleged Violation of Probation” (“VOP”), filed by the Department of Probation. Thereafter, the defendant appeared before this court in Part 32, and plead guilty to the VOP, under “Specification #1” thereof, in exchange for a sentence [re-sentence] of one-to-three years in prison, the minimum prison term authorized for criminal possession of stolen property in the 3rd degree. The Supreme Court revoked the defendant’s sentence of probation, and re-sentenced him accordingly.

In papers, the defendant, who is represented by retained counsel on the instant motion, now states that he wishes to withdraw his guilty pleas, both to the VOP and to the underlying crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, and he moves this court to vacate both convictions. Thereafter, the People filed papers opposing the defendant’s motion.

Published on: August 24, 2013

The issue in this case is whether defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction should be granted

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an application by the defendant in the nature of a writ of error, coramnobis, to vacate and set aside a judgment of conviction, dated December 18, 1933, convicting him, upon his own plea of guilty of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to Prison, for a term of thirty to sixty years. This sentence was corrected on January 18, 1938, and the defendant was resentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty years, plus five years for the possession of a gun.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, a hearing, granted on an application for similar relief was held before the a former County Judge of Kings County, and resulted in a denial of the petitioner’s application on February 6, 1951. An appeal from that order was dismissed for no appearance by the appellant, on February 15, 1952.

On consent of the District Attorney, this hearing was granted and by stipulation, the minutes of the hearing held on November 21, 1950, before the Judge were incorporated and made a part of this record. A Kings Robbery Lawyer said that, the defendant testified that on December 1, 1933, he was arraigned before the County Judge of Kings County, on an indictment charging him with the crimes of robbery in the first degree, petit larceny, and assault in the second degree; that he was not represented by counsel; that he had not retained counsel; and that no one advised him of his right to counsel; that he did not know he was entitled to counsel; that he pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree; that on December 12, 1933, a hearing was held to determine whether or not he was armed with a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime, in accordance with the provisions of section 1944 of the Penal Law; that the court determined he was armed within the meaning of said section; that at that proceeding he was neither represented by, nor advised of his right to counsel; that on the 18th of December, 1933, he was arraigned on an information charging him with being a second felony offender and was so adjudged; that he was sentenced to a term in State’s prison of not less than thirty-five and not more than seventy years; that in that proceeding he was not advised of his right to counsel and appeared without one. The sentence was subsequently corrected as above set forth; that at the time of resentence he was without counsel; that he never waived his right to counsel in any of the aforesaid proceedings; that he first became aware of his statutory rights in the early part of 1950, when he immediately commenced coramnobis proceedings.

Published on: August 23, 2013

Reversals are ordered

by Stephen Bilkis

A man filed an appeal from a judgment convicting him of insurance fraud in the first degree, grand larceny in the third degree, offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, bribing a witness, criminal solicitation in the fourth degree, conspiracy in the fifth degree and a violation of judiciary law.

The charges against the man were the conclusion of a lengthy investigation instituted after the committee discovered widespread improprieties with regard to the man’s law practice.

The investigation revealed that the man had a network of individuals who referred automobile accident victims to his law office. In return, the man will give $100 to $200 for each case they referred, depending upon the type of injury. After the man interviewed the clients, he would determine the type of medical treatment the client would allegedly receive so as to meet the threshold for recovery under the law.

Published on: August 23, 2013

Neither the People, nor the Defense, offer any statement from this attorney.

by Stephen Bilkis

In June 2000, Defendant was charged with Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fourth Degree (PL Sec. 221.10), a Class B misdemeanor, and a related charge. The next day, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the above-stated charge and received a sentence of one year of probation. A surcharge in the amount of $120.00 was also imposed.

A Kings County Criminal Possession of Marijuana attorney said that defendant has not appealed her conviction in this matter.

Before addressing the merits of Defendant’s Motion, the Court finds that a formal hearing in this matter is unnecessary. This Court has reviewed the record of the underlying proceedings, as well as the statements of the relevant parties. As such, the Court may be “presumed to be fully familiar with all aspects of the case.'” Therefore, no formal hearing is necessary.

Published on: August 22, 2013

Under the People’s overbroad construction, these Penal Law sections would apply to every loan

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, defendants have been indicted on charges growing out of an alleged scheme to steal from charities serving Brooklyn and from the City of New York. The charges include conspiracy, grand larceny by false pretenses, grand larceny by misappropriation, offering a false instrument for filing, falsifying business records, and issuing a false financial statement.

A King County Grand larceny attorney said that the alleged victims of the larcenies and false documents were several offices and government agencies in New York. At the time of the alleged crimes, the first defendant was the executive director of one of the alleged victim corporation, and the second defendant was the executive director of another alleged victim corporation.

After the defendants moved for discovery, a bill of particulars, and a dismissal of the indictment, the Court on its own motion ordered additional particulars to assist it in ruling on the motions to dismiss and to clarify and simplify the issues if the case goes to trial.

Published on: August 22, 2013

Murder charge is reversed

by Stephen Bilkis

A woman is charged with two counts of petit larceny but she seeks to dismiss the complaint. She asserts that the complaint is facially deficient. But, the complainant filed a response asserting that the charges are sufficiently supported.

The complainant asserts, and the woman does not deny, that the woman was present at the home of the complainant when the incident of stealing happened.

The initial complaint asserts that the complainant left her wallet, containing a debit card, inside her bedroom while the woman was taking care of the complainant’s paralyzed husband and that when the complainant returned home, the Credit card was missing from her wallet.

Published on: August 22, 2013

The Court thus conclude that the counts of the indictment alleging assault in the second degree and menacing in the second degree are not duplicitous, and should be reinstated.

by Stephen Bilkis

One evening, the complainant was working in a grocery store when he became involved in a dispute with his employer, one of the respondents, over the payment of back wages. After all of the customers had left the store, manager instructed another employee, to lock the door. Respondents then allegedly attacked the complainant, beating and kicking him with their hands and feet, and assaulting him with various weapons. According to the complainant, during the course of the assault he was hit in the head with a gun by one of the respondents, another hit him in the face and forehead with a closed knife, and the other hit him in the head and back of the neck with a stick. The complainant lost consciousness and suffered injuries which included a broken facial bone. All four assailants were subsequently arrested and indicted on charges, inter alia, of having acted in concert to commit one count of assault in the second degree by use of a dangerous instrument, and one count of menacing in the second degree.

A Kings County Criminal Lawyer said that after inspecting and reviewing the grand jury minutes, the Supreme Court dismissed the assault and menacing counts of the indictment, concluding that they were duplicitous. Although the court thereafter granted the People’s motion for leave to reargue, it adhered to its determination dismissing the assault and menacing counts. In support of its conclusion that the counts were duplicitous, the court noted that the complainant had testified that three of the four defendants assaulted him with different weapons during the attack, and that each weapon caused discrete physical injuries to different parts of his body. The court also reasoned that the assault count had been submitted to the grand jury “in a manner which did not require 12 or more grand jurors to find that any particular item was the instrumentality which caused the complainant’s physical injury.” During the pendency of the People’s appeal from the order made upon reargument, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, reconsidered the issues raised by the parties’ prior motions, and adhered to the determination made in that order. There was no drug found and Burglary was not involved.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the court’s conclusion that the subject counts are duplicitous, reverse the determination in the order made upon reargument, and reinstate the first and third counts of the indictment. Each count of an indictment may charge only one offense, and a count which charges the commission of a particular offense occurring repeatedly during a designated period of time is duplicitous. The requirement that separate counts of an indictment charge no more than one offense serves to ensure that a defendant is provided with “fair notice of the charges against him so that he can defend himself and establish the defense of double jeopardy if an attempt is made to reprosecute him after acquittal or conviction of those charges”. Prohibiting duplicitous counts also prevents the possibility that individual jurors might vote to convict a defendant of a count on the basis of different offenses, thus permitting a conviction even though no unanimous verdict has been reached.

Published on: August 21, 2013

The evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to support the charges

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant is a New York State Assemblyman and the chairman of the Executive Committee of the County Democratic Party (CDC). According to the evidence before the grand jury, as an Assemblyman he routinely traveled from Brooklyn to Albany and back on New York State Assembly business. At the same time, as chairman of the CDC, he was provided with a car and a credit card by which the CDC paid all of his car-related expenses, including gas, oil and routine maintenance. During the period of time covered by the above-captioned indictment, the defendant submitted vouchers by which he sought and received a mileage allowance for the miles he had driven to and from Albany. It is the theory of the prosecution that by receiving the mileage allowances sought in the vouchers, the criminal defendant stole money from the State of New York by falsely claiming to have incurred the expenses which the allowances were meant to reimburse, and that when he certified on the vouchers that he incurred those expenses and was due a balance that included the mileage allowances, the certification on each voucher constituted a false statement.

Based on evidence, the defendant was indicted by the grand jury and charged with one count of grand larceny in the third degree and 76 counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree. The grand larceny count alleges that pursuant to a common scheme and plan, the defendant stole more than $3,000 from the State of New York by seeking and obtaining reimbursement for travel expenses that the defendant claimed to have incurred in New York and other counties by means of false pretenses in written instruments that the defendant offered for filing. The 76 false filing counts concern those written instruments, 76 travel vouchers (formally called NYS Assembly Member Per Diem Expenses Reimbursement Vouchers), which the counts allege the defendant offered for filing with the intent to defraud the State, knowing that each contained a false statement and false information concerning travel expenses that the defendant purported to incur in New York and other counties.

In an omnibus motion, the defendant seeks inspection of the grand jury minutes and dismissal or reduction of the charges in the indictment, claiming that the evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient and that the grand jury proceedings were defective. The defendant also claims that the indictment itself is defective and that there are jurisdictional and legal impediments to his conviction for the crimes charged. The defendant also moves to dismiss the indictment in the interests of justice. Finally, the defendant moves for an order directing the State to provide him with a bill of particulars and for discovery and inspection. Upon consideration of the papers submitted by both the defendant and the State, and after hearing oral argument from both parties, the court issues that the defendant’s motion for the court to inspect the grand jury minutes is granted; the court has inspected and reviewed the grand jury minutes. The defendant’s motion for disclosure of the grand jury minutes to him has previously been granted to the extent that, with minor redactions, the testimony of two witnesses has been provided to him. The motion to disclose the remainder of the grand jury minutes is denied since that disclosure is unnecessary for the resolution of the defendant’s motions.