New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

Published on: August 23, 2013

Reversals are ordered

by Stephen Bilkis

A man filed an appeal from a judgment convicting him of insurance fraud in the first degree, grand larceny in the third degree, offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, bribing a witness, criminal solicitation in the fourth degree, conspiracy in the fifth degree and a violation of judiciary law.

The charges against the man were the conclusion of a lengthy investigation instituted after the committee discovered widespread improprieties with regard to the man’s law practice.

The investigation revealed that the man had a network of individuals who referred automobile accident victims to his law office. In return, the man will give $100 to $200 for each case they referred, depending upon the type of injury. After the man interviewed the clients, he would determine the type of medical treatment the client would allegedly receive so as to meet the threshold for recovery under the law.

Published on: August 23, 2013

Neither the People, nor the Defense, offer any statement from this attorney.

by Stephen Bilkis

In June 2000, Defendant was charged with Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fourth Degree (PL Sec. 221.10), a Class B misdemeanor, and a related charge. The next day, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the above-stated charge and received a sentence of one year of probation. A surcharge in the amount of $120.00 was also imposed.

A Kings County Criminal Possession of Marijuana attorney said that defendant has not appealed her conviction in this matter.

Before addressing the merits of Defendant’s Motion, the Court finds that a formal hearing in this matter is unnecessary. This Court has reviewed the record of the underlying proceedings, as well as the statements of the relevant parties. As such, the Court may be “presumed to be fully familiar with all aspects of the case.'” Therefore, no formal hearing is necessary.

Published on: August 22, 2013

Under the People’s overbroad construction, these Penal Law sections would apply to every loan

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, defendants have been indicted on charges growing out of an alleged scheme to steal from charities serving Brooklyn and from the City of New York. The charges include conspiracy, grand larceny by false pretenses, grand larceny by misappropriation, offering a false instrument for filing, falsifying business records, and issuing a false financial statement.

A King County Grand larceny attorney said that the alleged victims of the larcenies and false documents were several offices and government agencies in New York. At the time of the alleged crimes, the first defendant was the executive director of one of the alleged victim corporation, and the second defendant was the executive director of another alleged victim corporation.

After the defendants moved for discovery, a bill of particulars, and a dismissal of the indictment, the Court on its own motion ordered additional particulars to assist it in ruling on the motions to dismiss and to clarify and simplify the issues if the case goes to trial.

Published on: August 22, 2013

Murder charge is reversed

by Stephen Bilkis

A woman is charged with two counts of petit larceny but she seeks to dismiss the complaint. She asserts that the complaint is facially deficient. But, the complainant filed a response asserting that the charges are sufficiently supported.

The complainant asserts, and the woman does not deny, that the woman was present at the home of the complainant when the incident of stealing happened.

The initial complaint asserts that the complainant left her wallet, containing a debit card, inside her bedroom while the woman was taking care of the complainant’s paralyzed husband and that when the complainant returned home, the Credit card was missing from her wallet.

Published on: August 22, 2013

The Court thus conclude that the counts of the indictment alleging assault in the second degree and menacing in the second degree are not duplicitous, and should be reinstated.

by Stephen Bilkis

One evening, the complainant was working in a grocery store when he became involved in a dispute with his employer, one of the respondents, over the payment of back wages. After all of the customers had left the store, manager instructed another employee, to lock the door. Respondents then allegedly attacked the complainant, beating and kicking him with their hands and feet, and assaulting him with various weapons. According to the complainant, during the course of the assault he was hit in the head with a gun by one of the respondents, another hit him in the face and forehead with a closed knife, and the other hit him in the head and back of the neck with a stick. The complainant lost consciousness and suffered injuries which included a broken facial bone. All four assailants were subsequently arrested and indicted on charges, inter alia, of having acted in concert to commit one count of assault in the second degree by use of a dangerous instrument, and one count of menacing in the second degree.

A Kings County Criminal Lawyer said that after inspecting and reviewing the grand jury minutes, the Supreme Court dismissed the assault and menacing counts of the indictment, concluding that they were duplicitous. Although the court thereafter granted the People’s motion for leave to reargue, it adhered to its determination dismissing the assault and menacing counts. In support of its conclusion that the counts were duplicitous, the court noted that the complainant had testified that three of the four defendants assaulted him with different weapons during the attack, and that each weapon caused discrete physical injuries to different parts of his body. The court also reasoned that the assault count had been submitted to the grand jury “in a manner which did not require 12 or more grand jurors to find that any particular item was the instrumentality which caused the complainant’s physical injury.” During the pendency of the People’s appeal from the order made upon reargument, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, reconsidered the issues raised by the parties’ prior motions, and adhered to the determination made in that order. There was no drug found and Burglary was not involved.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the court’s conclusion that the subject counts are duplicitous, reverse the determination in the order made upon reargument, and reinstate the first and third counts of the indictment. Each count of an indictment may charge only one offense, and a count which charges the commission of a particular offense occurring repeatedly during a designated period of time is duplicitous. The requirement that separate counts of an indictment charge no more than one offense serves to ensure that a defendant is provided with “fair notice of the charges against him so that he can defend himself and establish the defense of double jeopardy if an attempt is made to reprosecute him after acquittal or conviction of those charges”. Prohibiting duplicitous counts also prevents the possibility that individual jurors might vote to convict a defendant of a count on the basis of different offenses, thus permitting a conviction even though no unanimous verdict has been reached.

Published on: August 21, 2013

The evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to support the charges

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant is a New York State Assemblyman and the chairman of the Executive Committee of the County Democratic Party (CDC). According to the evidence before the grand jury, as an Assemblyman he routinely traveled from Brooklyn to Albany and back on New York State Assembly business. At the same time, as chairman of the CDC, he was provided with a car and a credit card by which the CDC paid all of his car-related expenses, including gas, oil and routine maintenance. During the period of time covered by the above-captioned indictment, the defendant submitted vouchers by which he sought and received a mileage allowance for the miles he had driven to and from Albany. It is the theory of the prosecution that by receiving the mileage allowances sought in the vouchers, the criminal defendant stole money from the State of New York by falsely claiming to have incurred the expenses which the allowances were meant to reimburse, and that when he certified on the vouchers that he incurred those expenses and was due a balance that included the mileage allowances, the certification on each voucher constituted a false statement.

Based on evidence, the defendant was indicted by the grand jury and charged with one count of grand larceny in the third degree and 76 counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree. The grand larceny count alleges that pursuant to a common scheme and plan, the defendant stole more than $3,000 from the State of New York by seeking and obtaining reimbursement for travel expenses that the defendant claimed to have incurred in New York and other counties by means of false pretenses in written instruments that the defendant offered for filing. The 76 false filing counts concern those written instruments, 76 travel vouchers (formally called NYS Assembly Member Per Diem Expenses Reimbursement Vouchers), which the counts allege the defendant offered for filing with the intent to defraud the State, knowing that each contained a false statement and false information concerning travel expenses that the defendant purported to incur in New York and other counties.

In an omnibus motion, the defendant seeks inspection of the grand jury minutes and dismissal or reduction of the charges in the indictment, claiming that the evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient and that the grand jury proceedings were defective. The defendant also claims that the indictment itself is defective and that there are jurisdictional and legal impediments to his conviction for the crimes charged. The defendant also moves to dismiss the indictment in the interests of justice. Finally, the defendant moves for an order directing the State to provide him with a bill of particulars and for discovery and inspection. Upon consideration of the papers submitted by both the defendant and the State, and after hearing oral argument from both parties, the court issues that the defendant’s motion for the court to inspect the grand jury minutes is granted; the court has inspected and reviewed the grand jury minutes. The defendant’s motion for disclosure of the grand jury minutes to him has previously been granted to the extent that, with minor redactions, the testimony of two witnesses has been provided to him. The motion to disclose the remainder of the grand jury minutes is denied since that disclosure is unnecessary for the resolution of the defendant’s motions.

Published on: August 21, 2013

The police recovered three loaded and operable firearms

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a Marijuana Possession case. Respondent is a public housing authority that provides and manages residential units such as the subject residence, the Breukelen Houses, located Brooklyn, New York. Petitioner was a tenant of apartment 3B (the apartment) at the Breukelen Houses. According to the Resident Lease Agreement, Petitioner was the sole lessee for the apartment and only authorized resident listed on her most recent affidavits of income.

A Kings County Criminal attorney said that in September 2005, Respondent charged petitioner with, among other things, non-desirability based on (a) her son’s unlawful possession of marijuana on Respondent’s property and (b) filing false income information with Respondent. The parties chose to settle the charges by signing a stipulation of probation in December 2006. Under terms of the Stipulation, petitioner agreed, inter alia, to subject her tenancy to a five-year probationary period commencing on 2007 and ending on 2012; to permanently exclude her son from residing in or visiting her at the apartment. If Petitioner failed to adhere to the conditions under the Stipulation, Respondent would be entitled to seek to terminate her tenancy for violation of probation.

Although Petitioner’s son was removed from the apartment, Respondent did not remove him from the Resident Lease Agreement, despite her request. In August 2006, petitioner was diagnosed with breast cancer. In March 2007, approximately three months after signing the Stipulation, Petitioner asked her son to return to the apartment and assist her with daily activities, such as moving around the apartment, shopping, and using the bathroom while she was undergoing chemotherapy treatment.

Published on: August 21, 2013

If the complainant acted as a private individual, there could be no suppression.

by Stephen Bilkis

A Kings Drug Possession Lawyer said that, a Spanish-speaking student at Boys’ High School in Brooklyn reported that someone had taken his calendar-type Timex wristwatch. The Dean of the school transmitted this information to the uniformed school service officer who is the complainant herein. All that the complainant had to go by was the report that the perpetrator of the theft wore a corduroy coat with a fur collar. He did see a student (the defendant) wearing a coat of that description. Without saying why, he invited the student into the Dean’s office and asked him to show him his wristwatch. The student did so. It was not the stolen watch.

A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, the complainant testified that when the defendant’s coat was open he observed a slight bulge in a front pocket of his dungarees, with an inch or so of a brown envelope protruding from the top of the pocket. He asked the student to empty his pockets. This he did. There were three brown envelopes. Two of them contained what looked like–and turned out to be–marijuana. One was empty. There were also some pills and a pipe.

The complainant called in a police officer attached to the school, and the defendant was arrested for possession of dangerous drugs. He testified at this hearing that when the complainant stopped him he was wearing a coat that was unlike the one described by the complainant. He said that there were no envelopes showing at the top of his pocket. He charges that the seizure was illegal, and seeks suppression of the marijuana under CPL 710.20. In ruling on the motion, the court accepts the testimony of the security guard with respect to the defendant’s coat and the location of the brown envelope in the defendant’s pocket.

Published on: August 21, 2013

The question presented by the instant motion is whether a defense request for a copy of a search warrant falls within the parameters of this statute.

by Stephen Bilkis

A Kings Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant, charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (Penal Law (PL) § 220.03), Criminally Using Drug Paraphernalia in the Second Degree (PL § 220.50[2]) and Unlawful Possession of Marijuana (PL § 221.05) moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds alleging that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the applicable ninety day statutory period mandated by CPL 30.30(1)(b).

A Kings Drug Possession Lawyer said that, the People concede, in their Affirmation in Opposition, that their announcement of readiness for trial was not made until the ninety-first day after the filing of the accusatory instrument. They assert, nonetheless, that their announcement of readiness was timely for two reasons, namely: (1) that the defendant’s pre-conversion oral request for a copy of the search warrant underlying the defendant’s arrest, is an excludable pre-trial delay as provided in CPL 30.30[4][a] ; and (2), even if the Court would disallow the request for a copy of the search warrant as an excludable pre-trial delay, as the day on which the People would have been required to announce their readiness for trial fell on a Sunday, the General Construction Law permits a timely announcement of readiness on the following business day in the instant case, the ninety-first day which fell on a Monday.

A Kings Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant was arrested on the aforementioned charges on November 8, 1996. The misdemeanor complaint, in relevant part, reads as follows: Deponent is informed by P.O. Brooks that deponent entered the above premises pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Judge on 11/97/96 and observed the defendant standing in a bedroom with a quantity of crack/cocaine possession and a quantity of marijuana possession on top of a dresser in open view.

Published on: August 21, 2013

The 13-year-old appellant was arrested

by Stephen Bilkis

In January 1992, the 13-year-old appellant was arrested. He was charged with acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted grand larceny in the third degree, attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, and criminal mischief in the fourth degree. He was remanded to a secure facility, based upon a history of absconding from Children’s Village, a non-secure setting, several times in the prior several months, and upon his posing a serious risk of not appearing in court on the return date. At a fact-finding hearing, he admitted to having committed acts constituting two counts of criminal mischief in the fourth degree. On that date, his Law Guardian requested that the dispositional hearing be adjourned from Westchester to Brooklyn, as that was the appellant’s last county of residence. That application was joined in by the Westchester County Attorney, and the matter was transferred to Kings County for a dispositional hearing. The fact-finding order was entered thereafter.

A Kings County Criminal lawyer said that the appellant appeared in the Family Court, Kings County, seven days later, and was assigned a new Law Guardian. On that date, the presentment agency asked for continued remand for purposes of conducting a probation investigation and preparing a report, a mental health study, and an exploration of placement, and in order to ascertain the whereabouts of his parents or guardian and his status at Children’s Village. Over the Law Guardian’s objection, the court adjourned the matter for those purposes, and continued the remand because no parent or guardian was present in court, as well as because there was substantial probability that the appellant would not appear on the return date. The matter was adjourned for disposition. Family Court Act § 350.1(1) provides that in cases such as this, the dispositional hearing shall commence 10 days after entry of the fact-finding order. That statutory 10-day period expired on February 7, 1992.

On February 6, the Law Guardian moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to Family Court Act § 350.1. That motion was denied on February 10. At that time, the court noted that it had received a probation and mental health report, but that the probation department required an adjournment in order to complete the exploration of placement alternatives. The court granted the adjournment, finding special circumstances, and adjourned the case to February 19, 1992.