New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

An accused man was questioned at length by his attorney to establish that he no longer used heroin and was involved in a methadone program. His direct testimony was interlaced with differing references to his having been off heroin for at least one month, 6 weeks and two months, the clear implication being that he had no need for heroin possession or intent to distribute and sell it. He testified that he was en route from his home to his methadone clinic and, in doing so, took a most circuitous route, passing along 112th Street, which he knew was a shooting gallery. His attorney again presented the issue of his route by asking several questions as to the indirect route taken, which was never satisfactorily explained except that the accused man stated he sought to avoid encountering members of a motorcycle club whose location he never defined in relation to the path he took or the one he avoided.

On cross-examination of the accused man, the prosecutor explored the very areas which had been inquired into on direct and, for the most part, the extent of the cross-examination resulted from the vague, imprecise and inconsistent responses by the accused man. Thus, when questioned as to whether he had in fact stopped using heroin before joining the methadone program, he responded that he was trying to stop then. It was followed with the response that he wasn’t using it at that time. While, on direct examination, he claimed to have been off heroin for varying periods of time, on cross-examination he admitted he was not totally straight at the time of his arrest but was working on it. Although the dissent finds fault in the questions pertaining to the methadone program, it was the accused man who first injected the issue when he endeavored to show that he was off heroin and, accordingly, had no need to shoot up. Under the circumstances, inasmuch as the issues were explored extensively by the accused man on his direct examination, it would be unfair and unbalanced to preclude the prosecution from legitimate cross-examination. Contrary to the view expressed by the dissent, Mental Hygiene Law was intended to apply as a shield, not as a sword and, based on record, does not operate to preclude questions on the very subject introduced by the accused.

On this record, the court finds that there was no denial of the accused man’s right to a fair trial. In view of the extent of the accused man’s direct examination, it would be palpably unfair and unreasonable to limit the prosecution on the very significant issues raised to establish the defense that defendant was off the habit. The accused man opened the door by admitting that although he had been addicted to heroin since he was 19 years of age and had used drugs for twenty-years but he discontinued such use since he attended the methadone program months prior to his arrest. It is obvious that his defense was keyed to the fact that he had no need to deal in or get involved in a case of heroin possession since the financial demands of the habit had been eliminated by his being a part of the methadone program and that his being by coincidence on 112th Street, the shooting gallery, was to avoid some unsavory characters whose location he was unable to pinpoint. Moreover, the proof of guilt was overwhelming, the accused man, having been found with heroin possession of 24 glassine envelopes after being observed for a period of time by an officer who had monitored his actions by use of power binoculars from a second story window. Under the circumstances, considering all of the evidence, the unquestioned overwhelming proof of guilt and the absence of any objection to preserve the issue for review on appeal, at most there was harmless error.

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This action concerns a young woman who at an early age became addicted to drugs. In 2005 when she was 18, she became a patient of the accused orthopedist and employee of orthopedic rehabilitation center for treatment of lower back pain and, a month later, for left ankle pain. From May 2005 through January 2007, the orthopedist prescribed large amounts of Vicodin and Methadone for the complainant woman’s pain. It is claimed that the multiple prescriptions by the orthopedist were improper, illegal and negligent and caused both physical and mental injury to the woman separate and apart from her earlier and continued addictions to illegal drugs such as heroin and cocaine and illegally obtained drugs such as Oxycodone.

Before, the Court is a motion for summary judgment by the accused parties. It is supported by an affirmation from a Board Certified Orthopedist. He first reviews the allegations made by the woman against the orthopedist. They include negligently and unjustifiably prescribing opiates to the woman and, by doing so, aiding her drug habit and causing her addiction to these opiates, improperly prescribing Methadone without a proper license, and failing to refer the woman to a pain management specialist.

The Board Certified Orthopedist states, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty after reviewing all the relevant medical records and deposition transcripts, that the orthopedist committed no departure from good and accepted medical standards in his treatment of the woman, which was appropriate in every respect. He adds that as a licensed physician he was authorized to treat the woman and prescribe narcotic medications as he did without any negligence or medical malpractice.

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A Georgia Intent to Distribute Lawyer said that, the defendant appeals his conviction after trial to a jury for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846, and to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1). This court recently affirmed an earlier conviction of defendant for conspiracy to possess and to distribute heroin. On the present appeal a Georgia Heroin Lawyer said that defendant contends that the government arbitrarily has carved a single conspiracy to deal in narcotics into separate heroin and cocaine conspiracies in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.

A Heroin Lawyer said that, the government’s proof in the heroin conspiracy trial established that defendants arranged sales of heroin for their cocaine customer a Detective, who unknown to them was an undercover DEA Agent. Co-defendant, who pled guilty, and the Detective testified against defendant in both trials. The government presented to the jury portions of defendant’s own testimony from the heroin conspiracy trial in the trial on the cocaine conspiracy charge. During July 1976, conspiratorial negotiations involving cocaine and heroin went on simultaneously. The major events proven in defendant’s trial on the heroin conspiracy charge which we discussed in our earlier opinion affirming that conviction, were also central to the government’s proof against defendant’s in the trial on the cocaine conspiracy charge.

The issue in this case is whether defendant’s claim for double jeopardy should be granted.

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The defendant has been convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree (Penal Law, § 220.43) for allegedly selling a pound and a half of heroin to two undercover police officers in Manhattan. At the trial the defendant denied selling the drugs and testified instead that he had simply acted as the agent of the buyers, by locating a seller and helping the officers complete the purchase.

On this appeal the defendant claims that the trial court erred in charging the jury that he could only be considered an agent of the buyers if he acted “purely gratuitously” and that if he received “any benefit, however slight, from having participated in the transaction, he would not be an agent (of the buyers), but a seller.” The prosecutor takes the position that the defendant was not prejudiced by the charge because the evidence, particularly the defendant’s own admissions at the trial, conclusively shows that he was not acting solely as an agent of the buyers. The People also urge that the so-called “agency defense” has been interpreted too broadly by the Appellate Divisions and should either be abandoned or applied only to a narrow class of cases.

The indictment charging the defendant with selling heroin to two undercover police officers on May 30, 1974 was the result of a joint State and Federal narcotics investigation which had begun in January of that year.

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The complainant is a college student living in Long Island and working part-time as a bartender, telephoned one man in Florida with the hope of using $50,000 in his possession to become involved in the sale of drugs. Although negotiations were carried on through at least two telephone conversations and the student’s two trips to Florida in order to meet the man, the student asserted at his examination before trial that no deal was consummated. The reason, it is claimed, is that the student was too scared.

Days later, the student and two passengers in his car were arrested in Brooklyn and charged with heroin possession and reckless endangerment. The arrest was made only after a chase by an unmarked police car. The student claims that the officers did not identify themselves as police and he was unaware who they were until a red flasher was placed atop the unmarked vehicle and the student’s car was blocked by a marked patrol car. He claims to have fled (at thirty miles per hour) because he had his money in the trunk of the car and feared that the men in the unmarked car were going to rob him. The arresting officer, however, states that he identified himself as a police officer and ordered the student to stop his car, after which the student fled. The pursuit says the officer was of a speeding Porsche through several red lights.

As the Porsche came to a stop, thirteen glassine envelopes, later found to contain heroin, were thrown from its passenger window. The search of the vehicle revealed a trunk containing, among other things, $64,580 in cash.

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This involves a case where the court ruled that the indictment against the defendant be reinstated.

During 1981 police officers conducted a large-scale investigation into the distribution of narcotics in New York, Queens and Bronx counties. The criminal investigation, which included a number of drug purchases by an undercover officer and involved the extensive use of electronic eavesdropping and surveillance, led to seven indictments charging the 12 subjects of the investigation, among them defendant, with conspiracies to sell narcotics, and with the sale and possession of heroin and cocaine. The charges against defendant were based on his alleged participation in heroin sales to the undercover officer on June 26, August 19, and September 11, 1981, and an attempted heroin sale on September 24, 1981. As a result defendant were charged in one of the indictments with one count of conspiracy in the second degree for their activities from May 28, 1981 to September 22, 1981. They were also charged with two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree and four counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree for the August 19 and September 11 sales.

Trial Term dismissed the indictment against defendant, finding that that evidence was insufficient as to him to make out a prima facie case for either the sales or the conspiracy.

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